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Abstract
Since around 2000, China has been experiencing a major shift in its industrial bases. Many cities
have been relocating polluting and energy-intensive plants from urban areas to the less-
developed periphery. In the summer of 2005, when I started to pay attention to industrial
relocation cases in China, I found that the issue of urban land contamination was not of much
concern to either the general public or the government, not even Chinese environmental scholars.
I found little evidence that, among relocation projects, former industrial land was properly
monitored and treated before construction. Although problems with polluted land have been
widely studied in developed countries, this field has remained virtually untouched in China until
recently. These industrial sites, usually polluted, are considered brownfields.
Without a comprehensive brownfield redevelopment regulatory system in China, I have also
observed inconsistence in local environmental activities in dealing with potentially contaminated
land. I answer the following four questions: (1) Given the absence of a strong
national/provincial brownfield legislative system, why are some brownfields remediated while
some are not?; (2) How can the interactions among polluting factories, profit-driven developers,
and public agencies affect the outcome of various stages in the land-recycling process? (3) What
are the sources of variation in land recycling projects even within the same city? and (4) What
institutional arrangement is favorable to pollution remediation?
My argument is that, rather than solely relying on reform from the top, local governments have
the ability to ensure a sustainable and healthy industrial land redevelopment. Through three case
studies of relocation projects (the Capital Iron and Steel Plant, the Beijing Coke Plant and the
Beijing Chemical Plant), I find some institutional changes which were not designed initially for
brownfields are conducive to more effective and efficient management of land contamination.
These changes, such as the introduction of the Land Consolidation and Reserve Center and the
auction system, have promoted a transparent decision-making process, increased involvement of
civil society, and effective inter-agency communication, all of which reinforced my hypothesis
that a relatively balanced participation in decision making among stakeholders involved in land-
recycling projects leads to sustainable land recycling.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The Love Canal neighborhood in the United States used to be a solid, working-class community
in New York's Buffalo-Niagara region, formed during the late 1950s. Sadly, the three-block
community was built on an industrial chemical dumpsite without proper remediation. It was not
until the 1980s, 30 years later, that over 200 families were moved out of the area because of the
presence of many underground pollutants, and serious health problems, such as birth defects and
miscarriages, were found among residents (Beck 1979). The Love Canal crisis is not an isolated
event. History may be repeated in the People's Republic of China (China) if no precautions are
taken to prevent it. Since around 2000, cities in China have been experiencing a major shift in
their industrial bases-many have been relocating polluting and energy-intensive plants from
urban areas to less-developed peripheries. In Beijing alone, between 2000 and 2005, a total of
144 traditional manufacturing plants were moved outside the urban area (Interview 20070101).
These include a large portion of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that are engaged in heavy
manufacturing activities, such as coke making, iron and steel making, and chemical production.
Although this government-led movement helps reduce air, water, and noise pollution in the
urban areas, the officials and the public seem unaware of land contamination on the converted
industrial sites. During my early field trips to China, I found that former industrial sites, usually
polluted, were typically very quickly converted to residential or commercial uses without
appropriate remediation. In contrast, in the United States the cleanup period of comparable
industrial sites takes far longer, partially because of the relatively well-established US
brownfield development regulations (Bartsch 2002; McGrath 2000).
Insufficient remediation of polluted sites can dramatically increase the risk of human
exposure to toxic substances. In the long-term, it can cause serious social and economic
disruptions, such as community-wide health problems, local economic depression, and
prohibitive cleanup costs, all of which will jeopardize the sustainability of a living environment.
Planners should consider those industrial sites, likely polluted, to be unsuitable for at least some
types of development, especially residential and certain sensitive commercial purposes, without
appropriate remediation. In the United States, redeveloping these contaminated or potentially
contaminated sites is called "brownfield redevelopment" (EPA website). In my research, I call it
"land recycling," a term proposed by our Multiregional Planning land-recycling team. Land
recycling, beyond cleaning up polluted land as its ultimate goal, integrates public health,
environmental quality, economic development, housing, transportation planning, and protection
of property rights in the redevelopment process. Therefore, it is an interdisciplinary subject,
involving environmental policies, land-use planning, and economic development.
At present (February 2011), except for several regulations on soil quality standards,
which mainly target cultivated land, China has few national-level soil cleanup standards for
urban land assessment. Fortunately, my preliminary interviews with officials from various
governmental agencies, such as the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the then-Chinese State
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC), indicate that the national government has realized the imperative of
imposing land-cleanup regulations to prevent the misuse of contaminated land. We expect that,
before long, the national and provincial governments will establish national and/or regional laws,
regulations, and cleanup standards for polluted land in urban areas, as well as policy incentives
for cleanup projects to ensure environmentally friendly and sustainable economic development.
1.1 Research Question and Design
According to the Beijing government's strategic plan, each year between 1999 and 2004, 20-30
polluting enterprises would move their production bases out of the fourth ring road. These
factories would reside in designated industrial clusters in the suburbs of Beijing. On these
vacated sites, high-rise apartments, office buildings, and commercial complexes were erected
overnight. The uses of these former industrial sites have varied widely. In 1998, an air
conditioning manufacturing plant bordering the second ring road' was planned for a high-rise
apartment complex; in 2001, a former paper mill site was designed for Moma City, a high-end
apartment complex; and in 2002, a combined five-plant site next to the Central Business District
would be transformed into Fuli City, a commercial-residential complex. Real estate companies
have competed for the development rights to these former industrial sites; local newspapers have
reported the staggering growth of land prices; and real estate advertising has broadcast the
upcoming desirable facilities and services of the neighborhood. In the past, none of them
seemed to care about whether the land was contaminated. It is true that before mid-2000, in
Beijing, most urban industrial sites did not go through a formal assessment procedure before
redevelopment. This is not surprising because contaminated land, especially in urban areas, had
not been of concern to the Chinese society, and few people were aware of the potential health
impact of land contamination. This situation changed around 2005. As of today, in 2011,
Beijing is one of the few Chinese cities that has taken action to manage brownfields. This
research is intended to investigate why and in what way the situation has been changed.
Despite the lack of a comprehensive brownfield redevelopment regulatory system, I have
observed inconsistency in local environmental activities in dealing with potentially contaminated
1 Beijing adopts a ring-road system. The second ring road is the outer boundary of the city's urban core area. See
Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3.
land. For example, at the municipal level, Tianjin, Shenyang, and Shanghai have enacted city-
level, soil-assessment standards for industrial land. Under these locally-designed policies,
industrial sites in those cities are supposed to be carefully assessed, and polluted land is subject
to remediation before any new development happens on it. At the project level, the Shenyang
metallurgical plant in Liaoning Province has become a showcase for land redevelopment (LIU
Changjie 2006), and the Capital Iron and Steel (Shougang) Plant in Beijing, which just finished
moving in 2010, has received careful environmental examination (FANG Wanli 2007). Even in
the same city, I observed differences among relocation projects: some properties have achieved
significant accomplishments in terms of environmental protection, while some have not. Why
was land contamination of some projects managed in a positive proactive fashion? What
explains these variant environmental activities among urban industrial land redevelopment
projects? What are the environment and land-policy implications for future relocation projects?
Briefly speaking, in terms of environmental protection, China adopts a command-and-
control mechanism, in which the central/provincial government sets up rules, and local
municipalities or lower government units carry out the rules. In contrast, the management of
land falls largely under the control of municipalities. Therefore, the case-specific difference can
be explained by the implementation of environmental rules, compliance with land-transaction
rules, and the actual property-rights arrangement, under the assumption that plant-relocation
projects are regulated under a similar central and provincial regulatory framework.
I argue that rather than solely relying on reform from the top, local governments have the
capability to ensure a sustainable and healthy industrial land redevelopment. On the basis of an
analysis of Beijing, a review of relevant policy and planning document, interviews with key
stakeholders, and case studies of relocation projects, I examine the redevelopment of former
industrial land from the late 1990s through the 2000s in China. The questions that guide my
research are: How has brownfield redevelopment evolved in Beijing over the past decade? What
factors have contributed to the pattern of development? Can any conclusions be drawn from the
Beijing case?
The goal of my research is to understand the social, economic, and political relations
among different stakeholders through the course of land recycling, starting from plant-relocation
decision making, to site preparation and design, and to building construction. Stakeholders refer
to entities that have perceived or conceivable interests in a policy or project, in the forms of
individuals, government agencies, organizations, or groups of individuals (Freeman 1984). In
land recycling, I define the stakeholders broadly as those who directly and indirectly affect and
are affected by the process. More specifically, they consist of, but are not limited to, local
planning departments, environmental bureaus, land bureaus, industrial enterprises, real estate
companies, research institutes, and other local public or quasi-public agencies. The constellation
of stakeholders varies from case to case.
For China, I answer the following four questions: (1) Given the absence of a strong
national/provincial brownfield legislative system, why are some brownfields remediated while
some are not?; (2) How can the interactions among polluting factories, profit-driven developers,
and public agencies affect the outcome of various stages in the land-recycling process? (3) What
are the sources of variation in land recycling projects even within the same city? and (4) What
institutional arrangement is favorable to pollution remediation? To answer these questions, I
examine who the principal actors are in the redevelopment process, their preferences and power
resources, and the way their choices and interactions are shaped by formal institutions.
I hypothesize that a relatively balanced participation in decision making among
stakeholders who are involved in land-recycling projects leads to sustainable land recycling. A
balanced participation means that each key shareholder has the right and the ability to disagree or
disrupt the project progress in various ways from the project design through the completion of
the construction. If an industrial site is assessed prior to new development, and a cleanup
procedure is planned or undertaken to prevent future environmental problems, I contend that the
land-recycling is sustainable. To prove this hypothesis, I need to determine how these
stakeholders have been influencing the land-recycling procedure in the context of current
political and economic structure. I test my hypothesis through comparative project-level case
studies, which I explain later.
1.2 Methodology
As Economy (2006) noted, China is transforming from purely state-led environmental
governance to more interactive market mechanisms. Under these interactive market mechanisms,
environmental governance relies not only on a command-control hierarchical system, but also on
market-based policy instruments, a high degree of responsibility for private actors, strong
involvement of citizen consumers, privatized and independent evaluation approaches, and
economic-financing techniques. These mechanisms will ensure good practices of local
governments in dealing with environmental issues. The dominant method of studying
brownfield issues is to trace the transition of industries and the redevelopment process of
contaminated sites. My research builds on the case-study method. By conducting project-level
case studies, I present how economic and political actors interact in the land-recycling process.
On the basis that the United States has developed a fairly comprehensive brownfields
redevelopment system, I evaluate the current institutional arrangements and suggest possible
areas for improvement in order for China to reach the US standard.
The universe for my research subject is industrial sites in China that have been
redeveloped or are in the process of redevelopment. In China, municipal governments play a
central role in implementing environmental policies, setting local development priorities, and
overseeing the disbursement of land and other city-owned resources (Sinkule and Ortolano
1995). In practice, environmental responsibilities, especially in connection with land and State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs), become even harder to assign due to the complex nature of property
(including the SOE's land and capital assets) rights in China.
I select projects in terms of enterprises' production activities, responsibilities of major
participating governmental units, real property rights-especially land use and benefit rights-of
project sites, and the financial arrangement of relocation-induced expenses. The cases should
satisfy the following three criteria: (1) they are located in the cities that have initiated a plant-
relocation plan; (2) the land coverage is relatively large; and (3) the project has been recently
(last five years) implemented. I select three projects in Beijing: the Capital Iron and Steel Plant
in Shijingshan District, the Beijing Chemical Plant in Chaoyang District, and the Beijing Coke
Plant in Fatou area.
I conduct in-depth case studies of these three former industrial sites, collecting
environmental, social and economic data and analyzing the management process in each case.
My analyses are based on an extensive English and Chinese literature survey, news articles,
unpublished governmental reports, historical data, and personal interviews. My interviewees
mainly come from four categories: (1) officials in local land bureaus or planning departments, to
learn the scope of relocation projects and the citywide land-use pattern; (2) officials in local
environmental bureaus to understand their responsibility in environmental management; (3)
officials from other relevant governmental agencies; and (4) managers in enterprises to explore
project-specific information. Each interview lasts 1-2 hours, with a series of structured and
open-ended questions. Considering the sensitivity of the issue, I identify interviewees by their
last names and affiliations at the time of the initial interview. I code each interview based on the
date of the interview with first four digits indicating the year, the following two digits indicating
the month, and the last two indicating the order of the interview cited in the text.
1.3 Literature Review
A brief review of US brownfield management history shows that governmental intervention in
brownfield redevelopment strategies experiences three stages, in each of which local economies
under restructuring are affected differently (Table 1.1). The US historical experience since the
1970s sheds light on the question of how brownfield policy and management might be developed
and improved. In the first stage, there exist few environmental laws and standards that regulate
the conversion of industrial land into urban-settlement uses. Land is usually reused without
proper remediation, which often leads to serious health problems for residents of the site, such as
those who lived in the Buffalo-Niagara region and were affected by the Love Canal pollution
(Gibbs 1998). In the second stage, the government imposes stringent environmental regulations
to constrain the misuse of contaminated land because of increasing public awareness of health
issues. As a result, large tracts of polluted land in urban areas are usually underutilized or even
abandoned, which often leads to serious urban economic depression. In the last stage, in order to
solve the dilemma of the misuse of polluted land in the absence of sufficient regulations versus
the abandonment of contaminated land with the existence of forceful regulations, the government
offers provides a rigorous yet flexible set of remediation regulations supplemented by
appropriate financial incentives. In addition to those federal efforts, since 1990, states and cities
have actively launched brownfield programs, which provide technical assistance and grants to
assist brownfield projects moving forward (Day and Johnson 2004).
Table 1.1: Timeline of US Federal Brownfield-Related Legislation
1970 Clean air act passed
Outbreak of 1972 Federal water pollution control act passed
Stage 1 environmental 1974 Safe drinking water act passed1976 Resource conservation and recovery act (RCRA) passed
Toxic substances control act passed
1978 Love canal showcases toxic waste threat
1980 Ronald Reagan elected president
Stage 2 Stringent Comprehensive environmental responses, compensation and liability 
act
regulation (CERCLA) passed (Superfund)
1986 Superftnd amendments and reauthorization act passed
1993 EPA creates Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative
Flexible 1995 EPA develops Brownfield Action Program to shift sites from the Superftmd's
liability inventory to state brownfields tracking systems and to promote voluntary
Stage 3 regulation and approaches among the states.
financial 2002 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act passed to
incentives loosen the environmental cleanup liabilities of land owners for contamination
they did not cause.
Source: 1970-1995 from Day and Johnson (2004: 243); 2002 author's addition.
Over time, the United States has designated a legal process for brownfield
redevelopment. The implementation of the regulations on site assessment and site cleanup are
ensured by several factors. First, the liability legislation minimizes the possibility of land being
misused without proper remediation (Alberini et al. 2005) and the financial incentives ensure an
active involvement of the private sector. Second, environmental assessment is required for every
site to be transferred or redeveloped, and the assessment report enters an official record (Hess-
Kosa 2008). Thus, there is little space for a former or future property owner to manipulate the
real condition of the property to avoid certain obligations. Lastly and most importantly, US
brownfield programs generally have public-participation requirements, such as public hearing
and meetings, which promote interactions between citizens, public officials and developers.
Property historical data are properly recorded and readily accessible to the public (Felten 2006).
Thus, the public-participation requirements give the community a certain power to influence the
decision-making.
China's environmental protection progress will probably follow a similar trajectory to
that in the United States. Indeed, China is at an early stage in the formation of a brownfield
regulatory system. Chinese environmental scholars and policymakers (e.g., GAO Xiaoli et al.
2009; WANG Kuiting 2008) place significant emphasis on the lack of regulations, urging the
government to enact laws like the Superfund 2. They expect that such a regulation would
preclude any irresponsible action of land developers. However, from the US experience, what
we may see is an increase in land-redevelopment costs, both monetary and non-monetary,
potential developers being scared away from industrial sites, and under-use of urban land. As a
result, local economic growth slows down, the local tax base shrinks, and the unemployment rate
goes up. All of these explain why municipalities are reluctant to take a proactive role in enacting
environmental regulations (Shi and Zhang 2006). The three-stage evolution shown in Table 1.1
implies that currently an optimal option for China is to shorten Stages One and Two and leapfrog
to Stage Three. Land pollution, unlike other types of pollution, has an extraordinarily long latent
period, usually 10-20 years. If policymakers do not take action at the time when polluted land is
being converted into alternative uses, they are creating a time bomb that will disrupt the social
and economic order later. Meanwhile, market-based incentives are necessary to encourage
"voluntary" local involvement in safeguarding environmental protection.
2 The Superfund is the first brownfield legislation of the United States. See Chapter 2 for more details.
Let us assume that soon the government will promulgate brownfield laws, which stipulate
cleanup liabilities, assessment procedure, land-use standards, and financial support mechanisms.
But the implementation of them still faces the same problems as do other environmental laws.
The contemporary Chinese environmental management system has been subject to criticism due
to its ineffectiveness in controlling environmental deterioration as a result of rapid economic
growth. As the central government makes continuous efforts by promulgating new regulations,
local practices often diverge into unexpected outcomes, especially in the context of decentralized
regulatory responsibilities.
One group of analysts (Jahiel 1998; Lo and Tang 2006) attribute the divergence to the
weak enforcement power of environmental protection authorities originated from the political
structure of the environmental apparatus. Although each level (province, municipality, and
county) of government has its environmental bureaus in charge of environmental protection,
Jahiel (1998) indicates that these local environmental agencies do not have sufficient authority to
enforce national environmental laws, standards, and policies. The main reason is that local
environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) are under the direct leadership of local governments,
which often prioritize economic growth at the expense of environmental pollution. Lo and Tang
(2006) note that this situation improved after the adoption of the leadership-responsibility system,
under which the political performance of heads of local governments are directly linked to their
achievement in controlling environmental quality within their jurisdictions. City leaders thus
have a strong commitment to environmental protection and willingly support EPBs' advice. In
addition, the leadership-responsibility system facilitates cooperation between EPBs and other
municipal units in law enforcement. However, they also indicate that the leadership-
responsibility system does not guarantee independent practice of local EPBs.
Another group of analysts (e.g., Mol and Carter 2006; Martens 2006) point out the weak
voice of civil groups as the key problem. Harrison (1995) and Wernstedt and Hersh (2006)
suggest a cooperative approach, which requires heavy public involvement in the decision making
process. They argue that incorporating public opinions is crucial to establish and implement a
fair and effective environmental protection regime. The public, including individual citizens,
industry, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), should be enabled and encouraged to
participate in the environmental protection process. In current China, legal specifications on
environmental information disclosure and public involvement are still limited, though there has
been improvement in this regard. According to a World Bank report (Wang et al. 2002a),
environmental NGOs have started to emerge, public awareness of environmental issues has
increased, and the mass media has become keen on reporting environmental incidents. These
changes are putting increasing pressure on the local government. However, the influence of
these social actors, such as NGOs, communities, and the mass media, in environmental society is
rather limited for different reasons.
In a recent study on public participation, Martens (2006) discusses the limitations of the
three forms of public actors. NGOs in China, different from those in the Western countries, are
more or less dominated by the government, because they have to abide by strict rules set up by
the government. For citizen consumers, their involvement in environmental issues is complaint
and protest, which are poor forms of participation (Mol and Carter 2006). If not taken seriously
by the government, their efforts are negligible. The most effective way to extend the influence is
to secure media's support. The media, however, as Martens (2006) points out, does not have full
freedom of speech and remains cautious about taking serious political risks. Despite all these
limitations, the degree of public participation in the problem of land pollution is likely to be even
minimal because people's action is largely dependent on the perception of environmental threats
while the impact of land pollution tends to be latent for many years (10-20 years).
1.4 Analytical Framework - the State, the Market, and Civil Society
In environmental governance literature, three actors are often analyzed - state, market and civil
society (Shuwen 2004; Yang 2005). When analysts talk about land-redevelopment projects, they
attempt to examine how policies or decisions are made in the state arena. They stress the central
role of the government while overlooking its interactions with other social actors. In the past,
governance was exclusively associated with the role of the state, i.e., the government. This
narrow definition of governance has been broadened to emphasize the interactions among the
government, the private sector and civil society. A UNEP (2009) report suggests that effective
environmental governance requires cooperation among all actors who impact the environment,
from governments to the private sector and civil society.
In addition, we need to acknowledge that the government is not a unitary actor. It
consists of different functional department units having distinct responsibilities. Project
decision-maker group refers to a multi-player system, which includes public agencies such as
municipal authorities, planning departments and environmental protection bureaus. They operate
independently on the basis of the scope of their responsibilities and interdependently for the
benefit of public welfare. The key is to understand this inter-agency relationship.
This inter-agency relationship is best described by Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), who
argue that Chinese policy is made in a system of negotiation, bargaining, and the seeking of
consensus among affected actors. Although published in 1988, this book is still relevant today in
many circumstances. Borrowing their words, land recycling is carried out "by the formal
structure of authority, by the networks of individuals bound by mutual obligations and loyalties
who are embedded in the formal organizations, and by the total web of bargains among hundreds
of thousands of units which comprise the system (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: 32)."
As numerous industrial sites in cities are being converted into more profitable uses, the
land market is facing the challenges of incorporating land contamination into redevelopment
consideration. In other words, when rules of law related to land contamination have not been
firmly established, negotiation, bargaining and seeking consensus among actors - public, private,
and civil - are common in decision making regarding how a site should be redeveloped. My
analytical framework is a triangular relational diagram among three actor groups - the
government, the private sector and civil society (Figure 1.1). Within each group, I selectively
list some major actors relevant to my research, which I call stakeholders. Note that this labeling
of stakeholders is not absolute. Due to institutional changes over time, some may shift from one
category to the other, and some may stand between two categories.
The institutional arrangement is important for understanding the land redevelopment and
the environmental decision-making mechanism. Land redevelopment projects typically involve
three groups of interests, namely development, regulatory, and the public (Figure 1.1). Each
group consists of multiple actors. Those in the development interest group are at the center of
the brownfield redevelopment process. In this process, the behavior of these players is regulated
by the regulatory body; and their decision as to how to treat former industrial land is likely to be
affected by public opinion. I conduct a stakeholder analysis, understanding stakeholders'
interests, their capacity to intervene in the progress of redevelopment project, and how they
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Figure 1.1: Triangular Relation among Three Actors
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation is structured as follows. Juxtaposing current deindustrialization in China and
past deindustrialization in the United States, Chapter Two provides an overview of the evolution
of US brownfield regulation. My purpose is to present lessons and good experiences that the
United States has had along its way to developing today's well-designed system. After
recognizing that brownfields are an outcome of deindustrialization, I demonstrate in Chapter
Three that former industrial sites in China, likely contaminated, have had a completely opposite
fate to those in the United States. They are redeveloped quickly by private developers. In this
chapter, I elaborate the reasons these sites are attractive to developers and the potential problems
of the hasty development of industrial land. The solution to avoid future environmental incidents
caused by contaminated land is government intervention in the private sector-driven land
recycling process. In Chapter Four, I step away from land issues and move to environmental
management in general. Because brownfields are a new subject, a review of the critiques of
China's current environmental protection system sheds light on the effectiveness of upcoming
brownfield policies. In this chapter, I argue that simply enacting brownfield regulations is not
sufficient to generate good land recycling practices. What deters air and water pollution
mitigation may also apply to land. In Chapter Five, I take a close look at the entire land
recycling process, divide it into three stages, each with several steps, and identify stakeholders in
each step. This detailed listing helps me analyze key actors in a stakeholder analytical
framework, through which I evaluate the changing nature of stakeholders' positions in response
to brownfield policies. In order to elaborate the variances among land-recycling projects, I
reserve Chapter Six for case studies. These cases represent three land redevelopment models,
showing the interactions among government agencies, private developers, and the public. I
conclude in Chapter Seven by recapitulating the progress Beijing has made to achieve
sustainable land recycling.
Chapter 2: Deindustrialization and Brownfields in the United States
Deindustrialization by definition means a process of "a widespread, systematic disinvestment in
basic productive capacity" in a region (Bluestone and Harrison 1982: 6). It is a phenomenon in
which industrial activities in a nation or area, especially those involved in manufacturing
production, are removed or decline significantly. This process has occurred in regions in the
United States at different time periods and has been accompanied by many problems. To
demonstrate, take the case of the Great Lakes region. It used to be the US industrial heartland,
producing largely metals, machinery, and consumer durables. After deindustrialization occurred
in the region, prosperity came to an end, and most of the area has never recovered. Plant
shutdowns, accompanied by job losses for several years straight, led to a vast volume of
abandoned or underutilized land. Health problems caused by the misuse of brownfields started
to emerge notably in the late 1970s (Jenkins et al. 2009). Brownfield problems thus became
another problem that deindustrialization brought to the former host communities. Residents
exposed to risks were not protected by laws or regulations until the Reagan administration passed
the Comprehensive Environmental Responses, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in
1980, widely known as the Superfund. Over the past three decades, a complex regulatory system
for brownfields has been developed in the United States.
In this chapter, I review the causes and consequences of US deindustrialization
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and the emergence of brownfield legislation during this
deindustrialization process. I then focus on why and how the brownfield redevelopment system
evolved as a result of mitigating the destructive impacts of deindustrialization, in particular, in
terms of the development of the environmental responsibility designation, the land-
redevelopment process, and roles of stakeholders. The contents of this chapter constitute the
basis of my analytical framework for presenting the Chinese brownfield issue. Given that
China's urban industrial transition differs from that of the United States, I suspect that China is
unlikely to follow a similar trajectory. By reviewing the US developmental stages in relation to
brownfields, I expect that China can take advantage of the US's successful experience and at the
same time avoid mistakes the country has made.
A Case of Deindustrialization
Homestead, Pennsylvania is located to the southeast of Pittsburgh, an industrial heartland of steel
production (Figure 2.1). The Homestead Works (the Works) used to be the pride of America's
steelmaking history. Established in 1879, it completely shut down in July 1986. During its peak
in World War II, the plant employed 20,000 workers on the 550-acre (around 2.2 square
kilometers) riverside tract. Located near the Works were the dwellings of workers and families
living in the mill town within walking distance of the work site. In the 1960s, due to reduced
demand for steel products, US Steel, the then-owner of the Homestead Works and the nation's
largest steel producer, started to cut back production. Over the 1970s and 1980s, plant closings
were numerous and proliferated in industrial areas. Homestead was no exception. Plants were
closed section by section: in 1983 Homestead's open-hearth furnace shop was permanently
closed; afterwards, within three years, US Steel closed the rest of Homestead's mills; buildings
were left empty. In 1988, the Park Corporation, a Cleveland-based private company, bought the
site from US Steel and tore down most of the buildings and structures. Then the site lay idle for
nearly a decade (Various issues, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette). Although the biggest parcel of the
site has been transformed into a shopping center, filled with department stores, restaurants,
offices, and apartments, its historical past still overshadows the town of Homestead. Homestead
is just one portrayal of many towns that have experienced deindustrialization.
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Figure 2.1: Location of Homestead
2.1 Cause of Deindustrialization
According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, in February 2010 the unemployment rate peaked
at 10.4%, as high as in the early 1980s. If today's economic recession in the United States can
be attributed to the rising energy prices, the overheating stock market, and the bursting of the
housing bubble, the economic crisis of 30 years ago was an inevitable outcome of the nationwide
deindustrialization movement starting in the prior decade. Plant closings, reduction of
manufacturing employment, and capital flight occurred not only in the United States, but also in
other developed countries. In an attempt to understand this phenomenon, a number of scholars
have offered their explanations, as described below.
Many factors contribute to deindustrialization. In their edited volume, Rodwin and
Sazanami (1989) presented a collection of papers depicting deindustrialization phenomena in
different regions across the United States. The spatial distribution of manufacturing industries
has gone through three types of transformations in US history: intra-regionally from urban to
suburban, inter-regionally from the Northeast and Midwest, and internationally from the US to
overseas. This transformation in a certain sense is an ongoing process because firms search for
optimal locations for most cost-efficient production. Although the intra-regional and inter-
regional shifts of firms and investments happened even before the 2 0 th century, the nature and
pace of the changes throughout the 1970s and 1980s create debates among scholars and
policymakers about the effects of deindustrialization. In particular, among all regions in the
country, the Midwest and Northeast regions have sustained the greatest losses in manufacturing
jobs since the late 1970s (Rodwin and Sazanami 1989). Those regions that lost manufacturing
plants are considered to be deindustrialized.
The traditional argument for the cause of deindustrialization is the competition from low-
wage labor in less-developed regions. Analysts consider the traditional manufacturing sector to
be labor intensive in that wages paid to workers take up a large proportion of the total production
cost. After the Second World War, the labor unions in the United States became
unprecedentedly strong in their relationship with their employers: today workers' rights are well
protected by federal laws and corporations have limited power to compromise workers' interests.
Since the early 1970s, corporations have found it difficult to maintain their expected profits
under the set of labor union rules. In addition, thanks to advancements in communication
technology, management no longer needs to stay in proximity to production plants. As a result,
capital has become more mobile and flexible than ever before. Multinational corporations have
moved their manufacturing bases to areas with low-cost labor supply, a low-rate of corporate
taxes, and weak labor unions, while keeping their headquarters in their original locations (Cowie
and Heathcott 2003).
Bluestone and Harrison (1982) provide a systematic explanation of the corporations'
behavior. Before stating the cause of deindustrialization, they first identify three major problems
of deindustrialization: (1) the high rate of unemployment due to plant closings, (2) the listless
growth of the domestic economy due to the weak domestic purchasing power, and (3) the
inability to compete in the international market due to the overvalued dollar. Then they attribute
these problems to corporate managers' strategic decisions concerning disinvestment by
redirecting capital from domestic plants to overseas facilities, by downsizing fixed capital assets,
or by eventually shutting down plants. They estimate that the job loss associated with such
disinvestment strategies in the private sector amounted to 38 million jobs during the 1970s.
Some scholars, however, take an optimistic view of deindustrialization, claiming that it is
a natural outcome of economic development rather than a failure of a region's manufacturing
sector. Although admitting that the United States was losing blue-collar manufacturing jobs in
the 1970s, Bell (1976) and Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997) believe the country was entering a
"post-industrial society" that would heavily depend on knowledge and information, and
innovative intellectual technology, and in which its industrial base would be dominated by the
service sector. They suggest that what the service sector is doing to the manufacturing sector
now is similar to what the manufacturing sector did to the agricultural sector. This is occurring
because the fast growth of productivity in the latter sector requires fewer and fewer laborers.
According to them, jobs lost in the manufacturing sector can eventually be absorbed by the
service sector, although sometimes this transition takes time. Indeed, the major employers in
rustbelt cities, such as Boston and Pittsburgh, have shifted from manufacturing to the service
sector; also, in sunbelt cities, such as San Francisco and Atlanta, the traditional manufacturing
sector has been replaced by industries in the new high technology sector, for example electronics,
biotechnology, advanced engineering, and energy.
A handful of scholars (e.g., List et al. 2003) attribute runaway firms to the increasingly
stringent environmental regulations imposed on local firms. In the 1970s, the US federal
government passed a series of environmental protection laws to set up standards for
manufacturers. These legal documents undoubtedly increased the production costs. In the sense
that environmental regulation may foster a more competitive industry, it may also drive factories
away to more environmentally lax places, most likely offshore. In their studies of the impacts of
air-quality regulation on plant-relocation decisions, List et al. (2003) found that regulatory
stringency deters plant managers from locating production activities in areas with high
environmental standards.
By tracing the location of US manufacturers, I find different aspects of regional change
and deindustrialization in different areas of the country, notably the types of problems, the size
of the economic base, and deindustrialization experience. The industrial Midwest, a region that
produces most of the nation's metals, machinery and consumer durables, includes the states of
Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin. This industrial heartland, quite distant from the
growing areas of the nation, has suffered the biggest hit from the decline in manufacturing since
the late 1970s. As Bluestone and Harrison (1982) depicted, during the late 1970s and the early
1980s, there was an unprecedented wave of plant closings in US basic industries, such as auto,
steel, and tires. For example, in 1979 and 1980, auto manufacturers closed or planned to close
20 facilities in the United States; in 1980, the US Steel Corporation closed 14 plants and mills in
eight states; between mid-1975 and early 1981, the tire industry closed 24 plants, 11 of them in
sunbelt cities. These figures become more striking if I add the consequence of these closings for
related plants along the supply chain. There is evidence that, between 1967 and 2001, the United
States as a whole lost 9% of its manufacturing jobs, and the figure for the Rustbelt Northeast and
Midwest was over 40% (Doyle 2002).
2.2 Consequence of Deindustrialization
The starting point of the deindustrialization process in the United States has no clear
demarcation. Rodwin and Sazanami (1989) found it happened in the first half of the twentieth
century, but that its pace certainly quickened after the mid-1970s. They demonstrated through
case studies of states and metropolitan regions that those regional economies having job losses in
the manufacturing sector can overcome their recession status if economic restructuring occurs
simultaneously in the region. However, not all regions were able to restructure their economic
composition successfully. Many traditional manufacturing regions that used to host populous
working class, numerous roaring machines, and prosperous production activities were left with
shuttered or even abandoned facilities, unemployed and miserable workers, and hollowed-out
town economies. Despite the recovery of the national economy starting in the mid-1980s, the
destructive impact of deindustrialization on former industrial cities persisted through the end of
the 2 0th century.
Unemployment
As shown in Figure 2.2, the nationwide average unemployment rate reached a peak of over 9.5%
in 1982 and 1983. News about plant closures and relocations proliferated in the late 1970s and
into the early 1980s. In Massachusetts, several computer companies, instead of expanding their
production facilities in the same state, invested in North Carolina; in New Jersey, a chemical
company and a hand-tool manufacturer moved their operation bases to South Carolina and to
Georgia, respectively; in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, one of the region's largest retail food
chains shut down more than 500 supermarkets and department stores. The South, which was
considered the beneficiary of the deindustrialization, was no better off. Major corporations
closed down production branches in southern towns, leaving behind acres of vacant land. In
1980, California faced 150 major plant closings, eliminating more than 37,000 jobs. (Bluestone
and Harrison 1982: 36-40)
Digging into monthly unemployment data by state published by the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics, I deduce how pervasive the deindustrialization process was across the nation. Figure
2.3 illustrates the year when a historically high unemployment rate occurred in each state. It
reveals that 1982 and 1983 were the worst two years for most states, among which Michigan and
West Virginia led the national records for the historically highest state unemployment since
1976. Michigan recorded 16.9% in November 1982 because the auto-dependent city of Detroit
lost its competitiveness to foreign automakers. West Virginia, a coal producing state, posted
18.2% in March 1983 as a result of a sharp demand reduction for coal during the recession. The
economic recession in the 1980s had different impacts than today's economic downturn because
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Figure 2.2: Unemployment Rate of the United States, 1970-2009
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There is no doubt that many states suffered from a nationwide plant closing, but it is also true
that some metropolitan regions underwent an economic restructuring process. Service industries,
including communication, FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) services, and personal and
social services, took over from the manufacturing industry as the largest employer. This shift in
economic structure in theory was what Schumpeter (1976: 83) called "creative destruction,"
which means "process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one [the manufacturing sector], incessantly
creating a new one [the service sector]." Since the mid- 1 970s, services have accounted for 90%
of the 35.7 million jobs newly created (Thurow 1989). As Thurow points out, compared with the
manufacturing sector, the service sector is characterized by low wages, low growth rates of
wages, and large variance in wage payment.. As well-paid jobs were destroyed in the country
and some were replaced by service employment, regional disparity widened. Regions that were
able to restructure themselves, for example Boston and New York, thrived, while those that
discarded their key industrial base and failed to create new jobs, like Pittsburgh, bore low to zero
or even negative economic growth.
What I am concerned about here is more than the cross-national unequal distribution of
the benefits. Intra-regionally, cities and towns were more likely to be trapped in despair than the
suburbs. As manufacturing jobs moved abroad, newly-created jobs have become relatively
mobile and geographically dispersed. (Bradbury et al. 1982)
Economic Problem
Industrial flight created a snowball effect on the local economy. When companies left cities and
towns, they also took away the biggest revenue source of the municipalities, namely, the
corporate tax and property tax. In many cases, companies abandoned their properties and the
sites became tax delinquent. A large amount of underutilized land also tended to reduce property
values of the surrounding communities. For cities with empty factories occupying a large
portion of the city's total area, reduced tax bases led to poor provision of public services, the
funds of which relied on property-tax revenues. Eventually, deteriorating structures and physical
environment drove middle- and upper-income families out of the urban center; together with the
firms and their tax dollars. Those traditional manufacturing towns failed to attract or create new
business in the area and were unsuccessful in redeveloping those former industrial sites into
productive use. The municipalities thus got caught in a vicious circle of low tax revenue, terrible
living environment, and more capital flight. In the end, these towns were left with an increasing
concentration of the poor, the unemployed, and empty buildings. Homestead by 1993, as
described in a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette report, had accumulated a deficit of $200,000, mainly due
to a severely reduced tax base on closed operations. The town was officially declared one of the
five financially distressed communities in the state of Pennsylvania.
Brownfields
In the meantime, the disinvestment in existing industrial bases combined with the redistribution
of industrial resources left former manufacturing-dependent regions vast amounts of land for
reuse. However, redeveloping this land has not been as simple a task as normal real estate
development, because the land is often labeled as brownfields with many constraints on its reuse.
Brownfields are generally defined as properties that are perceived or suspected to be
contaminated. Deindustrialization not only brought substantial economic and social harm, but
also caused equally destructive environmental damage to the local economies.
Lois Marie Gibbs (1998) in her book Love Canal: the Story Continues describes what can
happen after factories leave towns. The developers, after acquiring the land above the canal,
which was used as a dump site for chemical wastes, turned it into a working class community
with houses, schools, and parks between the 1950s and 1970s. The danger of the site was kept a
secret from the residents until the late 1970s when evidence of health problems caused by the
dump was uncovered. In effect, there was virtually no significant brownfield legislation before
1980. Before then, people who were trapped living or working on potential brownfield sites
were not protected. It was only within the past three decades that a complex regulatory system
has been developed in the United States.
2.3 The Evolution of Brownfield Regulation
Today, the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) defines brownfields as real property,
the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or
potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant. Alker et al. (2000: 17)
propose a more comprehensive definition of brownfields: "A brownfield site is any land or
premises which has previously been used or developed and is not currently fully in use, although
it may be partially occupied or utilized. It may also be vacant, derelict or contaminated." In
terms of the scale of the site, brownfields can be large abandoned industrial or railroad facilities,
or traditional manufacturing plants operating with signs of pollution. They can also be small
commercial lots, used for gas stations or laundry businesses. The brownfields of large size are
found mostly in industrial districts and the smaller ones in central cities. These sites are not
available for immediate use without intervention. Today's US brownfield management system is
an outcome of long-term struggles and multi-party negotiations among various stakeholders,
including different levels of government agencies, private landowners and developers, local
communities, and other related organizations.
Before 1980, environmental protection of contaminated land was not at all a primary
concern of the federal government. In 1970, the US government formed the Environmental
Protection Agency, a federal agency, to take charge of protecting human health and the
environment. In the same year, the first federal environmental law, the National Environmental
Policy Act, was passed. In the following decade, more environmental acts were promulgated to
regulate production activities and prevent them from causing excessive damage to the living
environment. These include the Clean Air Act, the Water Pollution Control Act, the Safe
Drinking Water Act, the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, and the Toxic Substances
Control Act. These statutes, although significantly contributing to the improvement of
environmental practices in production firms, also served as a catalyst to push firms to less-
regulated parts of the world (List et al. 2003). The regulations target individual manufacturing
firms in operation, based on the assumption that the environment will improve once those firms
abide by environmental rules. Likewise, the National Environmental Policy Act assumed that
the local environment would also get better if the polluting firms stopped their production
activities. Sadly, this was not the case. In some industrial areas, residents, old and young,
contracted chronic diseases even after factories are closed.
Table 1.1 in Chapter 1 lists major federal legislations related to brownfields. It seems
that during the early period when the US government promulgated laws for environmental
protection, laws concerning brownfields were not on its immediate agenda. In the late 1970s, as
health incidents became increasingly pervasive in former industrial cities and towns, the
brownfield problem emerged as a new category in environmental protection. Brownfield-
induced health incidents, for example the Love Canal crisis, pushed Congress to pass regulations
to govern the cleanup of former industrial sites. The first federal brownfields law, the
Comprehensive Environmental Responses, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), also
known as Superfund, was passed in 1980. Six years later, an amendment, the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act, was passed to provide additional funds for cleanups.
Achievement of CERCLA and Amendments
Although the evaluation of Superfund's impact on the local economy is mixed, it has achieved
two major goals. First, brownfield management is predominantly administered by the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) through federal legislation. The amendment act
established a system of ranking contaminated sites based on degree of contamination. Sites that
rank highest are put on the National Priority List (NPL), and cleanup actions are generally
guaranteed by the EPA. For instance, Times Beach, Missouri, a small town 25 miles southwest
of St. Louis, was identified by the EPA as having a high concentration of dioxin-contaminated
soil under its paved roads. Similarly contaminated was the Minker/Stout/Romaine Creek. The
entire town was thus put on the NPL. According to EPA reports of the Times Beach case (EPA
1990), the state of Missouri purchased the town's land with Superfund money. In February
1983, the EPA spent about $30 million to relocate all of the residents and businesses at Times
Beach; the cleanup cost of soil and water contamination in the town was estimated to be $50
million; and the cost for cleaning soils from other sites in eastern Missouri was estimated to be
$120 million. Up to now, the EPA has spent billions of dollars cleaning up the mess associated
with the industrial legacy of the nation.
The second achievement is that the law clearly defines who is liable for the cleanup. In
order to ensure secure environmental protection, the Superfund adopts a rather strict system in
designating responsible parties. Not only the prior owners or operators of the site who caused
the pollution but also current owners, operators, lenders, and developers are liable for the
cleanup costs. In cases where actual polluting parties are not identifiable, current property
owners may be held fully liable for the cleanup simply by owning a contaminated property,
regardless of actual fault. In other cases, a party that is responsible for only a small portion of
the contamination may be held liable for the entire cleanup. By these means, law executors can
identify at least one responsible party for the contamination. Subsequently, it is assumed that the
responsible party will pay for the treatment bill through enforcement actions.
Unintended Impact of Stringent Regulation
The unintended consequence of the Superfund is that it created a risk-aversion phenomenon in
the real estate market in which buyers were reluctant to touch brownfield sites and sellers were
reluctant to have their properties listed as brownfields. In the 1980s, after the passage of the
Superfund, the number of underutilized and abandoned sites grew even more rapidly. The
former rustbelt, which had suffered great industrial losses in the previous decades, encountered
an even more serious problem - undervalued, underutilized, and abandoned industrial land. Russ
(2000) concludes that, by the end of the 1990s, the large inventory of US brownfields was an
unintended consequence of environmental policies and real estate market responses. The
challenges to redevelop them were constrained by problematic public policy, significant liability
and financial risks, and reluctant lenders.
In addition to the hundreds of acres of former industrial sites, cities also encountered
underutilized small facilities that were easily overlooked by the federal programs. These small
sites became the eyesores of the city, demanding the active intervention of sub-federal
governments.
Flexible Liability Regulation and Incentive-Based Approach
Beginning in the 1990s, the United States underwent a series of regulatory reforms that assigned
more responsibility to the state and local governments. More than 20 states approved by the
EPA have been allowed to determine their own methods and criteria for cleanups (Johnson 2002).
Most states have developed flexible, incentive-based approaches and innovative programs, such
as voluntary cleanup, to encourage regulated parties to act in their own interest while complying
with health and environmental requirements. In Ohio, the State Voluntary Action Programs
(VAPs) were signed into law in 1994 to protect innocent brownfield buyers from future blame
for potential contamination and to encourage private parties to voluntarily investigate and clean
up a property. (McCarthy 2002). As of 2003, more than 48 states have adopted Voluntary
Cleanup Programs (VCPs) (Leigh 2003). Russ (2000: 18) summarizes the most common
elements of states' VCPs: "the relief from environmental liability for the actions of others,
predictable cleanup standards, protection for lenders, public participation in the review process,
protection from third-party lawsuits, and reopeners 3."
3 Reopener is a liability relief provided by state programs that protect developers from holding liable for future
remediation actions.
Since brownfields became a public initiative, many states have made efforts to create
favorable economic and political environments for developers by offering government grants,
low-income loans, and generous tax credits. The purpose of these incentives is to encourage the
private-sector's engagement in remediation as well as redevelopment. Unlike early cleanup
programs, these programs set their final goals beyond cleanup, looking toward converting the old
site into an attractive new property that creates jobs, houses, and public spaces.
2.4 Debates over Brownfield Redevelopment
In developed countries, debates over government intervention in brownfield redevelopment
mainly focus on two subjects - liability regulation and public funding. Some analysts (e.g.,
Bartsch and Dorfman 2000) argue that the current liability designation is not conducive to
stimulating redevelopment because the fear of future liability keeps investors and money lenders
away from brownfields. As mentioned previously, the Superfund requires that all potentially
contaminated properties be completely cleaned up before any type of new construction, and that
the cleanup liability falls on past and current land owners or users, even in the cases where they
did not cause the pollution. This statement implies that cleanup requirements are not applicable
to all brownfields unless the land-use type or ownership changes. The Superfund has been
criticized as a major deterrent to the reuse of contaminated land; thus it helps explain why market
transactions of brownfields happen less frequently than for greenfields, and why many
brownfields remain status quo for years. From the property owners' perspective, the Superfund
discourages them from reusing or selling a brownfield for fear of environmental liabilities for
cleanup costs (de Sousa 2000). From the potential buyers' perspective, they are always
suspicious of any level of brownfield designation because of undisclosed information about the
level of contamination and legal responsibility between themselves and sellers (Boyd et al.
1996).
Scholars and practitioners (e.g., Bartsch and Dorfman 2000) have criticized the stringent
Superfund liability stipulations and proposed that the government should reduce the regulatory
burden and relieve liability for future cleanups and environmental damages. Eventually, in
January 2002, new legislation, the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act, was passed to protect innocent parties. Also writing about the situation in
Europe, Alberini et al. (2003) provide quantitative evidence that, if European developers receive
relief from liability, there is a 34% probability increase that they will be willing to choose an old
industrial site over a clean one.
Another argument focuses on the use of public resources for private properties. When a
transaction does occur, the cost of brownfield redevelopment will include three components:
cleanup, transaction, and risk. Among these, cleanup expenses for eliminating polluted soil are
the most visible and direct cost. Transaction expenses refer to additional investments in
environmental assessment and technological support associated with contaminated land. For
example, US brownfield developers often need to visit various agencies and institutes to get the
project approved or to obtain technical support. Developers often consider a brownfield
transaction to be highly risky. If new land owners fail to recognize the degree of contamination
of the land before the transaction is completed, they have to bear the liability for potential
problems, which might double their initial cleanup budget. This cost of potential liability can be
treated as the price of risk (Boyd et al. 1996). Also, because banks and insurance companies are
often reluctant to support such risky projects, US land developers usually find it difficult to
finance projects on contaminated land. Accordingly, public funds seem to be the solution for
financing.
Government-provided financial support is one typical approach that the US government
takes to expedite the land-recycling process. The 2002 Act provides $250 million per year to
states and local governments to clean up brownfield sites and return them to productive use.
Since the beginning of its Brownfields Program in 1995, the US EPA has leveraged $400 million
for brownfield assessment, revolving loans, and cleanup grants. In addition, many US states and
cities also provide tax benefits and incentives to facilitate brownfield redevelopment projects
(Bartsch 2002; Meyer and Lyons 2000). These financial incentives not only support direct
cleanup expenses but also subsidize assessments, loans, and brownfield-related job training.
However, some analysts argue that a government financial subsidy may be unnecessary because
the additional costs and potential risks can be fully capitalized into land price. By examining the
impact of contamination risks on sales prices in Chicago, McGrath (2000) finds that, within the
city, land purchasers systematically discount land bid value in consideration of contamination
risks. Similarly, by tracking sales of 144 parcels in Baltimore over a 10-year period, Howland
(2004) finds that contaminated or potentially contaminated parcels were sold at an average
discount of more than 60%.
2.5 Procedure of Brownfield Redevelopment
Up to the present, the United States has developed a comprehensive set of environmental
regulations on brownfields. Remediation activities are subject to a complex monitoring system,
which consists of the EPA and other federal agencies, state and municipal authorities, as well as
NGOs and local communities. Figure 2.4 illustrates the process of brownfield redevelopment.
To develop a site, whether polluted or not, developers have to conduct the Phase I site
assessment and due diligence. If no contamination is observed, developers can proceed with the
site as normal real estate development. If evidence of contamination exists, Phase II assessment
must be conducted. During Phase II, the developers have to conduct a more careful investigation
to identify the type, quantity, and extent of the contamination. Based on this information, the
developers have to propose remedial options that are both environmentally acceptable and
financially feasible.
On the government's side, each level takes on different responsibilities (Figure 2.5).
Typically, federal and state governments set up remediation standards and rules for liability
designation, which form the regulatory framework for environmental site assessment as well as
risk and liability assessment. In some cases, except for being a watchdog, the government does
not intervene in the land-redevelopment process unless the developer violates certain rules.
However, in the past 10 to 20 years, governments, especially local ones, have become more and
more active in providing technical assistance and financial and policy support to private parties
to facilitate the revitalization of distressed areas.
Local communities are one of the key resources for government oversight because they
have first-hand knowledge of the site's history, they know the exact demand for site planning
and design, and they are the final beneficiaries of the site improvement. Among all stakeholders,
they are the most concerned about the area's future because their immediate interests are linked
to the redevelopment project. Over decades, public scrutiny of environmental behavior in the
United States assumed a paramount position. Legislators have been creating opportunities for
community participation. The EPA requests public hearings and public filings of all property-
related documents to ensure public participation and information transparency.
In effect, evidence has shown that the success of a project depends on whether it
incorporates the concerns of all stakeholders into the process.
Select Brownfield Site
Phase I: Site Assessment and Due Diligence
Obtain background information of site to determine extent of contamination and legal and financial risks
- If there appears to be no contamination, begin redevelopment activities
- If there is high level of contamination, reassess the viability of project
Phase II: Site Investigation
Sample the site to identify the type, quantity, and extent of the contamination
- If the contamination does not pose health or environmental risk, begin redevelopment activities
- If there is high level of contamination, reassess the viability of project
Evaluate Remedial Options
Compile and assess possible remedial alternatives
- If the remedial alternatives do not appear to be feasible, determine whether redevelopment is a
viable option.
Develop Remedy Implementation Plan
Coordinate with stakeholders to design a remedy implementation plan
Remedy Implementation
- If additional contamination is discovered during the remedy implementation process, return to
the site assessment phase to determine the extent of the contamination
Begin Redevelopment Activities
Source: USEPA
Figure 2.4: Brownfield Redevelopment Process in the United States
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Figure 2.5: Key Components of Brownfield Redevelopment
2.6 Stakeholders in the US System
Today most people acknowledge that brownfield redevelopment is not strictly an environmental
issue. Rather, it reflects an inter-relationship among financing, regulatory systems and
community participation, and it requires the active participation of a variety of stakeholders. As
the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) describes (ASTM 2003):
The sustainable Brownfields redevelopment process is a voluntary effort that actively engages
property owners, developers, government agencies, and the community in conducting corrective
action, economic evaluation, and other actions to promote the long-term productive reuse of a
Brownfields property.
The entire redevelopment process consists of four stages - initiation of a brownfield project,
evaluation of the viability of the project, transferring of the property to a new owner, and
implementation of a redevelopment plan. During this process, it is crucial to identify all
stakeholders that directly affect or are affected by the redevelopment project. Stakeholders, in
forms of individuals, organizations, or other entities, typically include landowners, buyers,
developers, lenders, insurers, government agencies and community groups. Based on the goals
for each redevelopment stage, ASTM recognizes stakeholders involved in brownfield projects
(Table 2.1). Among them, community, government, transferor, transferee, and developer are
generally associated with the entire process, while insurers and lenders tend to be involved in
later stages. Unlike in the past when developers were the key driving party of a redevelopment
project, nowadays community groups and local government are endowed with more and more
leverage in redevelopment decisions. I find a shift from a purely market-driven, laissez-faire
abandonment of brownfields to a mechanism that emphasizes government intervention and
public participation. In addition, projects studying the successful reuse of brownfields reveal the
critical role of local government as facilitators that integrate the diverse interests of all of the
groups.
As shown by the Homestead example, after US Steel closed its last mill on the site on
July 25, 1986, the production site remained unoccupied for more than a decade. Perkins (2007)
reveals some details of the redevelopment of the Homestead site drawn from her interview with
Mr. Ford, a former employee of the Park Corporation. The primary contamination of the site
was caused by underground tanks that stored lubricants for mills' machines. In 1988, the Park
Corporation bought the 550-acre (2.2 km2) mill site for $14 million. Park spent seven years
demolishing most of the structures and sold the remaining equipment as scrap. Park also
acquired information on the location and contents of the tanks from US Steel. Because
Pennsylvania, at that time, did not have a brownfield program and the site did not reach the high-
profile level to qualify for the National Priority List, Park conducted the cleanup itself. It
removed the tanks, identified leaks, and replaced contaminated soil with clean fill.
In 1998, Park sold 270 acres of the clean property to Continental Real Estate for $20
million. Continental Real Estate together with its investment partner, Nationwide Realty, then
transformed the old mill site into The Waterfront, a world-class, mixed use complex that includes
retail, entertainment, offices, and apartments. (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 2000) The project
actually covered Homestead and two adjacent boroughs - West Homestead and Munhall in
Allegheny County (Figure 2.6). The Waterfront project received $21 million in tax-increment
financing (TIF) from Allegheny County for the development of roads, sewers, and utilities. The
three boroughs also reached an agreement on a tax-revenue-sharing mechanism in which each
borough collected tax revenue based on the amount of land (not buildings) within its jurisdiction
by the end of the TIF agreement term in 2018. The revitalized Waterfront was expected to create
4,000 jobs for out-of-work steel workers. The site developer estimated that by 2018 The
Waterfront would be worth $300-350 million with a dramatic increase in real estate taxes from
$175,000 to $6 million a year. (Hayes 2000)
The Park Corporation also collaborated with non-profit organizations and local
communities to preserve some historic relics. These included the Historic Preservation Services,
the Battle of Homestead Foundation, and the Steel Industry Heritage Corporation. Today, those
who visit The Waterfront will see twelve 100-foot-tall smokestacks sitting in a strip mall. Also
saved in adjacent areas were the pump house in Munhall, the Bost Building on Eighth Avenue in
Homestead, and the Carrie Blast Furnace in Rankin and Swissvale. (Schmeichel 1998)
Source: Serrin (1992)
Figure 2.6: Homestead and Its Vicinity
Although The Waterfront successfully underwent private remediation with minimal
public funding, it took the Park Corporation ten years to prepare the land finally for productive
purposes. In other words, Homestead residents were the biggest victims of the long idleness of
the site. Fortunately for them, after a long wait, the town's distressed economy has finally been
revitalized with the completion of The Waterfront project. A huge profit margin, in a sense, can
explain its success in engaging private developers. Another critical factor, in my opinion, is
local governments' active involvement in relation with the tax-sharing agreement among the
three boroughs.
2.7- Conclusion
In the period around the time that the Superfund was passed, deindustrialization and subsequent
brownfield redevelopment was purely a market-driven process. Firms relocated their industrial
bases to other places to pursue low-labor cost and to escape strong labor unions and strict
environmental regulations. As rigid brownfield legislation was put in place, cities and towns that
lost plants suffered the most economically, environmentally, and socially. Regulations by
themselves are not the solution to the brownfield problem. In the past two decades, we have
seen a shift in the government's role from a safeguard against the private sector's misbehavior to
a facilitator of redevelopment initiatives. We have also seen an increasing part played by local
communities with the support of non-profit organizations. Today, all states in the United States
mandate in their brownfield programs some type of public participation component, such as
public notices and public meetings, to empower the local communities (Lynn 1990). Successful
brownfield redevelopment projects have indicated that their success was a result of a
collaborative effort among the market represented by developers, the state represented by
governments, and the public represented by communities. The evolution of the US brownfield
management system may shed some light on what the three-party relationship might be. A well-
balanced stakeholder interaction is the key to a sustainable land-recycling agenda.
Table 2.1 Stakeholders in Brownfield Redevelopment
Stakeholder Goal for Initiation Goal for Evaluation Goal for Transaction Goal for Implementation
Community Improvement of physical and Participate in the evaluation process The transaction meets the Positive benefits from the
aesthetic conditions; and the development of appropriate redevelopment goals of the redevelopment property
Community and economic options for improvement of the community
revitalization Brownfields property
Government:
Redevelopment Economic revitalization; Community understanding of the
agencies Increased tax base economic considerations planned
use
Environmental Compliance with Ensure corrective actions are
and health agencies environmental, health, and protective of human health and the
safety requirements; environment; Ensure community
Identification of concerns and understanding of these objectives;
potential areas for improvement Ensure requirements of multiple
regulatory programs are satisfied
Planners The transaction meets the The redevelopment project
redevelopment goals of the meets stakeholders objectives
stakeholders; Approval of the
land use
Regulatory The transaction satisfies the The redevelopment project
agency environmental and public meets environment and human
health goals health objectives
Transferor/ Enhancement of property value Find a solution that enhances the The transaction meets their Timely completion of the
Transferee and achieved less costly and property value; Achieve less costly financial and liability goals redevelopment project and
faster approaches to corrective and faster approaches to corrective acceptable return on
action; Identify options to action; Identifies options to reduce investment
reduce and transfer risk and and transfer risk and liability
liability
Prospective Understanding the opportunities Better understanding of the The transaction meets their
transferee and barriers; Opportunities to opportunities and barriers; financial and liability goals;
purchase a property with Understand the financial/liability Cost-effective corrective
potential return on investment or risk management options action with limited long-term
to achieve a benefit to the liability
community; Manage liability for
environmental conditions that
they did not cause
- 53 -
- 54 -
Developer Opportunity to add value to the Better understanding of the The transaction meets their Timely completion of the
property; Manage liability for opportunities and barriers and project requirements redevelopment project and
environmental conditions that reducing the uncertainty associated acceptable return on
they did not cause with time to complete and costs of investment
completion
Insurer Understanding the factors that could Configure and price policy The redevelopment project is
influence financial and consistent with the insured
environmental risk conditions
Lenders/Banks Configure and price loan The redevelopment project
Lenders/Banks_ 
_ 
_ -meets the financial objectives
Source: compiled from ASTM (2003).
Chapter 3: Industrial Land Market
As Chinese cities are transforming from a manufacturing-dominant economy to a service-sector
economy, we have witnessed the demise of urban industries, which include plants located in
urban areas. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, urban industries in China had their heyday in
terms of total output; in the 1970s, they created friction with the urban environment; in the
1980s, they seriously obstructed the establishment of a healthy atmosphere; finally in the past
two decades they have been pushed away from the cities. Like industries in other countries, it
seems inevitable that Chinese factories should move away from cities to less-developed areas at
a certain stage of development. On the one hand, continuous urbanization as a result of rural-
urban migration demands more space for human settlement and a higher density of housing and
service provisions. On the other hand, rising land prices and operation costs, high labor costs,
and increasing traffic congestion problems create agglomeration diseconomies that drive out
factories.
It seems a natural market-driven process. However, in addition to these market forces,
the behavior of Chinese manufacturing enterprises has been substantially influenced by a series
of official documents on industrial policies, planning regulations, and land-use plans (Figure
3.1). In this chapter, taking Beijing city as an exemplar of industrial transformation, I present
how city officials used these official documents to affect the economic composition of Beijing.
As China shifted from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy, industries made
continuous adjustments to adapt to the new environment. I present how the spatial transition of
urban industries has interacted with Beijing's changing landscape. I explore the question: what
are the problems, challenges, and opportunities attached to those former industrial sites?
0 S00 0 0 0 0
1953 1958 1982 1984 1991 1997 2001 2004 2006
Draft Master Preliminary Beijing Urban - Notice on Beijing Urban Beijing Urban Beijing Urban- Beijing Urban Land-Use
Plan for Version of the Construction Providing Master Plan Land-Use Industrial Master Plan Comprehensive
Rebuilding and General Master Plan Preferential Comprehensive Development Plan
Expanding Master Plan of (Draft) Policies for Plan Plan - Beijing Urban
Beijing City Beijing Polluting Industrial
Enterprises to be Development Plan
Relocated
Source: author
Figure 3.1: Timeline of Plans and Policies, Beijing
Some Definitions - Urban, Suburban, and Rural
I define urban industries as those located in urban areas. Once an enterprise moves to the
suburbs or rural areas, it becomes a suburban or rural industry. The geographical definition of
urban, suburban, and rural is far from consistent in the Chinese literature. One of the reasons for
this inconsistency is the changing boundaries. Industries that were rural 50 years ago may be
urban ones today due to the expansion of the city boundaries. In my research, I present the
Beijing metropolitan region in terms of the ring-road system and district administrative
boundaries (Figure 3.2).
Beijing city refers to the entire metropolitan region, consisting of urban, suburban, and
rural areas. The urban core area typically includes four districts - Xicheng, Dongcheng, Xuanwu,
and Chongwen. This four-district area formed in ancient times is also considered the old city
area. This urban core, together with four adjacent districts - Chaoyang, Haidian, Fengtai, and
Shijingshan - makes up Beijing's urban space, called the urban eight-district area (chengbaqu).
Economic activities in this urban region are the main focus of my research. To correspond to the
urban eight-district area, officials divide the rest of the districts and counties into inner suburb
(iinjiaoqu), including Tongzhou, Shunyi, Daxing, Fangshan, and Mentougou, and outer suburb
(yuanjiaoqu), including Huairou and Pinggu districts, as well as Miyun and Yanqing counties.
Given the high percentage of agriculture output, officials also designate the outer suburban
districts as rural areas.
Taking into consideration of Beijing's road system, the ring roads are often used to
delineate location. Beijing currently has six complete ring roads. Although the ring roads do not
exactly overlap with administrative boundaries, officials consider the fifth ring road the outer
boundary of the urban area.
Source: created by author from GIS data.
Figure 3.2: Urban, Suburban and Rural Beijing
3.1 Industrial Development in History
Beijing's current urban landscape and industrial structure are largely affected by national policies.
Wang Jun (2002) in his book The Tale of the City (Cheng J) expressed his sorrow at seeing
Beijing's transformation from a culturally rooted city to a factory-dominated environment. He
indicated that this shift was a result of the national policy that suggested all cities should be







industrialized after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Under this
national vision, urban industries were considered to be a significant component of Chinese cities'
economies for almost half a century. In effect, under the planned economy, China followed a
Soviet-Union-style urban development, in which cities were designed to transform the economy
from one based on consumption to one based on production. Between 1949 and 1979, land used
for manufacturing activities grew dramatically in Beijing. During this 30-year period, the total
industrial gross output in Beijing with an annual growth rate of 17.6%, accounted for over 60%
of the total social production (Wang 2002). Out of the 130 industrial sectors, Beijing developed
120 sectors within 30 years, covering nearly a complete range of industries. The total output of
heavy manufacturing industries at one point reached a peak of 63.7% of the city's total output,
making Beijing second to Shenyang as China's largest heavy industrial base. (Wang 2002)
Since 1949, the geographical distribution of industries in Beijing has been changing. In
the planned economy, every economic activity or goal was set up by the central government
(Wang 2002). The government made the decisions as to where to build plants and how much
land to allocate to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Between 1949 and the late 1950s, the urban
area, consisting of only four districts - Dongcheng, Xicheng, Chongwen, and Xuanwu districts -
was only 87.1 square kilometers (km2). Industrial clusters were formed on the edge of the four
districts. Over the following two decades, the municipal government restructured the city's
industrial composition, leaning toward basic raw-material manufacturing. Some large-scale
enterprises were newly built further away from the urban core area, but a large number of
manufacturing bases established earlier remained where they were (LIU Chuncheng et al. 2009).
Since the beginning of the 1980s, after China adopted a market economy, rapid urbanization,
economic growth, and a deteriorating living environment demanded an upgrade of the urban
industrial structure to make it more conducive to a more-energy-efficient and less-polluting
industries. One focus of the Beijing government at this stage was solving the problem of non-
optimal use of land in terms of industrial location.
One strategy policymakers used to reach such a goal was to encourage heavy-polluting
industries to move out of the urban area (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics 2006). Starting
in the mid-i 980s, the Beijing government issued numerous decrees, ordinances, and policies to
ensure such a relocation of such industries. By 2004, more than 210 factories had completely
moved out of the urban core, converting 10.3 km2 of industrial land to alternative uses. The
percentage of manufacturing industries dropped from 49.6% of all industries in 2000 to 39.7% in
2004, and the total output decreased 11.8 percentage points; as a result, the number of workers
employed decreased by 115,000 from 2000 to 2004, although not all jobs lost were caused by
plant relocation. In contrast to the urban core, Beijing's suburbs absorbed the majority of the
relocated urban industries. (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics 2006)
Industries grew much faster in the suburbs than in the urban districts from the beginning
of this century. The industrial investment ratio of urban to suburban reversed from 66/34 in
2000 to 40/60 in 2004 (Beijing Development and Reform Commission 2006). In 2004, there
were 22,440 suburban industrial enterprises, with a total output of 297.1 billion yuan, almost
catching up with the urban output, 300.4 billion yuan. Industrial growth in the suburbs brought
numerous jobs as well. Employment grew by 43.1% within these four years. The work force in
the suburbs reached 885,000, which was 163,000 more than that in the urban area. Of the total
build-up area within the metropolitan region, as of 2004, 15.8% (260 km2) was recorded as
industrial land area. Despite the burgeoning of non-urban industries, the eight-district urban core
still accommodated more than half of the metropolitan industries, with a land area of 138 km2.
(GU Yunzhou 2006)
Every five years, as part of the national five-year plan, the Beijing Development and
Reform Commission announces the city's five-year plan, setting up the economic-development
target for the planned period. One section of the document is devoted to the industrial sector,
known as "'Xth Five-Year' Beijing Industrial Development Plan." As of the summer of 2010,
the latest published plan is the "Eleventh Five-Year (2006-2010)" Plan. By comparing what was
planned with what actually happened, we are able to understand in depth the economic
transformation of the city. Table 3.1 presents a summary of the past three five-year plans.
Measured by economic indices, such as output and value-added, the economy of the
Beijing metropolitan region did not encounter any losses from manufacturing sectors. The actual
growth rate of industrial output during the 1 0 th five-year period (2001-2005) exceeded the
planned rate by 6.7 percentage points. By 2010, the total output was targeted by the Commission
to be over one trillion yuan, double the 2005 figure. In effect, three years before the deadline,
the actual industrial output of 2007 was reported to be 965 billion yuan, only 35 billion yuan less
than the goal. In terms of geography, more industries were found in non-urban areas than in
urban areas. We see a diminishing share of contribution to the economy by urban industries.
Beijing has mapped a scenario in which industrial zones in non-rural areas will incubate the
majority of manufacturing activities. Of those former urban industrial enterprises, a few left the
city before 2000, many left between 2000 and 2005, some are in the process of relocation, and
very soon virtually all will be relocated or closed.
Table 3.1: Planned and Actual Industrial Development of Beijing
Yea Plan 1 0 h Five-Year Plan 1 1th Five-Year Plan
(1996-2000) (2001-2005) (2006-2010)
Actual Planned Actual Planned
Of the metropolitan region
Total output of final 229 456 678 1000
year (billion yuan)
Annual growth rate of 14.3% 13.4% 20.1% 8%
output
Total value-added 74 134 178 260
(billion yuan)
Industrial location adjustment
Urban area for headquarters;
Industrial distribution Urban edge for high-tech One agglomeration; Twoindustrial ring belt; Suburbs industrial belts; Multipledescription for modem manufacturing specialized industrial zones
bases
Output of urban n.a. n.a. 45% 30%industries (% of the city)
Value-added of urban n.a. n.a. 44% 30%industries (% of the city)
Output ratio by
production location 63:37 n.a. 44:56 30:70
(urban: non-urban)
Industrial relocation
Enterprises relocated in 59 134 142 n.a.
the five years (unit)
Vacated land (1,000 1,720 6,130 8,780 n.a.
m2) 1,720 6,130 870__
% of industrial land 8.7% 7% 6.2% n.a.
within 4 th ring road 8.7% 7% 6.2% _ _ _ _
n.a. = not available
Source: compiled by author from Beijing Five-Year Plans of various years.
3.2 Impacts of Urban Planning on Industrial Development
In addition to the rapid industrial transformation of Beijing, the city's landscape has been shaped
and reshaped by a series of master plans and land-use plans since 1949. Receiving a diminishing
share in the urban economy, industrial development has been largely influenced by these plans.
Summarizing from these official documents, I show the changes in land-use patterns over time
and how these plans led to the rise and fall of the urban industrial sectors.
After 1949, when Beijing was designated the country's capital city, planning the city
became one of the top priorities for China's central government. The national leaders, whose
planning ideology was influenced by planners from the Soviet Union, advocated the notion that
the capital city should be the country's manufacturing center (Beijing Municipal Planning Office
1953). They suggested that Beijing undergo an industrialization process involving numerous
factories and a predominance of working-class people. In fact, beyond Beijing, the whole
country was undergoing an industrialization movement. Beijing's first comprehensive plan, Key
Issues of the Draft Plan for Reconstruction and Expansion of Beijing4, was designed in 1953 and
offered specific guidelines. As reflected in its title, the objectives of the plan were to rebuild the
city and expand its boundaries. More specifically, the plan described the general guidelines for
postwar reconstruction, including the location of central government agencies, functionality of
the city as a manufacturing center, goals of rebuilding and expansion, protection of cultural
architecture, reconstruction of road systems, and modification of water resources. The form of
the city was designed as a monocentric model, with new development radiating from the city
center.
Following the Draft Plan, which laid out planning guidelines, the city's first master plan
was released in 1958, three years after the Capital Planning Commission was established. The
Plan-Preliminary Version of the General Plan of Beijing 5 - presented a relatively comprehensive
planning system. In this plan, Beijing's administrative territory was expanded to include 18
districts and counties with a total area of 16,808 km2 (left, Figure 3.2). It was suggested in the
plan that Beijing needed to control its industrial growth in the old urban core area and at the
4 In Chinese, GaUian yu Kuojian Beiingshi Guihua Cao'an Yaodian.
5 In Chinese, Beiing Shi Zongti Guihua Shuoming Caogao.
same time should invest in suburbs.6 By the end of 1970, several industrial clusters had been
formed adjacent to the then urban edge, with a textile cluster to the east, an electronic cluster to
the northeast, a mechanical and chemical cluster to the southeast, and a metallurgical and
machinery cluster to the west. These clusters provided jobs and consumer goods for the urban
population, which was slightly over 1.6 million.
In the following two decades (the 1970s and 1980s), further investment in these factories,
along with the rising population, led to the extension of the urban boundaries. Enterprises in
these clusters were state enterprises that not only built production workshops but also provided
social facilities, such as schools, hospitals, housing, and recreation centers. Thus, by itself, each
state enterprise formed a gated mega-block community, widely known as work unit and in
Chinese as danwei. During the same period, many old but historical buildings and structures
were demolished to give way to these mega-block work-units (Wang 2002). While the majority
of the population were excited about the smoking chimneys and roaring machines seen and heard
from their backyards, Liang Sicheng, one of the first contemporary Chinese planners and
architects, was grieving for the disappearing historical architecture in Beijing (WANG Jun,
2002). Eventually, in the 1970s, manufacturing investment in the urban area became stable and a
land-use pattern was framed. However, signs of conflicts between a high-density population and
a large portion of manufacturing activities started to appear. Factories found little space for
expansion; they produced waste water, gas, and excessive noise; they consumed an extraordinary
amount of resources, such as water, electricity, gas, and oil; they demanded extensive
transportation facilities. All of these factors overburdened the capacity of the city (YANG
Baojun 2009).
6 In the 1950s, the urban area, now called the old urban core area, consisted of four districts and the surrounding
districts were under-developed rural areas.
In this contentious situation, another master plan - the Beijing Urban Construction
Master Plan - was passed in 1982, clearly emphasizing that Beijing, no longer an incubator of
heavy industries, should be re-positioned as the country's political and cultural center. The city
had to place strict controls on the growth of those industries that aimed at enlarging production
scales rather than improving production technologies. The State Council, when making sector-
reform programs, was asked to give prime consideration to the city's sector structure. The
programs it designed were intended to assist existing industries in adopting modem technologies
and upgrading their outdated equipment. Investment in heavy industrial manufacturing was no
longer allowed, especially those that heavily demanded energy, water, transportation capacity,
and land. The planning focus was required to shift toward developing sophisticated technology-
intensive industries.
In 1992, the Beijing Municipal Institute of City Planning and Design further amended the
1982 master plan and published the Beijing City Master Plan (1991-2010). The plan covered the
entire metropolitan region with a land area of 16,800 km2 . Divided by what is now the 5 th ring
road, which did not exist then, the territory consisted of an urban area (shiqu) inside the ring road
and an exurban area (yuanjiao diqu) outside. The 1,040 km2 urban area was further divided into
an urban central area (300 km2) and a quasi-suburban area, delineated by the 4 th ring road. In
terms of the urban-system layout, Beijing would adopt a four-level hierarchical city structure: (1)
central city, (2) satellite city, (3) town, and (4) county-level town. Based on this structure, to
solve the overcrowding problem, residents were expected to move from badly-served old
neighborhoods in the downtown to brand-new apartments in satellite cities and towns. Similar
targets were also set for industries. The plan stipulated that the next 20 years should see a
gradual move away from the high concentration of industries in urban areas. During this planned
period, polluting factories had to complete their technological upgrading and relocation projects.
Relocated plants needed to avoid transferring pollution to new production sites; plants remaining
in the city needed to upgrade their equipment and avoid generating new types of pollution. The
plan also specified that tertiary industry or public facilities would be given priority for the future
use of the vacant land. Regarding the new sites for relocated enterprises, districts or counties in
the suburbs were required to set up industrial development zones and vigorously promote the
growth of such zones by absorbing formerly urban industries and integrating them with village-
level enterprises (Beijing Municipal Institute of City Planning and Design 1992).
The unprecedented growth of Beijing made the Master Plan of 1991-20 10 unsuitable
before it reached the end of its term. Therefore, in 2004, six years before the last plan expired, a
new master plan - the Beijing City Master Plan 2004-2020 - was introduced. Based on the
urban hierarchical system in the previous master plan, this one proposed a new pattern of urban
space, called "two axes, two belts, and multiple centers" (Figure 3.3). "Two axes" refers to the
west-east axis along Chang'an street and the north-south axis across Tian'anmen Square; "two
belts" refers to the east development belt, including Tongzhou, Shunyi, Yizhuang, Huairou,
Miyun, and Pinggu, and the west development belt, including Daxing, Fangshan, Changping,
Yanqing, and Mentougou; "multiple centers" refers to functional centers, which are expected to
be competitive nationally or internationally, such as the Zhongguancun Hi-Tech Center, the
Olympic Center, the Central Business District, and the Shunyi Modem Manufacturing Base
(right, Figure 3.3).





Source: Beijing City Master Plan 2004-2020.
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Figure 3.3: Development Vision of Beijing - Two Axes, Two Belts, Multiple Centers
In this plan, the urban area sprawled for about 1,085 km2, of which one-third of the land
was downtown, one-quarter belonged to adjacent districts, and the rest was reserved for
greenbelt. This pattern also clarified specializations regarding the geographical distribution of
industries, which is conducive to the city's economic structural adjustment. In terms of the
adjustment of industrial distribution, three areas with a high concentration of relocation projects
were highlighted. They are Shijingshan District, a steelmaking cluster, the south area of Tonghui
River, a chemical manufacturing district, and Fatou, a coke-making area. I selected my three
case studies from these three areas.
3.3 Policies on Plant Relocation
The conflicts between urban factories and urban growth are obvious. State-owned heavy
manufacturing enterprises, which dominated the Chinese urban economy, used to be located
outside of the urban core area. Due to a continuous expansion of residential and commercial
areas over the past few decades, factories formerly located on the edge of the city are no longer
in this peripheral position. Meanwhile, urban industries had an aging capital stock and limited
space for facility upgrading and expansion. Much of the equipment being used was installed in
the late 1950s and therefore today it is energy-inefficient and outmoded. As a result, the
condition of these capital assets declined in value. In order to upgrade their old equipment, the
enterprises were in great need of capital and land. Yet the central and local governments
discouraged them from making further investment in their old locations because the presence of
those traditional enterprises obstructed the growth of the city. Bid-rent theory (Alonso 1964)
indicates that urban land value is not fully realized if utilized by industries because the highest
and best use of urban land is not for low-density production activities but for high-rise business
or residential buildings. Another problem of urban industries was the worsening environment
they caused. These traditional manufacturing plants threatened the living environment of urban
inhabitants by means of noise, air, and water pollution (JIANG Manqi 1994).
Neoclassical location theory (Isard 1998) tells us that the above conflicts, reflected in
transaction cost, would likely drive factories out of the city to make way for urban settlement,
but in China the pace has been stepped up, thanks to the incentive policies regarding relocation
projects. Since the mid-1980s, many municipal governments have been directing traditional
industries to move to less-developed suburbs (JU Pengyan 2006). This government-led
relocation movement in Beijing started in 1985. Over the past 25 years, a series of relocation
policies and land policies were tested, revised, promulgated, implemented, and further revised.
Such was the fate of the urban industries.
In an attempt to reinforce the 1982 Master Plan's specifications on controlling the scale
of urban industries, Beijing's municipal government, along with relevant agencies, announced
the Notice on Providing Preferential Policies to Polluting Enterprises to be Relocated in 1984.7
The Notice gave enterprises, which were mostly state-owned, wider options for acquiring funds
for factory construction in new locations. It said that, as long as enterprises' requests for
relocation were approved, they could receive relocation funds from different levels of
government, collect compensation for land transfer, and apply for discounted government loans.
Moreover, the enterprises were given more flexibility in maneuvering funds. To minimize the
reduction of production capacity due to relocation, the enterprises could keep their old facilities
operating at full capacity while building new ones. They were allowed to transfer profits
generated at the old locations to the new ones for loan payment and workers' welfare and bonus
funds, whereas in general, profits generated by SOEs had to be turned over to the government.
(Beijing Municipal Government 1984)
Plant relocation in Beijing experienced three stages (Yang Anjiang 2002). Between 1985
and 1994, the municipal government urged heavily polluting plants to move out of the urban
area. The primary objective was to alleviate the environmental pollution they caused. During
that time, the municipal government processed 65 land-conversion projects of 316,000 m2 of
land area (Beijing Economic Committee 2000). However, the incentive policy described in the
Notice, which seemingly benefited the enterprises, not only failed to eliminate pollution
problems but also failed the relocated enterprises: many of those early movers had a hard time
7 In Chinese, Guanyu dui Wuran Raomin Qiye Banqian Shixing Youhui Zhengce de Tongzhi.
financing their new production operations and simultaneously retaining their original production
capacities (Interview 20060802). Two factors can explain this situation.
First, available funds for the relocation project from various channels were insufficient.
Enterprises that requested relocation were mostly state-owned that carried substantial financial
burdens from the past. Also, there were no scale economies to be realized by the relocation
projects because these movers generally occupied small plots of land, scattered all over the city,
which had a fairly minimal value in terms of capital assets. Second, the enterprises' intention to
relocate was not always good-willed and technologically driven; rather, they were interested in
taking advantage of the incentive policy package to receive "free money" from the government.
In many cases, the enterprises simply moved their facilities and equipment to the new sites,
rather than purchasing new advanced technologies. Even though their move contributed to a
somewhat cleaner urban environment, they transferred pollution from one place to another by
relocating their production bases (ZHONG Lan 2006). Eventually, the majority of the early
movers barely survived in the new location for various reasons. Witnessing so many
unsuccessful stories, firms that fell within the polluting threshold and were qualified to enjoy the
preferential relocation policies became reluctant to move. (Interview 20070101)
In 1994, the Beijing municipal government enacted the Measure of Implementing
Polluting Enterprises' Relocation Plan in Beijing, 8 which, as with the two primary goals of all
relocation projects, juxtaposed firms' product-structure adjustment and their technological
transformation. During the second stage, between 1995 and 1999, the municipal government
processed 59 projects, dealing with 1,718,000 m2 of land. On average, each year 343,600 m2 of
land was released to the real estate market, as compared with only 31,600 m2 per year during the
8 In Chinese, Beijingshi Shishi Wuran Raomin Banqian Banfa.
first stage. (Beijing Economic Commission 2000) However, a large number of enterprises were
still "wandering" in the city. According to a survey done in 1999, within Beijing's fourth ring
road there still existed 783 manufacturing firms, which occupied over 8.7% of the urban area,
discharging massive amounts of sulfur dioxide (SO 2), dust, waste water, and chemical oxygen
demand (COD) to people's living environment (Beijing Economic Commission 2000).
The speed of plant closings in the urban area began to accelerate at the beginning of the
2 1st century, right after the municipality announced in 1999 Beijing's Implementation Measures
to Speed up Polluting Enterprises' Relocation and Industrial Structure Adjustment.9 The first
eight months of 2000 showed a promising start of the third phase of the relocation movement in
Beijing. From 24 projects, a total of 460,000 m2 of land was freed for alternative uses (Beijing
Economic Committee 2000). Furthermore, in August 2000, the municipal government passed a
more specific policy - Implementation Measures for Relocating Industrial Enterprises within the
Third and Fourth Ring Roads'0 - in order to target the enterprises within Beijing's third and
fourth ring roads. According to the Beijing Economic Committee's estimation, in the first five
years of the 21" century, an additional 6,000,000 m2 of industrial land would enter the land
market, involving 130 factories. Indeed, the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games set a deadline for the
municipal government to restructure its industrial composition, which then established a timeline
for its industries. It was planned that in the next 3-5 years, beginning in 2000, almost all
manufacturing enterprises, whether they were polluting heavily or not, were expected to proceed
with their relocation plans. The proportion of the land for manufacturing activities was targeted
to drop from more than 8.7% in 2000 to 7% by 2005. (Beijing Economic Committee 2000)
9 In Chinese, Beiingshi Tuiin Wuran Raomin Qiye Banqian Jiakuai Chanye Jiegou Tiaozheng Shishi Banfa.
10 In Chinese, Beiingshi San, Si Huan Lu Nei Gongye Qiye Banqian Shishi Fang'an.
3.4 Real Estate Development
An analysis of land cannot be isolated from an analysis of housing. The speed of plant relocation
was closely linked to the situation in the housing market. Between 2000 and 2010, housing
prices in Beijing more than doubled (various issues of Beijing Statistical Yearbooks). The rising
price was primarily driven by two factors: a strong demand by residents and immigrants and a
series of housing reforms since 1978. In 1978, the average living area per person in Beijing was
only 4.55 M2 ; 30 years later, the figure was 4.5 times bigger, 20.3 n2 (LI Junpu 2009). Within
the same period, Beijing's population grew from over 9 million in 1982, to nearly 11 million in
1990, and to close to 14 million in 2000 (various issues of Beijing Statistical Yearbooks). The
most recent population survey revealed that the number of residents in Beijing reached 16.33
million in 2008, a 520,000 increase from the year before. The increased population, 70% of
whom were migrants from other regions, is equivalent to a mid-size city. For Beijing, with a
land area of 16,800 km2 , this population increase should not cause any major problems if most of
the population is dispersed across the metropolitan region. However, according to the latest
2000 census, there were 8.5 million people living in the eight-district urban area, per capita about
104 m2 built-up area. The built-up area, i.e., "land for construction purposes (jianshe yongdi)",
includes land for urban and rural housing and public facilities, land for industrial and mining
uses, land for building communications and water conservation facilities, land for tourism, and
land for military uses.
The second catalyst of the booming real estate market in China is housing reforms,
starting from China's adoption of the market economy in 1978. Before then, housing was freely
allocated to employees by the government through the work units (danwei) where they were
employed. Practically, danwei owned the houses, but without the right to benefit from them by
selling them. As China adopted a market economy, housing became a commodity, which could
be transacted in the market. However, this transition did not happen overnight. LI Junfu (2009)
divides this transition into three stages.
The first stage was a trial period between 1979 and 1987, when danwei-provided housing
was allowed to be sold to employees at a highly government-subsidized price. Yet the policy did
not change the traditional way of getting a housing unit: free allocation from the state enterprise
remained the dominating channel for housing acquisition. Then, in 1988, the passage of the
Notice Regarding the Implementation of Housing Reform in Stages in All Cities" indicated the
beginning of the second stage of the housing reform.
In this stage, based on the Notice, the Beijing municipal government formulated its own
progress plan. It first applied the programs to 11 selected municipal state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), and 1,000 apartment units were sold to their employees. Second, it gradually
disseminated programs to include more SOEs, while at the same time implementing
supplementary policies to promote the transformation of dilapidated and aged houses
(weiiufang). During this second stage of reform, the government introduced specific program
approaches to the SOEs. It established a housing accumulation fund as a long-term savings
account to support workers' future housing purchases, created a housing fund to assist SOEs'
investments in support of the housing reform, sold publicly owned housing units, increased the
rent of housing, and raised funds collectively among shareholders for housing construction.
These policies gave SOEs an incentive to invest in housing projects, and thus partially alleviated
problems of housing shortage. However, the so-called real estate market was not well
established, given that the investment was predominantly driven by the government, and that
" In Chinese, Guanyu zai Quanguo Chengzhen Fenqi Fenpi Tuixing Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Shishi Fang'an de
Tongzhi.
many available apartments were not sold in an open market. Many people, unwilling to spend
their savings on purchasing market-priced houses, still counted on an allocation from the
government to get apartments.
As the municipal government continuously improved and enforced the housing policies
established during the previous stage, the rising population, the limited land resources and the
housing reforms started to boost the growth of a real estate market. In this third stage, starting in
1998, real estate developers became a major actor in providing new buildings. The number of
real estate firms in Beijing more than tripled from 958 in 2002 to 3,123 in 2005, and twice as
many people worked in real estate firms in 2005 as in 2002 (Chinese Real Estate Statistical
Yearbook, 2005-2007). Figure 3.4 indicates the rising trend of investment in real estate
development between 1990 and 2008. After a relatively flat period, an accelerated growth rate
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Note: The 2008 slowdown was caused by the Beijing Olympics because all construction was temporarily suspended
in that year. Commodity buildings, as opposed to affordable housing, refer to buildings that are sold in an open
market at a market rate.
Figure 3.4: Real Estate Investment in Beijing, 1990-2008
According to historical data on housing sales, housing in urban Beijing has always been
sold at the highest price in the country. Within the metropolitan area, the average sales price rate
of residential buildings increased 40% within four years from 2002 to 2005. Housing prices also
varied by location. As of 2008, the average price of commodity apartments was 16,892 yuan/m 2
within the 4 th ring road, 16,282 yuan/m2 within the 4th and 5th ring road, 8,696 within the 5th and
6th ring road, and 8,116 beyond the 6th ring road (Figure 3.5). Land prices were also moving in
the same direction as housing prices. The average purchase price of land in Beijing rose from
713 yuan/m 2 in 2002 to 3,098 yuan/m 2 within four years (Chinese Real Estate Statistical
Yearbook, 2005-2007). Above all, I conclude that the booming real estate market could absorb
as much land as available to support new construction. The closer to the urban core area, the
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Figure 3.5: Beijing Housing Prices by Location, 2008
3.5 Land Supply to Real Estate Development
Three types of land are the main sources used for urban development: agricultural land, old
residential land, and industrial land. Their development processes differ. According to an
interview I conducted in 2007 with an official from the Beijing Land Bureau (Interview
20070103), of the three types, industrial land has become most preferred by developers, as
explained below.
Agricultural land used to be the major source of construction land. Cities, towns, and
counties took land from farmers (giving them extremely low compensation) to construct luxury
houses and formulate economic development zones and vacation villages to attract businesses,
tourists, and people to the local areas. For a long time, agricultural land cost the least to acquire.
Those who farmed the land received monetary compensation based on the value of farmland, not
on its future land-use type. Local authorities exerted their power over land, which led to a vast
loss of agricultural land in China. To prevent further loss of agricultural land, the State Council
promulgated the Ordinances on the Protection of Basic Farmland' 2 in 1994 and then amended
them in 1998. Basic farmland here refers to arable land whose use cannot be altered, on the basis
of the demand for agricultural goods and the land-use comprehensive plan. Any request to
occupy farmland had to receive approval from the State Council, which meant the local
government no longer had control over this inexpensive land. Since 1999, any development
involving agricultural land has been under strict surveillance.
Another source of construction land is old residential areas. This type of land was
popular among developers because its critical location close to the urban center could guarantee
a potentially high market value of new houses. The cost of building new housing units included
12 In Chinese, Jiben Nongtian Baohu Tiaoli.
construction, land acquisition, and compensation to former residents. Of the three types of cost,
before 2000, developers spent very little on compensation because the former residents were at a
disadvantage in the negotiation process (FANG Ke 2001). This situation changed after the
municipal government promulgated the Implementation Measures to Speed up the Rebuilding of
Beijing's Dilapidated Housing13 in 2000. The Measures stipulated detailed standards for
residents' compensation, offering the disadvantageous group more leverage in the transaction. In
addition, as "rebuilding the old city" policy entered a later phase, the remaining sites often
contained mid-rise housing units and thus high density of households. Moreover, unlike
construction costs that were pay-as-you-go, compensation fees to former residents were expected
to be paid upfront. As people became experienced in claiming their rights, developers were
more likely to encounter tough residents who refused to leave without above-average
compensation. All of this meant that to get the same tract size of land, developers had to devote
more time to persuading residents to move with a mutually satisfactory price, spend more money
on demolition, and pay more compensation fees. Eventually, developers found housing projects
in old residential areas troublesome and not as lucrative as before, although they did not need to
apply for a permit of land-use conversion. (MENG Yangchun 2000)
Finally, given its low capital-input requirement and easy accessibility, industrial land
became the developers' favorite category. The benefit of acquiring industrial sites is that basic
infrastructure for real estate development already exists. From early 2000, large tracts of
industrial land became available for urban development as a result of the municipal
government's "relocation speeding up" policy. If one asked about the future use of these lands,
people often responded that these lands were likely to be rezoned for high-value uses, with
13 In Chinese, Jiakuai Chengshi Weijiufang Gaizao Shishi Banfa.
building houses as one of the top preferred options. This meant it was far easier than before for
developers to acquire industrial land and convert it to lucrative uses. Unlike agricultural land,
whose development needed the central government's approval, industrial land was redeveloped
through an agreement among the enterprises who occupied the land, the municipal (or even
district) governments who literally owned the land, and the developers. Unlike old residential
areas in which demolition and compensation costs were big burdens, industrial sites could
sometimes even bring benefits from selling plant facilities on the old sites. All of these points
made industrial land most attractive to real estate developers among the three types of land
supply.
However, former industrial land remains problematic in terms of property rights in the
established land market for historical reasons. Its troubling nature fostered the formation of an
informal real estate market during the first five years of the 21 t' century. Although land is de
jure state-owned, de facto ownerships vary as to who represents the state, who legitimately
exercises ownership rights, and who profits from land rent. At the time when SOEs were built,
they received land free of charge from the state through administrative allocation. Then, China's
land reform in 1988 entitled land users to lease their land-use rights in the market. This created a
dual land market, as Yeh (2005) described, in which leased and administratively allocated land
coexisted. Before 2005, relocated SOEs leased their administratively allocated land to
developers at a negotiated price. The de jure owner of the land, the state, was not involved in the
land transaction, and the SOEs acted as the de facto owner.
Eventually, the state realized the substantial loss of land revenue from sales of industrial
land. In 2006, the State Council passed the Notice on Strengthening Approaches on Land
Adjustment and Control, and the Ministry of Land Resources imposed regulations on selling
industrial land. It stipulated that all industrial lands had to be auctioned in an open market, and
the auction was to be done by a newly created government body, the Land Consolidation and
Reserve Center under the Municipal land bureau. This approach changed the relationship of
stakeholders in industrial land redevelopment, which I discuss further in Chapter 5.
3.6 Challenges of Redeveloping Old Industrial Land
In general, real estate redevelopment is divided into two stages: primary land development and
secondary development. Figure 3.6 demonstrates the process of real estate development in
Beijing. Primary land development refers to land reclamation and basic infrastructure buildup;
secondary development refers to building houses and structures on the land (Beijing Municipal
Bureau of Land and Resources 2006). As written in the 2006 Provisional Measures of Land
Reserve and Primary Development in Beijing, primary land development requires basic
infrastructure and service provision on the land. That is, the land has to achieve five connections
and one leveling (wutongyiping) or seven connections and one leveling (qitongyiping), which
for five connections means making accessible to the site (1) water, (2) electricity,(3) roads, (4)
gas, and (5) telecommunication and leveling of the site, and for seven connections, (6) post and
(7) heat are added. Conventionally, the responsibilities for connections and leveling should fall
to the municipal government. In practice, the municipal government often negotiates with
developers and the two share the costs. In the case of industrial land, basic infrastructure is
already available on the site. What primary land developers need is to remove the old production
facilities. However, something significant is missing from this procedure of the primary land
14 In Chinese, Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Tudi Tiaokong Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi.
development. In many developed countries such as the United States, any industrial site is
required by law to go through a stringent process of assessment and remediation before any new
development happens on it (USEPA 2002).
In the summer of 2004, when I started to collect information on brownfields in China, I
found very few official records to guide brownfield redevelopment. This is not surprising
because contaminated land especially in urban areas had not been of concern to the Chinese
society, and few people were aware of the potential health impact of land contamination. Yet
Beijing has become one of the few Chinese cities that have taken action in managing brownfields.
Through my interviews with officials from the Beijing Environmental Protection Agency
(BEPA), I learned the causes and challenges as BEPA continues to improve its brownfield
management strategy (Interviews 20090604 and 20090605). Presumably, most of the industrial
land more or less contains pollutants in the soil and should be at least assessed before being
reused. Unfortunately, few people in China were able to answer my questions such as what are
the number of polluted sites, the degree and scale of land pollution, and the standards for cleanup.
I assume that the state will soon impose general guidelines for redevelopment of
contaminated land, but how will the municipal governments and local practitioners respond to
the guidelines from the central government? What would happen if brownfield regulations were
imposed? What if land prices increase dramatically because of the additional cost of cleanup?
What if contaminated sites are abandoned as has happened in some developed countries? The
questions to be answered are: In what ways we can avoid side-effects of brownfield regulations?
What are the circumstances under which land environmental problems can be properly handled?
I explore the answers in the remainder of this study.
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redevelopment request to land bureau
If accepted
Development Planning Land Construction Communication
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Source: modified by author from Beijing Municipal Land Bureau (2005).






Chapter 4: China's Environmental Management
In the 1970s, when the developed countries were building up their environmental legislation,
China's environmental legal framework was non-existent. The environmental legal regime
began to develop in an extensive way only after the open-door policy in 1978, as a result of
astonishing economic growth at the expense of hard-to-control environmental degradation. Over
a relatively short period, China has built an extensive set of environmental laws and regulations
and established a comprehensive government body taking charge of pollution issues. However,
the effectiveness of this legal framework has been compromised for various reasons, ranging
from statutory deficiencies, to inadequate enforcement, to the narrow scope of public
participation (Beyer 2006).
Studies on regulating and monitoring the misuse of industrial land are urgently needed in
the wake of the recent massive urban reconstruction in China. Yet the brownfield studies that
have been done are poorly documented and understood, mainly due to a lack of data availability
and the fragmented and vague responsible entities. Before delving into brownfield issues, I
would like to explore China's environmental management in general, assuming that some of the
principles for air, water, and waste pollution may be carried over to brownfields. Which
instruments have worked and which have not, and why? In this chapter, I broadly review
existing laws and regulations and institutions regarding environmental management. I present
critiques of the current environmental management system and some innovative approaches to
improving the system. At the end, emphasizing liability, financial, and implementation issues, I
discuss challenges brownfield policymakers will encounter.
4.1 Existing Environmental Laws and Regulations
China's Environmental Protection Law was passed in 1989, twenty years after the passage of the
US National Environmental Policy Act. It seems as if the industrial revolution brought
environmental protection to the attention of Chinese society, just as it did to developed countries
such as the United States and England. What distinguishes China from other countries are the
pace and scale of the economic and environmental change. The conflict between economic
growth and environmental deterioration has been getting fiercer and fiercer because of the
expansion of urbanization and industrialization. It is fortunate that the Chinese government has
responded with increasing vigor to the problems of an ever-worsening environment by
promulgating a series of laws and regulations.
According to the Legislation Law passed in 2000, China's legislative structure at the top
consists of the National People's Congress (NPC) as the highest body of the State, NPC's
Standing Committee, and the State Council as the principal executive body (Figure 4.1). The
first two have the power to pass, amend, and interpret basic laws (jibenfa) and the Constitution
(xianfa), while the State Council has the authority to enact administrative regulations15
(xingzhengfagui). Directly supervised by the State Council, the ministries, commissions and
departments are allowed to issue sector-specific administrative rules (bumen guizhang).
Provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government also
have their own People's Congresses and Standing Committees, in charge of issuing local
ordinances (difangxingfagui), provided that they do not contravene the Constitution, laws, or
15 The translation of types of regulations is not uniform. Regulations can be broadly considered as rules (guize),
provisions (guiding), measures (banfa), regulations (tiaoli), orders (mingling), decrees (faling), instructions (zhishi),
resolutions (jueyi), decisions (jueding), notices (tongzhi), and announcements (gonggao) (Xue 2005). These
regulations are enacted by different levels of governments and department agencies. Also, they have distinct
enforcement power.
administrative regulations of a higher level. Local governments have the authority to pass local
government rules (difang zhengfu guizhang). The legislative process has strict procedures and
therefore it generally takes years from the time a bill is proposed to its passage.
National People's Congress Law
and Its Standing Committee
Stat Coucil AdministrativeState Council Regulation
People's Congress and its Ministries, Commissions,
Standing Committee of Local Sector Rule and Departments directly
Provinces, Autonomous Regulation under the State Council
Regions, and MunicipalitiesR
Local Government of Local
Provinces, Autonomous Government
Regions, and Municipalities Rule
Note: In Chinese, laws are calledfalv; regulationsfagui; and rules guizhang.
Source: http://Www.ccIr.org.cn/archives/1040. Accessed on 1/3/2011.
Figure 4.1: Chinese Legislative Hierarchy
The force of laws and regulations passed by the central government, including NPC, its
Standing Committee, the State Council, and its ministries/commissions/departments, covers the
whole country, while those passed by local legislative organs apply to the local jurisdictions
where they belong. At the national level, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP),
elevated to the ministry level in 2008 from being the State Environmental Protection
Administration (SEPA), is the major organ responsible for enacting environment-related
regulations, standards, and instruments. Sometimes MEP issues laws and regulations jointly
with other ministries.
It seems that China has built a comprehensive set of environmental legislation, covering a
wide range of problems. The first comprehensive environmental law - the Environmental
Protection Law - was passed in draft form in 1979, and ten years later, a final version was
officially incorporated into the Constitution. However, land pollution does not receive as much
attention as water and air pollution, even though water, air, and land, being the three fundamental
elements in the environment, should presumably receive equal attention when it comes to
protection. Water and air pollution prevention and control laws were developed in the 1980s.
But an equivalent law for land does not exist; instead, regulations on land contamination are
embedded in other rules, appearing as provisions. In other words, at present, there is no stand-
alone land-pollution prevention and control law in China's basic law system.
Brownfield-Related Law
Although soil pollution has been mentioned in several of China's environmental laws, relevant
regulations targeting urban industrial land are almost non-existent. There are three laws relevant
to brownfield problems, but these laws have substantial limitations. The current Environmental
Protection Law (Huanjing Baohu Fa), passed in 1989, has a provision stipulating that all levels
of government should sustain land quality, protect water resources, and prevent pesticide
pollution. However, as clearly stated in the law, this provision applies to agricultural
environmental protection. The Agricultural Law (Nongye Fa) specifies that farmers and
organizations involved in farming activities should maintain the quality of their land, utilize
pesticides and fertilizers in a reasonable manner, adopt advanced technology, protect and
increase land productivity, and prevent pollution on cultivated land (Geng Di)16 . Again,
agricultural land - not urban industrial land - is the focus. In a certain sense, the Land
Administration Law (Tudi Guanli Fa) includes descriptions of land contamination protection that
cover more than agricultural land, including forestry, grasslands, and wetlands. It says that all
levels of governments should take measures to sustain irrigation facilities, upgrade soil, enhance
land productivity, and prevent land desertification, salinization, erosion, and pollution. Still,
urban land is not of concern. In sum, I find that the three laws provide only vague requirements
for land protection, and give no specific guidelines on how to achieve the goal.
In addition to the above general laws, Chinese departmental rules and regulations present
some specific guidance for local governments. The Basic Farmland Protection Regulation (1994)
makes detailed provisions on land-pollution protection. The Environmental Quality Standard for
Soils specifies classifications of soil quality and methods for soil sampling and examination.
More recently in 2007, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) released three standard
regulations regarding soil, namely (1) Farmland Environmental Quality Evaluation Standards for
Edible Agricultural Products, (2) Environmental Quality Evaluation Standard for Farmland of
Greenhouse Vegetables Production, and (3) Standard of Soil Quality Assessment for Exhibition
sites. Nevertheless, all of these regulations and standards apply to agricultural land, where food
safety is the major concern. Industrial land, if it is to be converted to non-agricultural use, is
beyond the scope of these regulations; hence, real estate developers are not obligated to follow
these legal standards. Indeed, if apartment or office buildings are to be built on former industrial
sites, it makes little economic sense for a developer to follow the standards or apply the cleanup
16 Agricultural land is land such as arable land, land under permanent crops, and land under permanent meadows and
pastures. Agricultural land includes cultivated land, pasture land and other agricultural land.
methods that are set up for agricultural production, which tend to be more stringent, less flexible,
and more costly.
Environmental Impact Assessment Law
One important component of China's environmental protection efforts is the passage of the
environmental impact assessment (EIA) law in 2002, which requires any construction projects,
government plans, and programs to be subject to a formal procedural environmental assessment
before the actual construction or implementation. An EIA includes analyses of the proposed
project with respect to pollution levels, measures for pollution prevention and mitigation, and
follow-up monitoring. The EIA report, prepared by an MEP-authorized licensed agency, is
subject to evaluation and approval by the relevant environmental bureaus through a standard
procedure. The Law adopts a so-called "triple simultaneity" principle requiring (1) design, (2)
construction, and (3) operation of facilities for environmental control in parallel with (i.e.,
simultaneously with) the project construction.
The current EIA law went through a three-decade evolution with distinct phases (WANG
Yan et al. 2003). Although the concept of EIA was first introduced in the 1970s, the precursor of
the 2002 EIA law was the Ordinance of Environmental Management for Construction Projects,
passed by the State Council in 1998. As reflected in the title, the regulation applies to
construction projects only, and by nature it has a narrow enforcement power. In 2002, the
regulation's legal status was strengthened by being upgraded to a law endowed with enforcement
provisions. Also, its applicability was extended beyond construction projects to include
government plans and programs. To ensure the inclusion of environmental protection in
planning practices, more recently, in 2009, the State Council enacted the Ordinance of
Environmental Impact Assessment for Planning to restrain the conduct of above-county-level
local governments and related departments. The force of this ordinance covers comprehensive
plans (zonghexing guihua), such as land use plans, as well as utilization and development
plans/programs for regions, river basins, and coastal areas, and sector plans/programs
(zhuanxiang guihua), such as plans for industry, agriculture, livestock husbandry, forestry,
energy, irrigation, transportation, urban construction, tourism, and natural resource development.
In the European Union, the EIA for policies, plans, and programs is termed Strategic
Environmental Assessment (SEA). Some scholars (Chen et al. 2002; Bao et al. 2004) consider
the extension of the EIA application as a transition to SEA. Considering the absence of an EIA
requirement for policies, I continue to adopt EIA in my analysis. Based on these changes, I find
that the EIA has been shifting from targeting developers to regulating the government.
Thus far, the evaluation of the EIA's impact has been mixed. Its implementation faces
obstacles for a reason that frequently occurs: laws and regulations provide only a vague
provision for the entities responsible for law enforcement. Furthermore, although the procedure
for assessment is relatively well established, the procedure for integrating findings of EIA with
the decision-making of projects is absent. According to an interviewee (Interview 200), the
environmental department is still outside the final decision-making arena. In other words, what
it provides are suggestions, not rules.
Another critique of the ineffectiveness of EIA originates from the dependence of licensed
agencies on clients. Licensed agencies are supposed to work independently under the
supervision of EPBs and provide objective views on a project that comply with stipulated
environmental requirements. In practice, they are hired either by the government or private
developers to conduct environmental impact assessment. In order to establish a business
relationship for future contracts, licensed agencies frequently tailor the report to benefit the
developers who hired them (WANG Hua et al. 2002b).
Although expected to be strong and enforceable, these laws functioned unsatisfactorily in
relation to the fast-growing pollution problems in the early 1990s. Scholars (e.g., Xue et al. 2007;
Yang 2005; Shuwen 2004) have agreed on at least three reasons: the structure of the
environmental apparatus, the command-and-control regulatory mechanism, and the lack of
public participation. I will discuss these three aspects in the remaining part of this chapter.
4.2 Reform of the Environmental State Apparatus
China's environmental apparatus embodies a hierarchical structure, with the Ministry of
Environmental Protection (MEP) at the top, administering provincial Environmental Protection
Bureaus (EPBs) and city EPBs successively (Figure 4.2). The MEP is in the position to set
regulations and standards, while local EPBs are obliged to enforce these state regulations and
implement national policies. Local EPBs play a crucial role in ensuring that enterprises meet
health and environmental requirements. In the meantime, they are under the direct leadership of
the local government, for example, the mayors. Many times, EPBs have to compromise their
environmental protection goal to accommodate local governments' priority of economic
development. According to Jahiel (1998), this dilemma is created by the fact that EPBs'
operational expenditures are largely funded by local governments' annual budgetary funds. In
contrast, funds from the MEP and provincial EPBs are mostly project-based, thus not allocated
on a yearly basis. In addition, the director of a local EPB is often appointed by the
corresponding local government. Given their dependence on local governments, EPBs have to
take into consideration governments' priorities when regulating industries. In other words, of the
dual leadership hierarchies, the local government is more powerful (Jahiel 1998).
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Figure 4.2: Administrative Framework for Environmental Protection in China as of 2008
Local EPBs also have to work directly with other government agencies, including
planning commissions, economic commissions, industrial bureaus, land bureaus, and other local
authorities. Traditionally strong and influential in setting development policy priorities, these
local government agencies, rather than cooperating with EPBs, view EPBs as obstacles to the
projects they support or sponsor. Especially in cases where an agency is the beneficiary of the
project or policy, it appears to be reluctant to endorse stringent environmental measures
suggested by the EPB, and it tends to bargain with the EPB about environmental terms and
conditions (Lo and Fryxell 2003).
China's political realm has been undergoing repeated structural reforms. Environmental
agencies have been gaining gradual recognition and reputation in terms of the bureaucratic status.
Table 4.1 depicts a timeline of the status upgrading of environmental agencies. Along the
environment hierarchy, an elevation of the national body determines a movement up by one-level
in the entire structure. Before 1979, the national environmental agency was only an office
imbedded in other bureaucracies. This low status meant that it could neither issue orders to
subordinated levels of government, nor call meetings without approval from the superior
bureaucracy, nor have direct access to government leaders (Jahiel 1998: 767). Provincial and
city environmental offices endured a similar inferior status in contrast to industrial bureaucracies.
As a result, it was impractical for environmental protection offices to administer enterprises that
were often under the protection of industrial bureaus. Thus, in 1984, a new agency, the
Environmental Protection Commission, was created to facilitate communication between
environmental offices and industrial bureaus. In the same year, the National Environmental
Protection Office was named the National Environmental Protection Bureau (NEPB), which was
granted direct funding from the Ministry of Finance. However, NEPB still did not have direct
access to the State Council; instead, it reported to the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction
(CCTV International 3/25/2008). This situation changed in 1988 when it was renamed the
National Environmental Protection Administration (NEPA) as a stand-alone national-level
bureau, reporting directly to the State Council. NEPA's sub-ministerial position lasted for ten
years until 1998, when it was granted ministerial status; then another ten years passed and an
official Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) was established in 2008.
Table 4.1: Bureaucratic Status Upgrade of Environmental Agencies
Before National Environmental Protection Office (NEPO)
1979
1979- Several provinces and cities elevated local EPOs to Environmental Protection Bureau (EPBs)
1982
1984 Environmental Protection Commission was created to facilitate communication between NEPO and
industrial ministries; NEPO was elevated to National Environmental Protection Bureau (NEPB) which
can receive funds directly from the Ministry of Finance.
1988 NEPB was named National Environmental Protection Administration (NEPA), independent from the
Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction. NEPA reports directly to the State Council.
1998 NEPA was named State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), granted with ministerial
status. Environmental Protection Commission was abolished.
2008 SEPA was named Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), an official ministry.
Source: author.
On March 15, 2008, the first session of the eleventh National People's Congress
announced a plan for restructuring the State Council: fifteen agencies were rearranged, four
ministries were eliminated, and five ministries were created. Among the new ministries, the
Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) is the only ministry that was transformed directly
from a pre-existing agency, the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA).
Actually, SEPA had already been upgraded to ministerial status in 1998. It might appear to be
just a superficial name change. What difference does it make? The most significant change lies
in the legal system (CCTV International 3/25/2008): environmental agencies at all levels were
given stronger authority to enforce laws and regulations. Before, environmental representatives,
although allowed to attend meetings held by the State Council, could only make suggestions and
did not have voting power on bills. Now, as part of an officially named ministry, representatives
were not only heavily involved in the decision-making process, but also, more importantly, were
able to veto a bill that they thought was contradictory to environmental protection. Their
opinions were also taken more seriously by other ministerial representatives. Along with MEP's
promotion, local environmental agencies have been concurrently moved one level higher up the
political ladder. Overall, all levels of environmental agencies, national, provincial, municipal
and county, are now better empowered in the political realm, which is conducive to a stronger
environmental enforcement.
Local governments are being given more and more leverage to handle environmental
problems. Previously, environmental criteria were of little importance in assessing the
performance of local governments, while economic indices, such as GDP, had predominant
weight. Also, fiscal decentralization in the 1990s made the local governments heavily dependent
on tax revenues collected from local enterprises. There existed poor incentives for both the
governments and the private enterprises to comply with environmental laws, regulations, and
standards. As a result, government officials displayed more interest in promoting industries than
in stringent environmental enforcement. Given the fact that local governments play a key role in
financing local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs), EPBs often have to make concessions
to industries, which are considered the major contributors to the local economy.
Along with fiscal decentralization, there is a tendency toward decentralization of China's
environmental governance structure in the belief that local governments have the best knowledge
of their localities and environmental needs. Given the past state failures in national
environmental policies, provincial and local EPBs and local governments have been allowed to
develop environmental priorities, strategies, and financial instruments. Mol and Carter (2005),
however, raise a concern regarding the economic-growth preference of local governments, which
may jeopardize the good intention of giving the local authorities a larger degree of freedom.
Indeed, local citizens read shocking news stories in which local authorities tried to cover up
when their enterprises and local EPBs fail to function independently and objectively.
This situation improved after a policy reform mandating that environmental protection
was to be incorporated as one of the evaluation criteria of local governments. Local politicians
are now expected to meet certain environmental targets set by the higher-level governments.
City officials' efforts to improve air quality, control pollution, and invest in urban environmental
infrastructure can be reflected in the Urban Environmental Quality Examination System, which
generates a weighted score for each city. By 1997, SEPA evaluated 570 cities, ranked their
scores, and published the results in its yearbook (Rock 2002). As Rock (2002) states, by being
subject to open scrutiny, local officials have stronger incentives to increase their efforts on
environmental protection to meet certain environmental targets, so that their cities' images will
not look bad. Yet Lo and Tang (2006) point out that this performance evaluation policy is far
from adequate to augment EPBs' influence substantially, because it is just one of many
assessment criteria among which GDP remains a predominant indicator of a local official's
political achievement.
4.3 The Market Mechanism: Introduction of Economic Instrument
Specific methods to control pollution generated by industrial enterprises have shown promising
outcomes. These methods, including pollution discharge reporting and registering, pollution
treatment within a deadline, and pollution discharge permitting, rely heavily on command-and-
control mechanisms. State failure at environmental protection has provoked the Chinese
government to supplement command-and-control mechanisms with market-based policies to
manage the institutional defects. Thus, economic instruments were introduced in addition to
pure descriptive regulations. These instruments, such as the pollution levy system, user charges
for environmental infrastructure, the emissions trading system, and environmental taxes, have
been gradually introduced and improved. Among them, the pollution levy has the longest history.
The pollution-levy system, initially designed to punish enterprises that released above-
standard pollutants, was first introduced in Provision 18 of the 1979 Environmental Protection
Law (draft), which vaguely stated that polluting enterprises should be charged on the basis of the
amount and concentration of pollutants in excess of the discharging thresholds. Later, the State
Council passed the Provisional Measures for the Pollution Levy' 7 in 1982 and the Provisional
Measures for Repayable Use of Exclusive Funds for Pollution Source Treatment" in 1988, both
of which made detailed provisions for charge bases and rates, levying standards, fee-collection
procedures, and utilization of levying revenues.
However, for various reasons, this charging method failed to create an incentive
mechanism in which enterprises were willing to make continuous efforts to reduce pollution.
That is, once they met the expected standard, enterprise managers would be reluctant to invest
further in environmental-friendly production technologies (EPI 2001). The National
Environmental Statistical Report of multiple years indicates that the total amount of pollutants
(for example, SO 2, waste water, dust) discharged has been increasing since 1995. EPI (2001)
states that revenues collected through the pollution levy were insufficient to cover the cost of
environmental damages. This implies that the price of pollution remediation failed to reflect its
market value.
Jahiel (1997) points out the bureaucratic weakness of local EPBs. Local EPB officials,
while collecting discharge fees, often encountered resistance, especially from state-owned firms,
17 In Chinese, Zhengshou Paiwufei Zanxing Banfa.
18 In Chinese, Wuranyuan Zhili Zhuanxiang Jijin Youchang Shiyong Zanxing Banfa.
managers of which have higher political ranking than the fee-collectors. Typically, EPB officials
encountered situations in which managers refused to pay, delayed payment, requested fee
reductions or waivers. The amount of payment was actually a consequence of the relentless
confrontation and negotiation between finns and EPBs (Jahiel 1997). In those early years, by
refusing to abide by the pollution-levy policy, firms were far better off if they failed to pay the
full fee set by the rules.
Shi and Zhang (2006) attribute the weakness of enforcement to the characteristics of
enterprises. Before the mid-1990s, most enterprises were state-owned and centrally administered
by industrial bureaus. Within the entrepreneurial organization, each State-Owned Enterprise
(SOE) established its own environmental protection and control division in charge of collecting
pollution data and reporting to the city's EPB. On the one hand, the office was part of the firm
linked to its managers; on the other hand, the office reported to the city's EPB. Under such an
arrangement, the environmental watchdog imbedded in a potential polluter's organization could
hardly operate independently and objectively. This awkward situation has been changed as a
result of the reform of SOEs.
New Economic Actor: Financial Institutions
In developed countries, financial institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, and
stockholders are both strong forces of environmental safeguards monitoring companies. If found
breaching environmental standards, firms would have difficulty financing their production
investment. This control mechanism has not been pervasive in China because banks lending
money to SOEs has been more of a political decision (Interview 20051207). But cases of
forceful approaches through financial institutions have been seen. In Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province,
the city's EPB reached an agreement with the local People's Bank of China on making direct
payment to the EPB from the bank accounts of polluting firms (Jahiel 1997). Through this
method, EPBs can circumvent enterprises and institutionalize fee collection from SOEs, which
have entrenched ties with local public banks. Today, this fee-collection strategy has been widely
adopted in many other Chinese cities. However, Jahiel states that fee collection from non-SOEs
is not as successful because they are usually small in scale and not many have bank accounts.
Shi and Zhang (2006) present examples of financial and capital markets' initiatives, which link
financing decisions to environmental performances of industry. Since 2003, in China's stock
market, pollution-intensive firms have been required to submit an environmental review by the
State Environmental Protection Administration (now called the Ministry of Environmental
Protection) when they apply for funding.
Above all, the reasons that these economic instruments failed to produce satisfactory
results lie in the problems of pricing methods, fiscal arrangements, and revenue-expenditure
transparency. The functionality of a market mechanism depends not only on a strong rule of law,
but also an active and effective involvement of the civil society.
4.4 The Civil Society: Public Participation
Policymakers in China have realized the ineffectiveness of reliance on a rigid, hierarchical,
command-and-control system. As local and provincial environmental bureaus and local
governments are given a larger degree of freedom in deciding environmental priorities, strategies,
and financial arrangements, scholars raise questions about the accountability of local officials,
rule of law, and transparency. Khanna (2001), for example, suggests a cooperative approach,
which requires heavy public involvement in the decision-making process. She argues that the
involvement of the public is crucial to the establishment and implementation of a fair and
effective environmental protection regime. She thinks that a good environmental system should
enable and encourage the public, in the form of individual citizens, industry, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), to participate in the environmental protection process.
Over time, the Chinese people have learned to make their voices heard by environmental
agencies through writing letters, paying personal visits, and making phone calls. As shown in
Figure 4.3, filing environmental complaints by letter is a popular method with a rising trend,
while the number of visits by individuals or organized groups remains well below 90,000 per
year. In 1995, the environmental protection bureaus received only 58,678 letters of complaint; in
2006, they got 616,122 - a more than ten-fold jump within eleven years. Since the state opened
its hotline service for receiving complaints, the number of phone calls has caught up with that of
the letter forum, totaling over 600,000 in 2006. The number of personal visits remains low
partly because it is costly and partly because such an action may be deterred by local officials or
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Figure 4.3: Environmental Complaints by Letters and Visits to Environmental Agencies
In China, citizens have become increasingly involved in environmental policy-making
and implementation. Public participation was first provided in China in a regulatory document
in 2006 as part of the Environmental Impact Assessment Law. It includes provisions on
disclosing information, respecting citizens' opinions, and specifying procedures and methods for
public involvement. Construction companies or authorized assessment institutes can collect
citizens' comments on proposed projects through surveys, consultation, seminars, debates, and
hearings. To be more specific, for example, the complete impact assessment may be required to
be presented at a public hearing and public comments will be incorporated in the project's formal
report, which will be submitted to the decision-making authority. Some cities have initiated their
own practices for accommodating public opinions in the decision-making process. For instance,
Guangdong Province is a pioneer in holding legislative public hearings by a People's Congress
Standing Committee in 1999; Beijing has begun to publicize draft legislation online to invite
comments from civil society (Xue 2005).
Those public participation methods are far from adequate. There is no guarantee that the
public opinions are sufficiently reflected in the final decision, especially when they are
contradictory to the officials' beliefs or personal interests. By nature, citizens' influence on
environmental protection is extremely limited. In practice, one effective way to alter a decision
in favor of this less-represented group is to gain media support. By disseminating polluters'
misbehavior through newspaper or TV, the discontented crowd exerts a visible pressure on the
higher-level government to investigate the problem and intervene into the issue. Being afraid of
jeopardizing their political careers, local officials have no choice but to take public concerns
seriously. However, in my opinion, this approach is not sustainable because it is a case-by-case
solution.
The definition of the public in the concept of public participation is fairly narrow in
China. The public should in theory include all entities that are affected by the project: project
beneficiaries, local residents, NGOs, and social groups. The prerequisites for a broad
participatory population are transparency of planning process and disclosure of information, both
of which are still deficient in China. For example, environmental impact assessment reports are
supposed to be written in a way readily understandable to a large audience, so that they are able
to get fully informed of and participate in the project-design process. Most reports, however, are
written in technical and scientific language, which simply make them "participatory" for experts
only (Wang et al. 2002a).
In a recent study on public participation, Martens (2006) discusses the limitations of the
three forms of public actors. NGOs in China, different from those in the Western countries, are
more or less dominated by the government, because they have to abide by strict rules set up by
the government. Citizen consumers become involved in environmental issues through complaint
and protest, which are poor forms of participation (Mol and Carter 2006). If not taken seriously
by the government, their efforts are negligible. The most effective way to extend the influence is
to secure the media's support. The media, however, as Martens (2006) points out, does not have
full freedom of speech and remains careful not to take serious political risks. Recently, the
Internet is becoming another effective way for the public to gain government as well as citizen
support on solving environmental problems. Indeed, new communication technologies tend to
strengthen the empowerment of citizen groups, but it is only a helpful tool to deliver
empowerment rather than an alternative to it.
In a survey of 605 EPB officials in three cities, Lo and Fryxell (2003) study the impact of
regional variations on the regulatory enforcement styles in China. They find that public support,
through pressing on the government, is a critical factor for an effective enforcement of
environmental regulations. But the degree of participation is largely dependent on the perception
of environmental problems. Unlike other types of pollution, the impact of land pollution is likely
to be latent for a very long period of time, usually 10-20 years. People are unlikely to perceive
land contamination as a current problem. A survey done by a consulting firm shows a strong
correlation between people's perception of environmental problems and their complaints
(Interview 20070408).
Although the influence of civil society has improved over the past decades, what is still
lacking is an institutionalized system that allows the public to participate in environmental
decision-making through a systematic channel. A proper participation by citizens depends on the
status of laws about information disclosure and transparency. In China, practices about
environmental information disclosure and public involvement are extremely limited.
4.5 Implications of Land Contamination Management
As shown in Chapter 3, brownfields are an emerging environmental problem during the
deindustrialization of Chinese cities. The central government has made continuous efforts to
improve the country's environmental quality by promulgating new laws and regulations,
introducing market mechanisms, and promoting the level of citizen engagement. But not much
progress has made in the issue of urban land. In contrast, some local governments were more
responsive to this issue. Take Beijing as an example. In response to an accident in 2004 in
which three subway construction workers were hospitalized because they inhaled poisonous
chemicals while working underground, the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB)
formed a special team to investigate the contamination levels of closed or to-be-closed plants
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(Interviews 20090604 and 20090605). In the meantime, the Beijing EPB released two documents-
the Guidance for Site Environmental Assessment19 and the Notice about the Issue of Soil
Environmental Impact Assessment on Former Industrial Site20 - to regulate those site
redevelopment activities.
I believe that the politically-enhanced bureaucratic status of the environmental body, the
market-based innovative approaches, and the improvement of public engagement, all imply a
more effective implementation of upcoming brownfield legislations. The limitations of the
changes will still apply to land pollution as to other types of pollutions. At present, brownfield
policymakers at least need to sort out two questions: Who is legally responsible for cleaning up
the land? How, practically speaking, can the cleanup bill be paid?
Traditionally in dealing with pollution charges, China follows a "polluter-pays" principle.
Under this scheme, industries which formerly used the land should be responsible for the
contamination. This simple identification is implausible. For one reason, many of the polluters
are state-owned enterprises, meaning that their past activities were actions of state will. Thus,
the responsibilities should be passed to the government. For another reason, as the
contamination already happened, how can someone be responsible for conducts that were done
before such actions are forbidden? Therefore, the "polluter pays" principle is not sufficient to
solve the widespread brownfield problem. The local government, the key government agency in
implementing brownfield projects, has found the shortage of fund the biggest challenge
(Interview 20090605). According to my interviewee, expenditures for cleanup costs generally
come from the government's emergency funds. There are no sustainable grants or loans
available to brownfield redevelopment. It is imperative that the local government, in addition to
19 In Chinese, Changdi Huanjing Pingjia Daoze.
20 In Chinese, Gongyeqiye Banqianhou Yuanzhi Turang Huanjing Pingjia Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi.
providing financial support, needs to design and adopt innovative financing mechanisms to
encourage voluntary cleanup of the private sector, and at the same time, to engage the general
public to ensure a healthy environment to society.
State failure in environmental governance has called for a shift from a purely state-led
form of governance to a collaborative effort among private sectors, the government, and public
actors (Harrison 1995; Lo and Fryxell 2003). To ensure an effective environmental compliance,
the system has to be based on market instruments, more responsibilities for private actors,
public-private partnership, and public scrutiny engagement. In order to find ways to achieve
collaboration among actors engaged in brownfield redevelopment projects, i.e., stakeholders,
policymakers should be able to answer the following questions. Who exactly are those
stakeholders in land recycling? Who may oppose or support upcoming brownfield policies?
What are the interests and power of the opponents and proponents? Chapter 5 will explore these
questions in details.
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Chapter 5: Stakeholder Analysis of Land Recycling
Although the global economy is suffering from a recession, China still has an impressive growth
rate of more than 9 percent. However, continuously emerging environmental incidents have
been sending warnings that foreshadow the potential danger behind this prosperity. Although
land pollution seems to be a local matter, in reality its economic and environmental impacts are
worldwide and long lasting, and thus should be on the agenda of all rapidly reindustrializing and
deindustrializing regions. Furthermore, land pollution is not an isolated land-use matter; rather,
it affects people and agencies (the stakeholders) in different sectors and at various levels.
Since Freeman (1984) introduced the concept of the stakeholder in Strategic
Management: A Stakeholder Approach in the business field, stakeholder analysis has been
widely applied in various disciplines, including economics, political science, and environmental
science. A stakeholder is any entity - an individual, a group of people, a government agency, or
an organization - that has a perceived or conceivable interest in a project or policy (Jepsen and
Eskerod 2009). Project managers use stakeholder analysis to ensure a successful project
outcome; policymakers use the method to achieve a smooth implementation of a reform. I adopt
stakeholder analysis in my research to (1) identify stakeholders in relation to land-redevelopment
projects; (2) determine their importance or salience in the redevelopment process; (3) investigate
their influence (i.e., power) in disrupting redevelopment projects; and (4) analyze and predict
their position in the implementation of brownfield regulations.
In addition, I pay special attention to property rights concerning land ownership. As is
widely known, in China, the de jure owner of the land of SOEs (state-owned enterprises) is the
central government, practically represented by the local governments. But the de facto
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ownership of SOE land is controversial. In this chapter, I explore issues concerning the
historical legal stipulations regarding property rights to industrial land, the ownership conflicts
between the municipality and SOEs, reasons for the conflicts, and land policies that are used by
local policymakers to standardize the informal land market.
A Land-Redevelopment Case
Established in the 1950s, Beijing Jingmian Textile Company was the first textile manufacturer in
the People's Republic of China. Between 1953 and 1957, four factories were built successively
on a total land area of 930,000 m2 , three functioning as cotton mills and one as a printing and
dyeing mill. Over the following thirty years, the cotton mills grew into Beijng's top providers of
cotton products exported to more than twenty countries. These mills were managed separately
until 1997, when they merged and formed the Beijing Jingmian Textile Group during the
restructuring reform. Jingmian's factory and housing for workers were designed when the site
was developed in the early 1950s (ZHANG Yan et al. 2009). The production and housing
sections of Jingmian were divided by Chaoyang Road, with the housing area to the north and the
production area to the south. All mills were located next to each other, west to east,
corresponding to workers' residential tracts across the Chaoyang Road (Figure 5.1). Having
one's place of residence next to, or close to, one's place of work represents the prototype of a
danwei (work unit) community, which functioned as a small-scale society. Such a society
provided not only work opportunities but also social infrastructure, such as schools, hospitals,
playing fields, theaters, and other social services. The physical closeness of workplace,
residence, and social place created a cohesive group (Bjorklund 1986), which was dismantled
when the factories moved elsewhere.
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As a result of urban sprawl, the location of the mills, only four miles away from the
center of the Central Business District, became extremely valuable for real estate development.
In response to a 1999 municipal policy - Beijing's Implementation Measures to Speed up
Polluting Enterprises' Relocation and Industrial Structure Adjustment2' - the Jingmian Group
was prioritized by the Beijing municipal government as one of the targeted enterprises. Starting
in 2000, the 930,000 m2 land entered a period of redevelopment. During this process, the
integral spatial structure of the danwei community was fragmented, and the entire site was
divided into several plots developed by different real estate companies.
The redevelopment of the Jingmian site is a typical land conversion case of SOEs.
Between 2001 and 2004, the sites of the No. 1 cotton mill and the printing and dyeing mill were
transferred to several real estate companies for new construction. Jingmian sold this cotton mill
site, including its structures, to Zhongyuan Real Estate Company. This transaction generated
1.17 billion yuan to fund the enterprise's relocation and restructuring project in accordance with
the relocation policy (ZHANG Yan et al. 2009). By September 2005, an office and market-rate
apartment building complex had been erected on this cotton mill site. During the same period,
the printing and dyeing mill site was split and sold to two different companies, who received
approval from the Beijing Planning Commission to build apartment and commercial buildings.
Thus, in the Jingmian case, the state-owned enterprise split the site into several tracts,
negotiated with potential real estate developers about the price of land, and financed its
relocation projects with land revenue. The real estate developers then pursued the highest rate of
return by converting the industrial land into residential and commercial uses.
21 In Chinese, Tuiin Wuran Raomin Qiye Banqian Jiakuai Chanye Jiegou Tiaozheng Shishi Banfa.
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Source: Blueprint layer from the Beijing Municipal Institute of City Planning and Design; background layer from
Google earth, accessed in September 2010.
Figure 5.1: Layout of Jingmian Complex
5.1 Stakeholder Analysis: A Review
Freeman (1984:46) defines a stakeholder as "any group or individual who can affect or is
affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives." The early work on stakeholder
analysis was used to help corporate managers prioritize stakeholder relationships and solve
conflicts. A number of scholars (Jepsen and Eskerod 2009; Grimble and Chan 1995) have
applied this methodology to policy evaluation at different stages, from policy design to
implementation. Policy here is broadly defined as laws, regulations, programs, and projects.
The assumption underlying this methodological application is that the government functions as
an entrepreneur (Link and Link 2009) with an objective of maximizing societal benefit.
Especially in a decentralized market mechanism, local governments' behavior in terms of
policymaking is like managing a network of organizations, consisting of various government
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departments, the private sector, and civil groups. These organizations in a policy-defined
network become stakeholders from the perspective of the local government. Given that
stakeholders may influence each other and their interests and power may change through the
interaction (Boonstra and de Vries 2008), it is important to understand the network of relations
among organizations. I adopt the network approach to examine the roles of the state, the private
sector, and civil society.
Organizational Relationship
This network approach is similar to what political scientists call "networked polity" (Ansell
2000), in which the state empowers stakeholders and facilitates cooperation among them. The
literature on organizational structure distinguishes networks from hierarchies. A hierarchical
mode of coordination among organizations relies on a vertical chain of command-and-control
from the higher-level to the lower-level entities in a pyramid structure. In contrast, a network
form highlights multi-organizational or inter-governmental collaboration in a mix of formal and
informal social networks. Both modes suggest the importance of coordination, but they differ in
the way they achieve coordination (Burns and Stalker 1961). In a hierarchical system, the top
organization sets up goals and implementation strategies, sends commands downward, and
solves inter-organizational conflicts, whereas, in a network system, interactions across
organizational boundaries are commonly found and coordination is accomplished through mutual
adjustment. Ansell (2000) depicts the two governance structures in a "many-to-one" relationship
and a "many-to-many" relationship (Figure 5.2).
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Source: Ansell (2000:307)
Figure 5.2: Governance Structure: Hierarchy and Network
Traditionally, analysts explore two aspects of a stakeholder - interest and power
(Boonstra and de Vries 2008). Interest, an indicator of stakeholders, means that a party may
benefit from or be negatively affected by a policy. Power, independent from interest, means the
capacity to exert one's preference over other parties to achieve certain goals. Power can be
scaled from low to high in relative terms among stakeholders. A stakeholder who holds a stake
in a policy can be powerful or powerless, depending on its economic, political, and social status.
Mitchell et al. (1997) furthermore propose three attributes of stakeholders: power, legitimacy,
and urgency. While defining power the same way as Boonstra and de Vries, they add two more
aspects of stakeholders. According to them, a legitimate stakeholder is one whose claim to the
policy outcome is socially accepted or expected. In other words, the stakeholder's relationship
with the organization that carries out the policy has to be legitimate, according to, for example,
contractual, legal title or right, or moral interest. Mitchell et al. (1997) add urgency to reflect the
mutation of stakeholder-manager interactions. They (1997: 867) define urgency as "the degree
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to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention." In order to be urgent, the call needs to
be time sensitive so that any delay in responding to stakeholders' requests is unacceptable to
stakeholders; it also needs to be prioritized because not handling the issue seriously will be
costly to managers. Mitchell et al. (1997) emphasize the variability in stakeholder-manager
relations, stressing the changing nature of the salience of stakeholders.
I borrow the stakeholder concept from business literature as well as the network polity
concept from political science literature; I adopt a broad definition of stakeholders that includes
those who directly and indirectly affect and are affected by plant-relocation projects; I identify
stakeholders by their attributes, such as power, legitimacy, and urgency proposed by Mitchell et
al. (1997); I discuss the salience of each characterized group and the potentials of shifting from
one class to another through a network of stakeholders. In addition, I discuss the transformation
of environmental management from a hierarchical command-and-control system to a mix of
horizontal and vertical networks.
Stakeholder Typology
In this research, I define power as the political, economic or social capacity to intervene in the
pre-existing land redevelopment procedure in order to realize environmentally, economically,
and socially sustainable redevelopment of former industrial land. The degree of this capacity
depends on access to resources, such as financial resources, political status, and coercive means.
In the case of policy, the local government, being the manager of state issues, coordinates the
operations of various local government departments and the behaviors of businesses and citizens;
in the meantime, the interactions among these groups not only mutually affect each other's
power and interest, but also conversely influence local government's preferences.
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I present key stakeholders in the stakeholder typology proposed by Mitchell et al. (2000)
based on the various combinations of the three attributes of stakeholders, i.e., power, legitimacy,
and urgency (Figure 5.3). As Mitchell et al. indicate, the stakeholder theory they propose differs
from existing stakeholder theories in its activeness, which stresses the changing nature of various






















Source: Mitchell et al. (2000: 874)
Figure 5.3: Stakeholder Typology
To be considered a stakeholder, a party should have at least one of the three attributes,
various combinations of which generate seven types of stakeholders. Mitchell et al. categorize
the seven types into three groups. Those possessing only one attribute are latent stakeholders,
including dormant, discretionary, and demanding stakeholders; those with two are expectant
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stakeholders, including dominant, dependent, and dangerous stakeholders (I rename dangerous
as disruptive stakeholders); and those having all three attributes are definitive stakeholders. In
studying the stakeholder-manager relationship, Mitchell et al. (1997: 874-878) demonstrate three
propositions to explain the degree of stakeholder salience:
Proposition 1: Stakeholder salience will be low where only one of the stakeholder attributes-
power, legitimacy, and urgency-is perceived by managers to be present.
Proposition 2: Stakeholder salience will be moderate where two of the stakeholder attributes-
power, legitimacy, and urgency-are perceived by managers to be present.
Proposition 3: Stakeholder salience will be high where only all three of the stakeholder
attributes-power, legitimacy, and urgency-are perceived by managers to be present.
By recognizing characteristics of stakeholders, managers are able to accommodate their
interests in the firm and be prepared for potential threats to the firm's overall objective. In my
research, instead of looking at the issues of a firm, I focus on brownfield policy-induced
stakeholders. As China's brownfield policy is at a trial-and-error stage, it is crucial for the
government to recognize the characteristics of related individuals and groups, and their changing
status in light of the upcoming regulation and policy. In the following section, I demonstrate the
factors that contribute to the nature of key stakeholders.
5.2 Key Stakeholders in the Land-Redevelopment Process
A number of brownfield analysts have categorized stakeholders involved in the land
redevelopment process in different ways. Depending on a region's political structure, legislative
framework, financing schemes and the degree of citizen participation, the salience of
stakeholders' interests varies. Alker et al. (2000), for example, categorize stakeholders into four
interest groups: development, professional, regulatory, and other interests. The development
interest group includes land and property developers, institutional investors and banks, land
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owners, and industrial and commercial enterprises; the professional interest group consists of
lawyers, planners, insurers, and environmental consultants; the regulatory interest group includes
government agencies; the public and NGOs constitute the last interest group. Clearly, an analyst
can easily put a stakeholder into one of the four boxes without knowing how that stakeholder
operates inside the box. But this structure does not deliver information on the stage at which
each entity interferes with the redevelopment process. Similarly, Dair and Williams (2001)
categorize key stakeholders by their responsibilities or objectives. For landowners, property
value and liability for cleanup costs are their biggest concern; developers care mostly about the
profitability of the project; lenders have to be aware of their potential environmental liabilities
and future property value; neighborhood residents are concerned about the health impacts of the
contamination and their own property values; lastly, the public agencies pay attention to
economic development, job creation, fiscal revenue, environmental obligation and overall public
interests. However, how these stakeholders fulfill their responsibilities and what interactions
they have to achieve their objectives, sometimes conflicting, remain in a black box, unanswered.
It is important to analyze stakeholders' roles throughout the course of redevelopment. In
studying the ability of different stakeholders to achieve sustainable brownfield development in
England, Dair and Williams (2006) discuss each group by stage of involvement. They find that
variations in the achievement of sustainability among land-use projects can be explained by
stakeholders' access to information, timing of involvement, possession of power, willingness to
use sustainable technologies, and attitudes toward sustainable issues.
In this section, I present stakeholders in the framework of a developmental stage in order
to understand the factors that contribute to their interests and capacity to intervene in the
progress of redevelopment, and how they negotiate conflicts and express power in the
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relationship. In addition, rather than treating "the government" as a homogeneous interest group,
I decompose it into entities with multiple roles.
A Generic Model of Redevelopment
Table 5.2 indicates three stages of industrial land redevelopment: (1) SOEs initiating relocation
projects and providing land to the market; (2) primary land development during which land is
consolidated for future use; and (3) actual construction. Within each stage, acting agencies and
government bodies have to follow specific steps.
Stage One: Relocation Project
SOEs with production conditions meeting the criteria of pollution levels stipulated in the
Procedure for Relocating Polluting Enterprises first have to submit a request for relocation to the
industrial division of the Beijing Municipal Plan Commission (Step 1.1). This relocation
proposal is submitted to the plan commission along with the approval for rezoning the old site
and planning comments on the new site from the Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban
Planning, later referred to as the planning commission. I use "plan" to refer tojihua and
"planning" to refer to guihua in order to distinguish them, although both can be translated as
planning. In China, guihua is often used for a long-term (e.g., 10-year) plan, whilejihua is more
like a short-term plan. In addition, jihua, as opposed to market, contains some socialist concept,
while guihua is a neutral term.
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Table 5.2: Institutional Analysis Framework - Industrial Land Redevelopment
Stage Step Task Acting Agent Gov't Actor
- SOE submits a relocation request to the Plan Commission. Plan and(1.1) Relocation - The Planning Commission approves rezoning of land-use Planning
request type. SOE Commission
Economic,
- Four government agencies approve relocation request. Plan,(1.2) Project - SOE signs a letter of intent of land transfer with developer. Planning, and
approval and - SOE and developer report land transfer agreement to four SOE Administration
(1) land transfer government agencies. Developer Commissions
Relocation Municipal
Project (1.3) Feasibility economic
analysis - SOE submits feasibility analysis of the project at new site. SOE commission
(1.4) New Municipal
location planning
approval - SOE submits new site construction proposal. SOE Commission
Municipal
(1.5) Completion Economic
inspection - Economic commission inspects the new site construction. SOE Commission
(2.1) Land Plan - Municipal government announces land supply and reserve Municipal
formulation plan of the year. gov't
(2.2) Early
planning - SOE submits land development request to land bureau. SOE Land bureau
Land bureau
(2.3) Primary - Land bureau together with other agencies determines land Land and other
land development actor, approves request, and signs contract. Bureau gov't agencies
development Land Nine gov't
project design - Developer collects comments from nine gov't agencies. developer agencies
Municipal
- Municipal government retrieves land use right from SOEs. gov't
(2) Land - Land developer obtains document for land acquisition,
Development (2.4) Implement demolition, infrastructure construction. Land Relevant
primary land - Land developer implements construction. developer agencies
development - Land bureau checks development cost, inspects
completion, pays land development cost and overhead.
- Land Bureau reserves the land into land inventory. Land bureau
(2.5) Auction - Land bureau decides land transfer plan and price, and
preparation announces auction. Land bureau
(2.6) Market - Construction developer bids for land. Construction
transaction - The highest bidder pays for the land. developer Land bureau
- Land bureau signs land use right transfer contract with
(2.7) Land construction developer and registers land sale. Land bureau
transfer - Planning commission issues the Construction Land-use Planning
Plan Permit commission
(3.1) Location - Construction developer applies for construction site and Construction Planning
selection obtains the Construction Project Site Approval, developer commission
(3.2) Design - Planning commission announces design bidding program, Planning
bidding reviews submitted proposals, and chooses winner, commission
(3.3) Land-use - Construction developer applies for land use type, size and Construction Planning
(3) plan permit scale and receives the Construction Land-use Plan Permit, developer commission
Construction (3.4) Design Design Planning
Project review - Design company submits design plan. company commission(3.5) - Construction developer applies for the Construction Construction Planning
Construction Project Plan Permit. developer commission
project plan Design Planning
permit - Design company submits construction drawings. company commission
- Planning commission inspects the completion of Planning
_scale(3.6) Inspection construction project. c PomPmission
Source: Beijing Municipal Government (1994); Beijing Municipal Bureau of Land
Municipal Commission of Urban Planning (2005).
and Resource (2005); Beijing
Note: I use "plan" to refer tojihua and "planning" to refer to guihua to distinguish them, although both can be
translated as" planning."
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Once the relocation request is granted, a number of private and public agencies are
involved in the project approval (Step 1.2). Facilitated by the environmental protection division
of the Beijing Municipal Economic Commission, activities on the old site are accomplished in
this step. These activities include: (a) SOEs and identified developers sign a letter of intent of
land transfer; (b) SOEs submit the land-transfer request to four commissions, including the
economic, plan, planning, and administration commissions; (c) real estate assessment firms
provide a land-assessment report; (d) the planning commission announces the planning
requirements; (e) developers ask the four commissions for ownership permission; (f) developers
receive land-use-right ownership and provide proof of funding sources; (g) the Municipal
Industrial Technology Development Center issues a land-use-right transfer assessment report.
Steps 1.3 to 1.5 are related to the new site construction, which is not a subject of this research.
In summary, players in the relocation project consist of (quasi-)private parties, such as
SOEs, developers, and real estate assessment firms. Public parties include the municipal plan
commission, the economic commission, the planning commission, the administration
commission, and the Industrial Technology Development Center. In 2003, the Beijing
government underwent a restructuring, through which some commissions were rearranged and
some were created. For example, the economic commission became the Beijing Municipal
Bureau of Industrial Development. The plan commission was renamed the Development and
Reform Commission. Despite this government restructuring, the responsibilities regarding
relocation projects were passed on from the old agencies to the newly established ones. (Beijing
Municipal Government 2003)
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Stage Two: Land Development
Referring to the yearly land-supply-and-reserve plan of the municipal government (Step 2.1),
SOEs submit land development requests to the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Land and Resources
(Step 2.2), which entrusts the Land Consolidation and Reserve Center (later referred to as the
Land Center) to compile a land-development-implementation program, coordinates with other
departments to comment on the program, and determines the actual land developer. Under a
tender-auction-bidding system, such a land developer is either the Land Center or a contracted
private company chosen by the center. The developer then has to collect comments from nine
government agencies on specific requirements for planning, construction, transportation,
landscape, heritage preservation, environmental protection, and public services. The project
design (Step 2.3) ends when the municipal government takes back the use right of the land from
the SOEs. This means that the SOEs' role as the former land user is completed at this point.
The responsibility for organizing and implementing the primary land development falls to
the land developer, in most cases the Land Center under the tender-auction-bidding system (Step
2.4). After receiving permits from relevant agencies, the developer compensates the former user
for site acquisition, demolishes structures, and prepares basic infrastructure services for the site.
Upon the completion of the preparation for building construction, the land bureau inspects and
accepts the work. The treated site is then incorporated into the municipal land reserve inventory.
Once the site is in the land supply inventory, the Land Center organizes an auction (Step
2.5) and site construction developers bid for the site (Step 2.6). The land transfer (Step 2.7) is
completed after the highest bidder, the new owner of the land, signs the land-use right transfer
contract with the land reserve center and acquires the Construction Land-use Plan Permit from
the planning commission.
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Stage Three: Construction Project
If a construction developer acquires a site through bidding, the developer should have received
Construction Project Site Approval (jianshe xiangmu xuanzhi yiiangshu) from the planning
commission (Step 3.1) and applied for a land-use plan permit directly to the planning
commission (Step 3.3). The permit, officially called the Construction Land-Use Plan Permit
(jianshe yongdi guihua xukezheng), specifies details in terms of land use type, size, and scale. In
the meantime, depending on its need, the planning commission may call for a site design
competition among design companies (Steps 3.2 and 3.4), both of which are optional. If a
winner is picked, the construction developer will have to refer to the drawings when applying to
the planning commission for the Construction Project Plan Permit (jianshe gongcheng guihua
xukezheng) (Step 3.5). The actual construction is done by the construction developer and
inspected by the planning commission (Step 3.6). Eventually, the final real estate product is
placed on the market.
5.3 Analysis of Stakeholders in Adopting Brownfield Policies
In the industrial land development process, an issue that has been inadequately studied in China
is land contamination. As mentioned in Chapter 2, contaminated land is called brownfields in
the United States, whereas such a land category has not been scientifically defined in China.
Because of the absence of necessary brownfield regulations at the national level, immediate
action by local governments is necessary.
Incidents in deindustrialized regions have shown that land contamination, if not
remediated properly before any new construction happens on the polluted site, may have
disastrous consequences, costly not only financially but in public health terms (de Sousa 2008).
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Because Chinese cities have changed their economic basis from manufacturing to service-sector
oriented, a vast amount of industrial land has faced redevelopment pressure. Land contamination
as a by-product of deindustrialization, however, has not received as much attention from the
Chinese society at large as other environmental problems.
Beijing, the forerunner of the deindustrialization process among Chinese cities, began to
recognize land contamination as an urgent problem in the mid-2000s. In 2007, the Beijing
Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau released two documents: Guidancefor Site
Environmental Assessment and Notice about the Issue of Soil Environmental Impact Assessment
on Former Industrial Site. During the first decade of the 21 t' century, institutions that govern
China's urban land development have experienced constant transformation. In particular,
regulations of former industrial and potentially polluted land have complicated the process
shown in Table 5.2. In this section, I analyze the complexity and challenge of establishing a
comprehensive brownfield management system that incorporates interests of different parties. I
explore three questions: What are the potential opposing and supporting groups for introducing
such a system? In what way they might change their position during the transitional period?
What factors might contribute to the transformation of their status?
As shown in Figure 5.3, the combination of the three attributes - power, legitimacy, and
urgency - generates seven types of stakeholders. Regarding China's industrial land
redevelopment project, Table 5.3 presents a list of stakeholders, which I created based on
relevant legal documents, published literature, newspapers articles, internal government reports,
and personal interview notes.
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Table 5.3: List of Stakeholders
Stakeholder Attributes Stakeholder
Type Power Legitimacy Urgency Representation
Dormant X Citizens
Discretionary X Design companies











Dependent X X Environmentalists
Environmental NGOs
Disruptive X X Individuals/groups using violence means
Definitive X X X Environmental bureaus
Source: created by author based on Mitchell et al. (1997).
Stakeholders having only one of these attributes are the weakest actors in terms of
influencing planning rules. As the potential users of a developed site, citizens are dormant
stakeholders who possess the power to request a healthy living environment. Because such an
interest group is hardly identifiable prior to the sale of the building, this power cannot be exerted
during the planning and construction processes. Design companies could be discretionary
stakeholders with the attribute of legitimacy only, in that they are simply rule takers.
Demanding stakeholders, who have urgent claims for land remediation actions but unfortunately
do not have power or legitimacy to speed up the passage of brownfield regulation, are likely to
be individuals or communities. Whether individuals or communities have urgent claims depends
on how much of a health threat they may feel is posed by the contaminated land. Given that the
impact of land pollution is now barely discernable, such an urgent group has not emerged as a
sizable force in China.
119
If possessing two of the three attributes, stakeholders are strong actors. Dominant
stakeholders are those who are both powerful and legitimate. Their influence on policymaking is
critical. This category includes government bodies, such as the municipal government, the land
bureau, and the planning commission; quasi-government bodies, such as SOEs, the Land Center,
financial institutions, and the media; and private actors, such as real estate companies. All of
these groups have the ability, although expressed in different ways, to intervene in industrial land
redevelopment. Except for the media and financial institutions, all dominant stakeholders are
active participants in the redevelopment process. Dependent stakeholders refers to individuals or
organizations having urgent legitimate claims but no power. I consider local residents,
international organizations, environmentalists, and environmental NGOs to be dependent
stakeholders. They are named "dependent" because they have to rely on powerful stakeholders
to enforce their claims. For instance, local residents foreseeing the health threat of land
contamination request that the government regulates the behavior of real estate developers.
Being more farsighted than the general public, international organizations, environmentalists,
and environmental NGOs may ask the government for a timely policy response to the misuse of
former industrial sites. Disruptive stakeholders are those that use powerful violent means to
fulfill their urgent claims. Policymakers should pay special attention to people or groups who
have the possibility to shift to this group because they are a potential threat to the general public.
Lastly, the environmental bureau is supposed to be the definitive stakeholder which possesses all
three attributes.
It is important to note that even though they are in the same category, stakeholder groups
possess different degrees of power and urgency. Figure 5.4 presents these differentiated degrees
in a relative mapping concept. In addition, under certain circumstances, a stakeholder group may
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transition from one category to another if the degree of one or more attributes is enhanced. As
Figure 5.4 shows, government bodies are relatively more powerful among dominant stakeholders.
The urgency is higher for international organizations and environmentalists than for local
residents and environmental NGOs. This is because the former groups have been exposed to the




























Two basic approaches can promote the sustainable development of former industrial land
either empowering dependent stakeholders or increasing the urgency of dominant stakeholders.
Dependent stakeholders gain power if they secure support from dominant stakeholders. In the
case of observable environmental problems, the public often resorts to the media with the
ultimate objective of grabbing the attention of powerful government officials. This requires that
the public be aware of the impact of pollution and be active in pursuing their rights for a clean
environment. However, neither prerequisite seems applicable to the land problem for a number
of reasons. Local residents are not fully informed of the condition of former industrial sites by
land developers, nor do they have knowledge of the potential impact of the pollution hidden
underground. In contrast, environmental NGOs, environmentalists, and international
organizations may have knowledge of many disastrous land-pollution cases that occurred in
developed countries. Yet the three groups still lack the power to push local authorities to
develop land contamination-related policies. Although Chinese environmental NGOs have been
somewhat successful in convincing the government to implement environmental policies (Wu
2009), there is little evidence that they have included land contamination in their agenda. A
handful of environmentalists have started to solicit the Chinese government for proper
supervision of polluted sites. But Lu (2007) argues that grassroots environmentalism in China is
too fragmented to influence government policies. International organizations seem to be the
most powerful dependent stakeholders in that the Chinese government is more receptive to
suggestions from international parties than from domestic ones (Wu 2009).
The second approach is to raise awareness about land contamination among dominant
stakeholders, thus transforming them from dominant to definite category. I split these legitimate
and powerful actors into two groups - one group with strong power and the other with weak
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power. The powerful stakeholder groups consist of government bodies, such as the municipal
governments, land bureaus, land centers, and planning commissions; the less powerful ones are
either private sector, such as construction developers, or quasi-private sector, such as SOEs, the
media, and financial institutions. Stakeholders in this category, together with environmental
bureau, are particularly active and influential determinants of the development of brownfield
policies. In the following section, I demonstrate the factors that contribute to the changing
nature of key stakeholders.
5.4 SOE - Property Rights over SOE Assets
When a state-owned enterprise (SOE) relocates its production bases, two types of SOE assets are
to be disposed of or transacted. One is capital assets, such as machinery; the other is land. Since
the outset of SOE reform in the mid-1980s, many scholars who study property rights of SOEs
have tended to focus on their capital assets (Steinfeld 1998; Nakagane 2000; Jefferson 2010).
They debate on the variations of capital property rights during the reform transition, but Steinfeld
(1998) finds that they rarely agree to whom the rights actually belong, how the various types of
rights are allocated, and who has rights of control and who has rights of return. Including land
assets in the debate will further complicate the situation. A handful of scholars (LEI Aixian
1999; JIANG Yijun 2001) raise the issue of land property rights during the course of SOE reform.
The reason for understudying land assets is that SOEs used to receive land from the government
through administrative allocation. Therefore, land was not counted as SOEs' own assets.
However, as the free-allocation fades away and land-transfer mechanisms diversify, over time
SOEs have developed their own sense of ownership rights over the land they have occupied.
Property rights over land assets, accordingly, have emerged as a new realm of SOE interest.
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Rights over Capital Assets
In the planned economy, SOEs were owned and controlled by the central government. The
SOEs receiving command from the top had no autonomy regarding how many products to
produce and at what price to sell them. All revenues were remitted to the central treasury and
then allocated back to the SOEs or local government on an as-needed basis. One major problem
was that the actual operators of the SOEs had no incentive to work efficiently with the given
resources because the central state took responsibility for everything, including risks. As China
started to transform itself into a market economy, SOEs also developed the urge to reform their
managerial and operational mode.
The ultimate goal of SOE reform is to establish the so-called "modern-enterprise system,"
as proposed in 1993 at the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee. The
adoption of the Modern Enterprise System aims at granting autonomy to SOEs while retaining
the state ownership. In contrast to the old system purely controlled by the state, under this
system, SOEs have clear property rights, distinct powers and responsibilities, disconnected
functions of enterprises from government departments, and scientific management measures.
One approach is to diversify capital ownership by transforming its capital composition
from a solely state investment to a mixture of state, corporate, and private capital and other
sources. Managers of SOEs, free from bureaucratic influences, thus have to be responsible to
their investors. The meaning of separating government functions from enterprise management is
that, while the state still is the dejure owner of enterprises, the SOEs or the local governments,
being the defacto owners, are given decision-making power over the firms' operation. Factories
are expected to be reconstructed and restructured into corporations similar to Western enterprises
that can operate independently in a market system.
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Since their transformation, SOEs have developed a sense of ownership, which is a bundle
of rights including the utilization right, return right, and alienation right (Putterman 1993). In
theory, they are empowered to utilize resources to maximize the firms' benefits; they are entitled
to retain profits generated through operation and equally bear any damages, debts, and risks; they
have the latitude to transfer the above rights to another party, either as a gift or through sale.
However, some scholars consider ownership reform in China an incomplete reform, given that
the residual control rights and rights of alienation remain in official hands (Putterman 1995).
Over the past 30-plus years, since 1978, although the reform has progressed slowly and
arduously, managers of SOEs have skillfully maneuvered their ownership rights over the assets
they have been holding, including the land they are occupying. However, property rights
concerning land cannot be treated the same as capital assets rights because of the complications
of land rights.
Rights Over Land
According to the Constitution, urban land is owned by the state and rural land is collectively
owned by the rural commune. In my research, the focus is on urban land. Dealing with property
rights of urban land, an analyst needs to be concerned about two issues. One is what the various
forms of property rights are; the other is who benefits from which type of right. The 1990
Provisional Regulations on China's Urban Land Leasing and Transferring 22 provides some
answers to these two questions. According to the regulations, the people's governments at the
municipal and county levels should be in charge of leasing the right to land users. Land-use
plans should be made by the land administration departments of the municipality or county, in
22 In Chinese, Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan Churang he Zhuanrang Zanxing Tiaoli.
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coordination with the departments of urban planning, construction, and housing, and the plans
should be implemented by the land department. Once granted a land-use right, land users are
entitled to transfer, lease, or mortgage the property to a third party in accordance with the terms
of the original land-use contract, for example, leasing period, land-use type, and other
restrictions. Revenues collected from land leasing fees have to be included in the local
governments' fiscal budget, managed as special funds for the city's construction and land
development. By the end of the leasing term, the state can retrieve the land unless an extension
is granted to users. Clearly, two forms of rights were specified-ownership rights and land-use
rights. In practice, they are far more complicated than this dichotomy.
China's 1990 land reform stipulates that all urban land belongs to the government, which
can lease the land to private individuals or developers for a specified period of time. The length
of leasing varies by land-use types, with residential land 70 years, industrial land 50 years, and
commercial land 40 years (State Council 1990). This ownership of land-use right allows users to
alienate the bundle of rights further, for example, by sale, sublease, or mortgage. However, this
reform does not apply to SOEs that acquired land assets before 1990. Therefore, although the
1990 land regulations terminate the free administrative-allocation approach of the land-use-right
conveyance, requiring that land-use rights should only be conveyed through a market channel,
including tender (zhaobiao), auction (paimai), and bidding (guapai), a large percentage of land
currently used by SOEs was actually allocated freely to them without an expiration date. SOEs
believe they have the absolute ownership of the land they occupy (HUANG Zhengxue 2005).
A number of scholars have criticized the ambiguity of property rights in China's
transitional economy (Zhu 2002). Initially, SOEs received land freely through administrative
allocation. As SOEs became autonomous from central command, they tended to exploit state
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assets in pursuit of self interest at the expense of state revenues. The decentralization of state
ownership gave local governments and SOEs the legal power to maximize rent revenues from
land assets. Literally, administratively allocated land was not allowed to be transferred by land
users. Actually, the transaction of SOE land was not conducted in an open market, but through
negotiation between SOEs and developers. Underground negotiations resulted in an under-
valuing of the true land value (Zhu 2002).
As mentioned in Chapter 3, SOEs subject to relocation are entitled to keep the revenues
from the land sale for their own improvement. They finance relocation projects through a
differential land-rent mechanism. This difference in land value is the price gap between the
land-conveyance fee the SOE pays to the government and land-sale price the SOE asks for from
real estate developers. To encourage these polluting factories to move out of the inner city, the
municipalities allow the SOE, after paying the land-conveyance fee, to keep the proceeds from
the sales and use them for the acquisition of new sites, compensation to workers, construction of
new facilities, and paying off back loans. In practice, how the SOE allocates the proceeds
among these expense categories is quite flexible. Sometimes, an SOE that has its own real estate
firm may choose to develop the site itself, or may form a joint venture with outside developers.
Typically, redeveloping the former industrial site is an extraordinarily profitable project, which
can produce sufficiently large gains to finance industrial relocation (Interview 20060109).
5.5 The Local Government - Land as a Source of Revenue
The introduction of a tax-sharing system (fenshuizhi) in 1994 marked the start of China's fiscal
decentralization reform, which gave local governments flexibility in deciding local expenditures
with more sustainable and predictable flow of fiscal revenue. This overhaul of fiscal
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management in China altered the central-local relationship in terms of local taxation structure.
The 1994 tax sharing reform categorizes taxes into state (central) tax, local tax, and state-local
shared tax. As shown in Table 5.4, location-specific taxes are all local revenues.
Table 5.4: Tax Categories
Type of Tax Name of Tax
State Tax 1. Consumption tax; 2. Value-added tax and consumption tax collected by Customs Office; 3.
Income tax on state-owned enterprises; 4. Income tax on banks and non-banking financial
enterprises; 5. Business tax, income tax and urban maintenance and construction tax levied on
bank and insurance companies; 6. Tariffs.
State-Local Shared 1. Value-added tax (75% central and 25% local government); 2. Natural resource tax. (The
Tax resource taxes on offshore oil belong to the central government while the resource taxes
associated with land belong to local government.)
Local Tax 1. Business tax and urban construction and maintenance tax; 2. Income tax on local
enterprises; 3. Individual income tax; 4. Urban land tax; 5. Cultivated land occupation tax; 6.
Fixed asset investment direction adjustment tax; 7. Vehicle use and license tax; 8. Real estate
tax, contract tax; 9. Stamp duty tax; 10. Animal slaughter tax, agricultural tax and animal
husbandry tax.
Source: WANG Jinnian et al. (1999: 67)
Looking at the revenue structure of the government, it is not difficult to discover that
China is heavily reliant on revenues from SOEs, either through levying expenditure taxes, such
as value-added tax (VAT), or through non-tax receipts, such as profits from SOEs. At the
national level, the total government revenue, including taxation and other government income,
accounted for 18.1% of the total GDP in 2007. The Chinese government raised over 60% of its
total revenue from expenditure taxes (The Economist, 11/21-27/2009). In addition, informal
revenues, such as fines and fees, account for another significant amount of government revenue.
The fiscal decentralization reform since 1994 has substantially affected the local government's
behavior to secure sustainable revenue sources.
Loo and Chow (2006) and Wong (2000) have studied the impact of the 1994 tax-sharing
reform in China. The majority of the tax revenues go to the state government; the local
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governments receive budgetary income through tax reimbursement and inter-government
transfer. As a result of the reform, local governments have resorted to land as a source of income.
Under the tax-sharing system, local governments are entitled to keep all revenues generated by
real estate taxes, fees and earnings within their jurisdictions. These taxes include an urban land
use tax, a real estate tax, a cultivated land occupation tax, and a value-added tax on land.
Besides these formal tax revenues, local governments, in order to increase their economic
capability, seek other forms of financial sources, such as fees, most of which are from land
leasing and real estate development projects. Local governments are the ad hoc owners of the
land, so they monopolize the supply side of the primary land market. Given that their income is
closely linked to land value, local governments tend to convert agricultural land, designate
industrial economic zones, and promote real estate development.
Fiscal decentralization endows municipalities with wider control over what projects to
invest in. Raising incomes, ensuring low unemployment rates, and maintaining social stability
are often the highest priorities of local authorities and politicians. Because local governments do
not see an immediate return on costly environmental protection investments, instead of taking
preventative measures to avoid pollution, they tend to put more efforts into pollution treatment
after pollution occurs. Given limited financial resources, investment requests for prevention-
oriented projects are frequently ignored. (Beach 2001)
5.6 The Land Consolidation and Reserve Center - A New Government Body
As mentioned previously, SOEs acquire land freely without an expiration date through
administrative allocation from the government. The degree to which they can utilize the land is
strictly confined. They are not allowed to make profit out of such allocated land, for example,
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through leasing, sale, mortgage, or any kind of real estate development. Nor are they allowed to
transfer their land to a third party, unless a market-rate land-conveyance fee is paid before the
transaction. SOEs, by paying a land-conveyance fee to the government, are granted a land-use
title of benefiting from the property, a title that differs from the former strict use right. In other
words, after a fee is paid, SOE land turns into a market commodity, which can be freely
exchanged by market rules. However, an underlying problem is how the market-rate fee is
determined.
Before 2004, SOEs often opted to acquire the land-use title by means of negotiation
(xieyi), rather than tender, auction, or bidding. Different from these three approaches,
negotiation did not always occur in an open market. In a negotiation process, a land user (i.e., an
SOE in this case) submitted a land-use proposal to the land bureau, which then negotiated with
the land user on the price, usage duration, and usage constraints of the target site. In practice,
what usually happened was that SOEs negotiated with the land bureau for an under-market value
fee paid to the government, and then requested a higher, but still under-valued, land price, from
potential developers. Nationwide, Lei (1999) estimated that over 90% of SOE land-use rights
were conveyed through negotiation, a number that would not have been this high if rules had
been strictly followed.
A turning point in the above-mentioned situation began on August 31, 2004 when the
Ministry of Land and Resources began to strictly enforce a regulation requiring that all urban
land to be used for commercial, tourism, entertaining, and commodity housing purposes be
enlisted in a tender-auction-bidding system (Ministry of Land and Resources and Ministry of
Supervision 2004). Meanwhile, many municipalities established a Land Consolidation and
Reserve Center under the municipal land bureau, administering land consolidation, expropriation,
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purchase, retrieval, reservation and supply. Since then, the Land Center has become an essential
player in the primary land development stage.
Seeing what has happened in Beijing since the mid-2000s, one can get a sense of how
some stakeholder groups shift from one category to another in a positive way. Figure 5.5 depicts
a simplified transfer channel of land-use-right ownership from SOEs to final users before and
after 2004, the time point when auctions were enforceably implemented for all industrial land
being converted. Since then, the Land Center has become responsible for conducting primary
land development and organizing auctions. Compared with private actors, the Center, as a public
agency, is more cautious not to release "dirty land" to the market. In addition, if a large amount
of upfront funds are needed for site cleanup, it is also relatively easy for the Center to borrow
money from the bank for site preparation.
Before 2004 SO Private Real Final 
Users-
Estate Developers -Residents
After 2004 SOEs M Land Consolidation . Construction Final Users-
and Reserve Center Developers -Residents
Source: the author
Figure 5.5: Land Flow Before and After 2004
5.7 Conclusion
From 1999 to 2010, China's GDP world ranking jumped from seventh to second, right after the
United States. While the country's economy is growing at full speed, so is the cost to the
environment. According to China Green National Accounting Study Report 2004 (SEPA and
NBS 2006), in 2004, the cost of environmental pollution in economic losses amounted to 511.8
billion yuan (US$63 billion), i.e., 3.1% of the GDP. Of this figure, the environmental costs of
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water pollution, air pollution, and solid wastes pollution-related accidents accounted for 55.9%,
42.9%, and 1.2%, respectively. Based on this estimate, the central government released the
country's regional Green GDP figures in 2006 as an innovative approach to account for its
growth in an environmental context. However, this attempt failed in succeeding years for a
variety of reasons, among which the results of near zero (or worse) growth in many areas were
politically too sensitive (XIE Anfu 2004). Notably, this calculation did not consider damages
caused by urban industrial land. If this were included, the final green GDP figure would be even
lower.
On the positive side, Chinese policymakers have been working steadily to control
environmental damages. Land contamination has been placed on their agenda. The most urgent
task is to formalize brownfield redevelopment systems and incorporate them in the planning
process. If this is done, overseeing the use of brownfields will become a responsibility not only
of environmental bureaus but also of other entities as well. It is still too early to tell who the
strong supporters or opponents of upcoming brownfield policies will be. By referring to the
stakeholder typology (Figure 5.3), policymakers can, at least, visualize the position of each
stakeholder group. The mapping concept (Figure 5.4) can further assist them in predicting the
transitional status of salient stakeholders and identifying spaces for improvement of proposed
policies.
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Chapter 6: Three Plant Relocation Cases
As I observed from my field trips, in Beijing, there was little evidence that real estate developers
paid much attention to land contamination for industrial sites that were vacated during the
relocation peak period between 2000 and 2005. The turning point was caused by an accident in
April 2004. Three subway construction workers were hospitalized because of sudden exposure
to a high concentration of chemical products, which were a legacy of the Beijing Coating
Factory. Since then, the land pollution problem has emerged, and there has been increasing
pressure for government action. The first thing the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau
(EPB) needs to know is which land is polluted and how severely. Between 2005 and 2006, the
Beijing EPB investigated 18 closed or to be closed plants, sampled soil and underground water
on six sites, and preliminarily confirmed the presence of pollutants. During the investigation,
Beijing EPB officials had to refer to other countries' documents about assessment procedures,
pollution standards, and cleanup methods, because these seemingly basic guidance documents
did not exist in China. In developed countries, such regulations are generally promulgated by the
national or state government. It would have taken too long to wait for actions from the central
government. As a result of the local efforts, in 2007 the Beijing EPB released two documents,
the Guidance for Site Environmental Assessment and the Notice about the Issue of Soil
Environmental Impact Assessment on Former Industrial Site. The former standardizes methods
and procedures for soil assessment, but it does not have regulatory power. The latter stipulates
that any former industrial site is required to conduct a site assessment before redevelopment; if
pollution exists, a cleanup proposal should be submitted to the Beijing EPB; cleanup
responsibility falls on the former industrial enterprises; new construction is allowed only after
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the soil reaches a certain cleanup standard. More powerful than the Guidance, this Notice is an
administrative regulation, regulating all industrial sites in Beijing. However, because the Notice
is not a law, which would carry a penalty for non-compliance, its enforcement power is very
limited (Interview 20090604). This weak enforcement power presages uncertain outcomes of
land recycling projects.
In this chapter, I use three plant relocation cases to elaborate three typical models of
industrial land redevelopment - an enterprise-led land development model, a land center-led land
development model, and a developer-led land development model. The three cases are the
Capital Iron and Steel Plant, often called Shougang, the Beijing Coke Plant, and the Beijing
Chemical Plant (Figure 6.1). Instead of discussing why some brownfields have been well
managed and some have not, I describe the process by which they have been managed, i.e., the
question of how they have been managed. At present (February 2011), the redevelopment of
these sites is still an ongoing process, but I have observed the changing nature of such an
unsettled issue.
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Source: Beijing Studio, IT 2008
Figure 6.1: Location of the Three Cases
6.1 Capital Iron and Steel Plant (Shougang)
The Capital Iron and Steel Group, referred to as Shougang, has been a critical producer in
China's iron and steel making history. Established in 1919, the current Shougang has survived
for almost a century. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1959,
Shougang, as a state-owned enterprise, has made a series of investments to improve its
production technologies and capacities - for example, in 1964, it established the country's first
basic oxygen furnace with a capacity of thirty tonnes; in 1978, it ranked among the top ten iron
and steel producers with an annual steel output of 1.79 million tonnes; in 1994, its steel
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production reached 8.24 million tonnes, advancing to the country's top position in steel making
(Baogang Research Institute 2004). Over time, Shougang has transformed from an iron and steel
making producer to a conglomerate, expanding into the fields of mining, construction, real
estate, finance, social welfare services, and recreational services. The conglomerate has
contributed to more than half of the fiscal revenue of the city of Beijing as well as the
Shijingshan District, where its iron and steel production base is located (Xinjing News
10/11/2010).
Whether to move Shougang out of Beijing has been a sensitive debate since the 1980s
because such a decision would have significant socioeconomic impacts on the region. If the
factory were removed, fiscal revenue would shrink dramatically, the number of unemployed
would rise, and the steel production of the city would drop. Given the high energy consuming
and polluting nature of steelmaking, production activities have made Shougang the major
contributor to the city's air and water pollution (Xinhua News 3/21/2007). The key driver of the
relocation decision was the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (Wang Lixin 2009). The relocation
project began in 2005 and lasted until 2010. As of today, in 2011, how to develop the site is still
under discussion.
The Relocation Debate
Wang Lixin in his book The Relocation of Shougang documented in detail Shougang's historical
era from its origin, to its heyday, and to its closure. In fact, the closure was not caused by
dilapidated equipment and facilities, financial debt, or the pursuit of cheaper resources, but
because the factory's existence conflicted with the urban living environment. Solving this
conflict became conspicuously urgent after Beijing won the bid for the 2008 Olympics. August
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1, 2004 was the date in Shougang's history when its destiny was determined. Representatives
from eleven agencies, both public and private, gathered to discuss whether Beijing should keep
Shougang or ask it to move to Tangshan city in Hebei province. The eleven agencies included
the Shougang Group, the China International Engineering Consulting Company, the National
Development and Reform Commission, the State Environmental Protection Agency, the
municipal government, the Development Research Center Committee under the State Council,
metallurgical experts, environmental experts, the Hebei Development and Reform Commission,
the Tangshan Development and Reform Commission, and the Tangshan Iron and Steel Making
Enterprise.
This multi-party debate was actually a negotiation between two groups - the Shougang
Group and the environmental experts. Although both groups agreed to alleviate air pollution by
cutting back production at the company's Shijingshan base, they diverted on the question of the
future location of the iron and steel making production. The Shougang Group, led by its
president and secretary-general, Zhu Jimin, preferred keeping the factory in Beijing, while the
environmental protection experts advocated the complete removal of the factory (WANG Lixin
2009). Shougang, being a state-owned enterprise of China's pillar industry, is not only
economically powerful but also politically strong. On the one hand, its president, usually
appointed by the central government, holds a bureaucratic position as high as the vice-ministerial
level, above the representative of EPB and environmental experts. Without the agreement of
Shougang's president, municipal-level government agencies cannot force the factory to leave
under an administrative order. On the other hand, the environmental agency along with
environmental experts possessed the one-vote veto power as far as the environment is concerned.
It was not an easy negotiation at all. Finally, an agreement was reached that Shougang would
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reduce its production capacity and move to Caofeidian, Hebei province, in phases. This was a
breakthrough in the factory's history because in the past, although relocating the Shijingshan
production base had been raised on several occasions, Shougang leaders had refused to bring
relocation to the table.
Eventually, on February 5, 2005, with its relocation plan approved by the National
Development and Reform Commission and the Beijing municipal government, Shougang began
to shift production activities from Shijingshan in Beijing to Caofeidian. Its large scale and its
socio-economic impact on the city have made Shougang the social and economic focal subject of
Beijing society at the outset. Economically, Shougang estimated that the costs of relocation,
including construction at the new site, compensation to existing workers, loss of production, and
other foreseeable costs during transition, would be 40 billion yuan, an amount the enterprise
alone could not afford. By 2005, the site had five large iron-making furnaces of various
capacities and three steel-making plants, as well as supporting facilities, such as coke-making
plants, oxygen furnaces, and hot rolling mills. A vast percentage of the equipment stock in these
plants was upgraded in 1995, but would have to be disposed when the plants were closed (Wang
Lixin 2009). The plan was that by the end of 2007, the production capacity would be reduced by
half to 4 million tonnes; by 2010, all production would cease and only non-polluting services -
sales, logistics, and service industries - would be kept on the site. Socially, production cutback
meant a loss of employment opportunities. When operating at full capacity, the factory had more
than 100,000 workers; at one-half capacity, 50,000 workers might face reemployment or
unemployment; an entire closure would generate 60,700 spare laborers in the Shijingshan area,
with 39,300 workers staying either at the headquarters in Shijingshan or working in new plants
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(Xinhua News 3/12/2009). This last unemployment figure would be a heavy burden on the
society.
The Land- Use Debate
Whether to shut down all the plants of Shougang was a major controversy. So was the issue of
how to develop the site. The production site was by far the largest industrial land to be
redeveloped in Beijing. Located in the Shijingshan District of Beijing, and only 17 kilometers
from Tian'anmen Square in the center of Beijing, the 7.07-square kilometer parcel fell within the
node between the western development zone and the Chang'an Street axis in the urban spatial
pattern "two axes, two zones and multiple centers" defined in Beijing's Master Plan (2004-
2020). Beijing's first subway line, the No. 1 line, has served the community since 1969. After
the factory was removed, the site bridged the central city, Mentougou satellite city, and the rest
of the western part of Beijing in all directions.
One section in the Beijing "1 lth Five Year" Plan of Industrial Development was
specifically devoted to the spatial adjustment of Shougang's steel production activities. This
means that the Shougang relocation has been elevated to a national strategic level. Although
land use is a local or municipal matter, how to develop the giant site has received broad attention
at all levels of government, the private sector, and the public. A typical government approach
would be to allow the demolition of all facilities, break the site into several parcels, rezone them
to alternative land use types, and sell them to real estate developers. Using this approach, the
planners would transform the industrial area into a modern district filled with office and
residential towers, department stores, and hotels and restaurants. However, impressed by its
industrial landscape, some people opposed a complete erasure of this industrial culture,
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suggesting instead the conversion of the place into a theme park as a way to memorize the
historically influential mills.
Working in collaboration, in 2005, the Shougang Group and the Beijing planning
commission authorized a team of experts at Tsinghua University to conduct an investigation of
the site, making a laundry list of structures that should be preserved as industrial historical
monuments. The final product was a draft of the Planningfor Shougang's Industrial Park
Transformation submitted to the Beijing municipal government in December 2006. Then, after
months of revision, the final report was officially announced in April 2007, serving as the
foundation and guidance for future detailed design and planning schemes. The report started
with a broad review of the development advantages of the surrounding regions (location,
transportation, spatial and industrial resources, natural and ecological resources, and cultural
environment) and potential constraints (regional economy, land-use integration, employment,
social, ecological and human environment). In the report, site ecological investigation and
environmental assessment were reviewed especially carefully. Soil environmental engineers
found that three plots, accounting for 10% of the site's land area, contained a high concentration
of pollutants. The report indicated several times that without proper remediation, the highly
polluted plots could not achieve the standards for human settlement.
During an interview done by Xinhua News (LI Shu 4/6/2007), an anonymous official
from the Beijing planning commission stated that the industrial site was zoned into five
functional areas: (1) cultural and creative industries in the northern part; (2) leisure and tourism
industries in the southwest part; (3) the headquarters of the Shougang Group in the east part; (4)
an industrial theme park; and (5) an office complex for the central government along the
Chang'an Street corridor.
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In 2009, the Beijing Development and Reform Commission (BDRC) revealed during an
official meeting that the former Shougang area would be transformed from a labor and capital
intensive production place with a serious pollution level into a clean "China's Intelligent
Valley," an industrial park for international business services such as futures exchange (FU
Shasha 9/15/2009). The meeting emphasized commercial office building development. Like
many other relocation projects, the Shougang relocation project also enjoys favorable land and
tax policy support. More specifically, the Shougang Group is entitled to receive part of the land
conveyance fees from commercial plots; the Shijingshan District government is entitled to keep
part of the land-value premiums, which should have been turned over the municipal treasury, and
use the premiums for infrastructure construction within the area. In addition, different from
other concurrent relocation projects, those plots designated for professional services will be
exempt from the bidding-auction-listing regulations on former industrial land. Instead, such land
can be transferred through negotiation (FU Shasha 9/15/2009).
In the long run, the BDRC announced a three-phase redevelopment for the Shougang site.
First, between 2008 and 2010, Shougang tried to obtain policy support from the central
government to promote professional services development in the area. The objective was to
build a one million square meter office-building complex. Second, between 2011 and 2015, an
intensive construction period, the target is to establish a large-scale modern professional service
industrial park of 5 million square meters. Last, the ultimate objective is to expand the scale of
the industrial park to over 10 million square meters, making it a competitive attraction for
professional service establishments in the global market (FU Shasha 9/15/2009). Ambitious as
the plan is, how Shougang will carry it out remains unclear as of February 2011.
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Summary
The relocation of the Shougang plant lasted five years, from 2005 to 2010. As of now (February
2011), land development has not started. Indeed, it is too early to evaluate the outcome of
Shougang's land recycling. But at least there have been positive signs of an increased awareness
of land pollution, improved influence of the environmental agency, and a receptive state-owned
enterprise. As the Shougang Group moved its entire manufacturing complex from Beijing to
Caofeidian, this particular relocation has received political and financial support from the central
government as well as prominent public attention. What makes this case special is that the
redevelopment of the site has been upgraded to the level of a national planning program. Under
this circumstance, although the site redevelopment will be executed by the Shougang Group,
every step it takes is under the surveillance of the central government, which will ensure the
safety of the site's future usage. Yet this case is just one of the many gigantic industrial
migration projects happening in many Chinese cities and not all of them can be backed by the
central government. The majority follow the other two land development models I describe
below.
6.2 Beijing Coke Plant
For six months starting in July 2006, the Beijing Coke Plant, after running for 47 years, was
scheduled to be completely shut down in the Fatou region. To replace the old plant, the
company built a new coke-making mill in Tangshan, Hebei province. The relocation of the
Beijing Coke Plant is another prominent case in Beijing's industrial out-migration movement.
The Beijing Coke Plant, although smaller than Shougang in scale, also contributed
significantly to the city's growth. The plant was initially established in 1958 to supply
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manufactured coal gas to the Beijing region, as opposed to natural gas. During its peak time, the
plant had six large-scale coke ovens with a total capacity of 600 million cubic meters of gas. For
a long time, it was the only source of energy for Beijing's residential and office buildings. The
production of its main product - fuel coke - made the plant the country's largest producer of
commercial coke, a significant proportion of which was sold to the Capital Iron and Steel Plant
(Shougang) in Shijingshan District.
The Relocation Decision
Unlike the Shougang case, removing the Beijing Coke Plant from Beijing was never
controversial (Interview 20060610). As a municipally-operated, state-owned enterprise, the
plant was listed as one of the more than 200 enterprises in the southeast part of Beijing to be
relocated by 2008 (Beijing Municipal Government 2003). It is widely known that the plant
caused serious air and water pollution even beyond its vicinity. To produce coke, more than
three million tonnes of coal was burned per year. During this process, air emissions such as
sulfur and coke dust, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, light benzene, and ammonium
compounds were released from coke ovens. Water and soil were also polluted by those emitted
chemicals. Some environmentalists estimated that the plant produced nearly 50% of the city's
atmospheric sulphur dioxide and discharged 98% of the lead in the air (YAO Yi and RAO Pei
2006).
As the city's demand for coal gas was replaced by natural gas, the plant's role as an
energy supplier diminished. The original relocation plan was to close the old facilities in 2005;
but because some of Beijing's residents still depended on coal gas for energy, the
implementation was postponed to 2007 (MENG Wei 4/26/2005). By the time of its closure, the
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plant had 6,000 employees, 1,500 of whom would move to the new production site in Tangshan
city (Interview 20060610). The relocation project became the center of the society's attention
for two reasons: first, it was the first relocation project approved by the Beijing municipal
government, and second, the total investment of the project was estimated to be 3 billion yuan
(QU Qing 2006).
It seemed obvious to people that the steps following the plant closure would be: step one,
workers commuting to the new production base weekly or bi-weekly; step two, reusable
machineries being sold to other companies; step three, immobile facilities and buildings being
exploded and disposed as solid wastes; and step four, new buildings appearing on the site.
However, the coke plant did not follow the typical development trajectory.
The Land-Use Plan
Located on the southeast outskirts of Beijing, the 1.35 million-square meter coke plant connects
the urban core area, Tongzhou new town, and the Yizhuang Development Zone. This large
parcel has been an attractive target among real estate companies because it is among the scarce
land resources within the fifth ring road available for housing. Many people expected that this
industrial land was destined for real estate construction. Some predicted that this site might be a
new "Land King" in Beijing (JIA Dongting 2007), a term used to indicate the highest transaction
price of a parcel among previous land auctions in a certain geographical area.
The site's land-use plan has been revised several times since the start of the relocation
project. In January 2007, a few days after the factory was closed, I interviewed an official from
the Beijing Municipal Urban Planning Commission (Interview 20070111), who was in charge of
the relocation project. According to my interviewee, the State-owned Assets Supervision and
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Administration Commission (Guoziwei), an agency managing SOEs' assets, proposed the
relocation of the Beijing Coke Plant to the municipal government. At that time, the biggest
problem facing the coke-making enterprise was believed to be the shortage of funding for both
demolition of the facilities and compensation for 3,000 workers.
On December 25, 2006, the Beijing Municipal Land Consolidation and Reserve Center
(later referred to as the Land Center) signed a land-transfer contract with the Beijing Coke Plant.
The center paid the enterprise 0.2 billion yuan for 1.24 million m2 of the mill site, with the
remaining 0.11 million m2 retained by the company. The coke-making company would use the
0.2 billion to compensate its workers and pay for construction at the new site. According to the
land contract, before transferring the land to the center, the company should remove all of the old
facilities on the site by March 2008. The site would then be incorporated into the detailed
planning of the Fatou region.
Responsible for clearing the site, the coke-making enterprise faced its first task - finding
a demolition firm that did not request a high price. To determine with which firm to hire, the
coke-making enterprise called for a tender invitation in January 2007. Because none of the
onsite structures needed to be transported to the new site, the demolition was a fairly easy job:
the winning firm needed only to dismantle the machinery and equipment and sell them in pieces.
The tender invitation letter set the bidding prices at 350,000 yuan/unit for removing chimneys,
165 yuan/m3 for demolishing structures, and 48 yuan/m 2 for clearing the site. A rough
calculation indicated that the project would cost the coke-making enterprise 18 million yuan, to
be paid to the contract winner. (LI Fang 1/10/2007)
This seemingly open competition was criticized as being non-transparent, as seen in the
specifications of bidding prices. For conventional waste disposal services, waste producers pay
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demolition companies to demolish and dispose solid wastes. Unlike conventional waste-disposal
services, the demolition industry makes profits out of the sales of disposed facilities, rather than
the payment by factory clients. In the case of this project, the demolition firm could keep the
revenues from the sales of facilities. One firm manager made a rough calculation of the potential
benefit of this contract. In addition to the 18 million contract value, clearing the entire plant
would generate 30,000 tonnes of steel scrap, 1,000 tonnes of copper scrap, and other equipment
and materials, all of which were valued at 95 million yuan (China Business Times 1/25/2007). In
a similar case in the past, instead of the enterprise paying money to the demolition firm, the
former actually received money from the latter. This is plausible because the demolition firm
could make up profits by selling dismantled facilities. However, the tender outcome of the coke
plant was not satisfactory. The participating demolition firms found the process non-transparent
and the winner seemingly pre-determined (LI Fang 2007). As cited in the media, this process
has created a significant controversy.
By the time the Land Center purchased the 1.24 million m2 tract from the factory, the
initial plan of the Center was to convert the industrial land into residential use to maximize the
land value. The Center submitted a proposal for the land-use change to the Beijing planning
commission, which, however, suggested a redevelopment delay, because it wanted the
environmental department to conduct an environmental assessment of the site and to recommend
a land-recovery plan (Interview 20070111). Because of the controversy over the demolition and
the delayed proposal-reviewing process, the land-redevelopment progress was also slowed down.
This delay, in my opinion, worked out in a positive way, for it allowed planners more time to
understand the site and think about which option made the best use of the land.
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Two Issues Related to the Site
Similar to Shougang, the Beijing Coke Plant is characterized by its grand production facilities,
which record the history of China's industrialization era. Whether to preserve this industrial
heritage became a concern to planners. Although how to redevelop the former coke-making site
has received broad attention from public agencies, to real estate developers, and to Fatou
residents, the responsibility fell largely on the Beijing planning commission. Several months
before the plant was closed in 2006, planners from the planning commission visited the site and
were amazed by its industrial landscape - a dense railway system, giant furnaces, and a
sophisticated overhead pipeline system. Around the same period, a nationwide forum was held
in Wuxi city regarding industrial heritage preservation in China. The major achievement of the
forum was the passage of Wuxi Suggestion (2006), a proposal that encourages the government to
conduct industrial heritage identification, registration, and heritage-specific planning formulation.
Industrial heritage, a relatively new concept in the cultural heritage category, often includes
buildings and facilities of industry built during the area's industrialization period. The coke
plant seems to be a candidate for such a historic title. As the discussion on whether it qualifies to
be considered as part of the nation's industrial heritage was ongoing, the demolition plan was
about to begin. At that last critical moment, the planning commission ordered a halt to the action.
Finally in August 2009, the Beijing Municipal Administration of Cultural Heritage and the
planning commission jointly announced the city's first list of industrial-heritage sites, including
two coke ovens and one coal tower in the coke plant (Xinjing News 8/8/2010).
Another concern related to the site is land contamination. Coke-making is known to
cause serious contamination to groundwater and soil with petroleum-related chemicals, which
are byproducts of making coal into coke. In 2006, the Beijing Municipal Environmental
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Protection Bureau (EPB) was asked by the planning commission to prepare a soil-assessment
report and a cleanup plan for the coke plant site. That year, the Beijing EPB had just started
related practices in managing urban brownfields. Its biggest challenges were locating funding
for assessment and cleanup and finding experts in cleanup standards and techniques in this field
(Interview 20090604). On the one hand, previously, the Beijing EPB had difficulty finding
environmental experts on urban industrial land in China because the brownfield problem was
neither a professional practice nor an academic research field. On the other hand, no one was
named legally responsible for the assessment and cleanup costs. Finally, the Beijing EPB
consulted foreign experts and referred to research done in other countries for technical support.
Also, the Beijing EPB received some funding from the Ministry of Environmental Protection of
Italy to cover the site-assessment cost. They sampled soil, identified pollutants in the soil,
marked pollution boundaries, and proposed cleanup measures. The assessment project alone cost
roughly 20 million yuan (Interview 20090604).
The 1.35 million-square meter site has been attractive to developers because of its large
scale and good location. If used for apartment building construction, the rate of return will
probably be more than ten times (author's projection). Being aware of the land pollution, Zeng
Zanrong, deputy director general of Beijing Land Bureau, stated that the site would not be used
for large-scale apartment construction. The soil-assessment document reported that the soil was
contaminated by coal dust and aromatic pollutants at varying depths, underground. The
contaminated soil under the coal towers was as deep as ten meters. A consensus was reached
among the plant manager and government officials that the site had to be remediated before
construction. Because the plant site had been purchased by the Land Center, the Center had to
take a leading role in organizing land redevelopment, including the cleanup. According to one of
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my interviewees, it is likely that the Beijing Municipal Commission of Science and Technology
will contribute some funding toward the cleanup (Interview 20090605).
According to a news report, the planning commission intended to allow a 1.2 million m2
industrial historical heritage park and a 150,000 m2 science and technology park in the south part
of the site (LI Ai 2007). This land-use type requires a lower cleanup standard than other land-
use types. Even so, balancing the environmental standard and cleanup cost is an extremely
challenging task for detailed site planning and design. In 2008, the planning commission,
together with the land bureau, called for a competition of planning schemes toward both
domestic and international applicants regarding the protection and development of the Beijing
Coke Plant. Six out of fifty submissions were displayed to the public in the Beijing Planning
Exhibition Building, and finally the review committee chose two.
Summary
The Beijing Coke Plant case shows a promising start of brownfield redevelopment practice in
Beijing. The Land Center was fully involved in the land transaction as the intermediate owner of
the industrial site. In contrast to private real estate developers, in the coke plant case, the Land
Center worked more closely with the environmental agency, held a stronger moral obligation to
reduce potential risks, and had wider access to funding for brownfields. At each stage, from the
relocation proposal, to facility demolition, to the planning proposal, decisions were made based
on a fairly transparent procedure. Responsible government agencies adopted market
mechanisms, such as tender and open call, to facilitate a fair competition and to achieve a
favorable outcome. This Land Center-led land development model seems a safe approach to
solving the current land contamination problem. But because of cash flow constraint, it is
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practically impossible for the Land Center to buy all industrial sites from SOEs, invest in the
land to reach construction standards, and then sell the sites to real estate developers. Therefore,
in many cases, the center simply functions as an auction organizer, as happened to the Beijing
Chemical Plant described below.
6.3 Beijing Chemical Plant
Several chemical plants used to cluster in the southeast corner of Beijing's central business
district, thus becoming another infamous source of pollution to the city's environment (QU Qing
2006). Among these plants, the Beijing Chemical Plant was one of the heavily polluting ones,
along with the Chemical Experiment Plant and the Beijing No.2 Chemical Plant (ZHANG Fen
and JIA Zhongshan 2007). The sites of these plants received great attention from both Beijing's
public and private actors more because of their extraordinarily high market potential than their
pollution levels. The Beijing Chemical Plant, belonging to the Beijing Chemical Works, was
established in 1950 and moved to the Guangqu Road location in 1958. It has grown into the
country's major chemical reagents producer.
As early as 2002, the enterprise started its relocation project. In 2006, the plant's
production base was completely moved from the urban area to Beijing's rural area in Daxing
County. Although the site was cleared soon after the plant was closed, as of January 2011, the
actual redevelopment of the site has not yet started for different reasons.
Land Transaction
With a land area of 0.16 million square meters, the chemical plant parcel was among the second
batch of sites the Land Center released to the market for open auction. In this case, the Land
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Center acted as the organizer and facilitator of the auction, rather than as the intermediate land
owner, as in the coke plant case. In 2004, the site was sold to the Capital City Real Estate
Company for 1.82 billion yuan, but because the company failed to pay the full price within the
required time, the Land Center took the site back from the developer in 2004. In October 2006,
the site was believed by many to be reserved for the House of Two Restrictions program (liang
xianfang), which aims to provide houses at affordable prices and limited square footage for low
or middle income families. At the end of 2007, when the site was listed on the market, it turned
out to be zoned for commercial housing construction. However, due to an insufficient number of
participating real estate companies during the tendering period, the sale of the site was not
accomplished. After one and a half years, the site was listed on the market again. This time, in
June 2009, the sale of the site was a great success in Beijing's land market at 4.06 billion yuan, a
price that gave the site the title "land king." The buyer was Franshion Properties, a subsidiary
company under the Sinochem Corporation (Legal Evening News 11/27/2009). This outcome
meant that, despite the land contamination, the Beijing Chemical Plant site broke the bidding
record for vacant-lot auctions.
Public attention to the potential contamination of the chemical plant site was due to an
unexpected visit by a citizen. On February 26, 2006, the Beijing Municipal Environmental
Protection Bureau had a visitor, Wu Yunli, who had worked at the plant back in the 1960s. He
told Xinjing News reporters: "the reason I resort to the environmental bureau is that I heard the
industrial land will be used for housing." He revealed that, forty-two years earlier, he had buried
a lead box containing radioactive elements in the yard. If the box still existed underground and
was not carefully removed during construction, leakage might cause health problems for
construction workers as well as residents. Later, on the basis of the location information Mr. Wu
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provided, experts from the environmental bureau explored the area, dug a hole at the pinpointed
spot, and detected the surrounding areas. Nothing was found. Nevertheless, the environmental
bureau has asked the chemical company and the real estate company to be aware of the potential
danger and to report any suspicious items if found. (CUI Muyang and MA Li 4/15/2006)
Because the Land Center was not involved in the land preparation, the task of cleaning up
the site fell to the real estate company, which removed contaminated soil, transported it, and
treated or buried it off-site. Regulations for transporting construction wastes require that trucks
be sealed with a steel cover to avoid leakage of the wastes. This is especially important for
contaminated soil or chemical products. But the real estate company was found to be violating
the rules: it used only a canvas cover during transportation. Soil containing heavy metals was
dribbled along the route to the treatment facility. This misbehavior was disclosed in the Legal
Evening News (11/27/2009). After this media exposure, the company claimed that it would pay
special attention to soil contamination and strictly abide by all the rules.
When the Franshion Company purchased the chemical plant site in 2009, it was initially
zoned with a floor area of 280,000 M2 . In order to recover its high payment for the land and
other contingent costs, Franshion submitted to the planning commission a request for rezoning
the height of the building by 20 meters more and the layout of the infrastructure and park.
According to a regulation requiring that all proposal requests be posted on the official website of
the planning commission for 30 days to collect public opinions, Franshion's request was posted
between December 30, 2009 and January 28, 2010. Because of opposition from the public,
especially real estate companies that joined the land auction, the planning commission turned
down the rezoning request.
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This chemical site focused major attention on Franshion Properties several times: first at
the auction as the highest bidder, then during the cleanup incident, and then concerning the
rezoning issue. By July 2010, when I paid my latest visit to the site, the land was just as vacant
as it had been four years earlier. If the company does not start the construction within a year of
the contracted starting date, it may face an idle-land fine equal to 20% of the land price; if it does
not do so within two years, the Land Center may forfeit the land use right for which the company
has paid 4 billion yuan.
Summary
The land recycling of the Beijing Chemical Plant has experienced a meandering route,
interrupted by several unanticipated matters. The plant was closed and cleared in 2006 and few
activities have happened on the site since then. This delay indicates the struggling process of
incorporating land contamination in the redevelopment of a heavily contaminated site. The Land
Center, although an auction facilitator, acts as a safeguard through open land auctions, ensuring
information disclosure and good behavior of the private developers. Citizens have actively
participated in the process and in some ways successfully altered the site's development path.
6.4 Analysis - Three Models of Land Recycling
The three cases share some common characteristics: First, all sites were in locations with high
market value; second, they caused air, water and soil pollution to the surrounding environments;
third, they attracted significant public attention. Although occurring around the same period, the
three cases have demonstrated three distinct situations in the land recycling of former industrial
sites. They represent three models of urban industrial land redevelopment. Based on the land-
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development entities, I name them the enterprise-led land development model (Shougang plant),
the Land Center-led land development model (coke plant) and the developer-led land
development model (chemical plant).
The enterprise model is characterized by a very powerful relocated state-owned
enterprise. In this model, plants to be removed are generally economically and politically
powerful entities. They often receive financial and political support from the central government
because of their social-economic influence in a region and economic and political status within
the country. The redevelopment of such a site can be exempted from procedural regulations. As
shown in the Shougang case, many exceptions were made. The municipal government allowed
the Shougang Group to maintain ownership of the site and to be responsible for the site's land
development. This privilege means that the enterprise would be able to capture the land
premium created by land improvement. Parcels for R&D-related buildings were allowed to be
transferred to developers through an agreement-based land allocation approach (xieyi churang),
rather than market-based auction (ZHU Shuo 2010). The land development did not involve the
Land Center. This development model is relatively rare compared with the other two models.
The Land Center model highlights the significance of the municipal Land Center, a
recently created public agency to manage the city's land market. As mentioned previously, after
August 31, 2004, all industrial land to be redeveloped has had to be included in the government's
annual land-supply inventory, and the transfer of such land has had to go through an open
auction. The Land Center is responsible for these activities. In a typical Land Center model, the
Land Center purchases the site from enterprises with its own funding or borrowed money,
improves the site to a buildable standard (i.e., primary land development), and then sells it to real
estate developers in an auction. Through this process, the Land Center is able to capture the land
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premium. Thus, the coke plant case best demonstrates the role of the Land Center as a land
developer.
The developer model covers cases where the land is developed by a private real estate
company. A majority of former industrial sites belong to this category. In this model, the Land
Center just provides a platform for land auction and the winning real estate developer is in
charge of land development as well as subsequent construction. In the case of the Beijing
Chemical Plant, the Land Center organized the land auction, basically delivering the site in the
same condition as received from the chemical enterprise to developers, without additional
investment. For the Land Center, the advantage of this model is that there is no need for working
capital to purchase and improve the site. The disadvantage is that, once the parcel is sold, the
Land Center as a government agency has little obligation to ensure the provision of
environmentally safe land.
What are the implications of these three models to brownfields? I summarize the degree
of participation of key players in the land-recycling process (Table 6.1). Because the Shougang
model is a special case, my analysis will compare the two other models. According to one of my
interviewees (interview 20070103), if the Land Center buys the land, it will address the pollution
issues, working in collaboration with the environmental bureau and the relocated enterprise. If
the Land Center only prepares for auction, it will request that the relocated enterprise submit an
environmental-assessment report, which will be attached to the public-bidding report, so that
developers are aware of the environmental condition of the land they purchased. Generally,
developers will be asked to do the cleanup. In the latter circumstance, developers are expected to
have a strong commitment to environmental protection, which was lacking in the chemical plant
case.
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Table 6.1: De gree of Participation of Key Actors
Iron & Steel Plant (Shougang) Coke Plant Chemical Plant
Model type Enterprise-led Land Land Center-led Land Developer-led Land
Development Model Development Model Development Model
Key issues Whether to relocate or not; Demolition auction non- Land king of that time
Industrial heritage preservation transparent Rezoning after land auction
SIndustrial heritage preservation Land contamination
EPB* Worked closely with SOB Worked actively with land Worked passively with
center developer
Citizen Little participation Passive participation Active participation
*Citizen visit to EPB
tCitizen opposition to rezoning
SOE* Developer of the site Demolished onsite facilities Left everything behind to
others
Land Not involved Fully involved as land Partially involved as auction
Reserve developer and auction organizer organizer
Center
Market Call for site design competition Demolition tender invitation Rezoning request display for
mechanism No land auction Call for site design competition public comments
-Land auction Land auction
EPB is environmental protection bureau; SOE
Source: the author
is state-owned enterprise.
The style in which the environmental protection bureau (EPB) interacts with site
developers also makes a difference. Because China has few legislative specifications on
brownfields, especially enforceable rules on land remediation, the environmental bureau has
limited room to monitor the actual cleanup practices. Private real estate developers are likely to
simplify the cleanup process and keep the remediation cost as low as possible. Such a hasty
action cannot guarantee the best and healthiest use of the former industrial site. Alternatively,
the participation of the Land Center in land development implies a positive outcome. The Land
Center, as a government agency with a moral obligation to maintain a healthy environment for
the people, is likely to be cautious about what the environmental bureau suggests. Should any
suspected pollution be observed, the Land Center tends to slow down development and organize
a further investigation of the site.
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All three cases more or less adopted methods of public participation. Both Shougang and
the coke plant exhibited the top site-design schemes resulting from design competitions
organized by the planning commission. However, this public-record approach treats citizens as
passive recipients of what has happened. In contrast, the chemical plant demonstrated two
effective approaches to participation: public comment and personal visit. In public comment, the
rezoning proposal, which was turned down, was open to the public for a 30-day period and
subject to comments from the community. Also, a former plant worker's report to the
environmental bureau increased public attention to the problem of land contamination. The
behavior of the private developer was thus under the scrutiny of both the government and the
public.
Applying the stakeholder analysis demonstrated in Chapter 5 to the three development
cases, we can observe that several stakeholders initially with only two attributes turned into
definitive stakeholders with all three attributes of stakeholders. In the coke plant case, the Land
Center's role as the land developer indicated the shift of land developers from dominant
stakeholders which did not have an urgent call for immediate attention to land contamination to
definitive stakeholders. In the chemical plant case, the land auction method which required a
disclosure of site information drove the land developers, although private, to take immediate
action regarding land pollution. Similar shift also happened to local residents, the media, and
governmental agencies.
6.5 Conclusion
By discussing these three cases, I do not intend to conclude that one redevelopment model is
necessarily better than the others. Nor can I tell which model will generate a better outcome
157
because these cases are still ongoing. The purpose of the case studies was to demonstrate the
varying processes of land recycling. I explored the differences and their implications to
brownfield management. I observed some progress in Beijing's planning system. Market
mechanisms have been gradually applied throughout the land-recycling process, from demolition,
land sale, and site design. Planning information is no longer confidentially kept within the
government sphere. Public opinion, to some degree, is reflected in the decision-making process.
New institutions, such as the establishment of the Land Center and the introduction of the
auction system, have facilitated competition in the real estate market. All of this progress,
although not intentionally carried out to solve the brownfield problem, will certainly help to
ensure good practices in brownfield redevelopment.
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Chapter 7: Progress toward Sustainable Land Recycling
After the mid-1950s, under the planned economy, cities in China built factories right next to the
urban edge. People were proud of working in these manufacturing plants, living next to the mills,
and seeing smoke coming out of the machines, chimneys, and pipes. More than half a century
later, the country's population has doubled, with more than one-third living in urban areas; the
urban boundaries have expanded; and the economic structure has shifted. Although much has
changed, many of these factories are located where they were half a century ago. Conflicts
between these factories and the urban environment have become more and more contentious
since the 1990s: they contribute significantly to the deterioration of the air and water quality,
impede the growth of the real estate market, and delay the shift from the urban economy to a
service sector-dominant one. In a word, they no longer fit into the urban environment. Starting
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, factories, one after another, moved out of the urban areas to
less-developed areas. Around 2000, the number of relocated factories surged. As evidenced by
Beijing's statistics, the number of enterprises that left the city jumped from 59 to 142 during the
five-year periods before and after 2000 (Ninth and Tenth Five Year Plans of Beijing), with total
land areas of 1.72 and 6.13 million m2 , respectively.
7.1 Benchmarking with the United States
Looking back in history to the geographical transition of US industries, we can observe a similar
phenomenon in China, deindustrialization, occurring thirty years later. Deindustrialization in
China distinguishes itself from that in the United States in many ways. First, industries in China
are subject to a persistent displacement pressure from the government (Qu 2006), rather than the
159
"voluntary" movement that occurred in the United States as plant managers pursued large profits
and/or avoided union and environmental regulations (Collaton and Bartsch 1996). Second, it
was primarily a government-led initiative in China that triggered a speedy departure of polluting
industries, combined with political pressure and economic incentives. Third, driven by a
booming real estate market in China, large-scale former industrial land has been redeveloped
quickly. Acres of land were converted from industrial production to alternative higher-value
-uses, such as apartments and offices, rather than being abandoned as they were in the United
States. All of these differences seemingly indicate that, compared with cities in the United
States, cities in China have managed this transition fairly well. Yet, it is too early to reach a
definitive conclusion.
Unlike the United States, which has developed a full set of brownfield regulations with
clear prescriptions for liabilities, procedures, standards, and policy supports, China has few laws
specifically targeting urban brownfields. Some may disagree with me, arguing that the 1996
Environmental Quality Standard for Soils and the 1999 Environmental Quality Risk Assessment
Criteria for Soil at Manufacturing Facilities are examples of national regulation of soil standards,
and that the 1989 Environmental Protection Law and the 2004 Land Management Law stipulate
liabilities for cleanup (ZHANG Bailing at el. 2007). However, these acts are far from adequate
to protect the environment. As clearly specified in these regulations, the standards apply to soil
in farmland, vegetable fields, tea gardens, orchards, rangeland, woodlands and nature reserves,
and the cleanup liabilities fall on polluters. In practice, urban industrial land is out of the
affected scope of such stipulations. With the absence of brownfield-related regulations,
developers do not necessarily treat industrial land much differently than other types of land. As
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a result, without scientific assessment and cleanup, citizens who occupy buildings constructed on
or around these potentially contaminated sites are at risk.
In the summer of 2005, when I started to pay attention to industrial relocation cases in
China, I found that the issue of land contamination was not of concern to either the general
public or the government, not even Chinese environmental scholars. I found little evidence that,
among relocation projects, former industrial land was properly monitored and treated before
construction. However, there have been some improvements of the situation in recent years.
Sites were assessed and cleaned. Redevelopment activities were monitored and regulated. The
questions are: How were these former industrial sites, more or less contaminated, developed?
Did land developers assess the pollution levels and appropriately clean the sites prior to
construction? If they did, what made them do so? If they did not, why not?
I argue that government intervention is a key element in brownfield management given
existing environmental regulatory systems in China. The question is not whether intervention is
needed, but how to intervene. NRTEE (2003) found that the redevelopment of these sites whose
market values greatly exceed the costs of remediation is driven by the market force. Therefore,
for those former industrial sites in the urban areas, there is little need for government
involvement in the process beyond being a rule-maker and rule-keeper as long as appropriate
rules are followed. The assumption behind this statement is an already well-designed and
implemented set of brownfield laws, regulations and procedures. To this end, the first task for
the government is to improve the country's brownfield regulatory system. It is expected that,
once the rules of laws are enforced, the real estate market will adjust itself to accommodate the
environmental problems. This is a dangerous assumption because it may take years for such bills
to go through an often lengthy legal procedure and get passed. But the redevelopment is
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happening right now and the actions have to be regulated now. Indeed, local governments
should not wait for orders from the top. During this law-deficient period, what can local
governments do to avoid the misuse of contaminated land? My argument is that, rather than
solely relying on reform from the top, local governments have the ability to ensure a sustainable
and healthy industrial land redevelopment. A subsequent question to be answered is: What are
the circumstances under which land-related environmental problems are properly handled?
7.2 Progress in BeijingLand-recycling cases in Beijing have implications. From my field
trips, I observed that in the early 2000s developers simply avoided the treatment of the sites in
order to catch up with the speed of the real estate boom; since 2005 or so, land contamination has
been an important component at the site planning stage. Land transaction has shifted from an
informal negotiation driven by private players to a government-led standardized procedure based
on transparent competition.
In the early period of the relocation movement in Beijing (1985-2005), state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) generally negotiated with potential real estate developers. Land transaction
was completed between these two parties. Because these SOEs were in critical locations in urban
area, land was extremely valuable for commercial and residential construction. Real estate
developers were eager to develop the land as soon as possible to match the skyrocketing price of
real estate. SOEs were entitled to keep the land sale income for their own growth, even though
SOEs originally received the land from the government through free administrative allocation.
Under these circumstances, the government suffered a big loss on the land sale. In addition,
given that there were no brownfield regulations in existence, the government had little control on
the private sector's behavior. In other words, developers would make no or little effort to clean
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up the sites. As a consequence, most of the industrial sites that were developed in that period did
not even have a land-related environmental assessment, which is the initial step for brownfield
redevelopment.
Between 2005 and the present (2011), the above mentioned phenomena have changed,
thanks to the introduction of new institutions. One major institutional change is the intervention
of the government in the land supply market. In 2005, the Beijing municipal government
enacted the Provisional Measures for Land Reserve and Primary Development, which allows the
government to retrieve SOEs' land through acquisition, recovery, and expropriation, and then
auction the land to developers in an open market. The Land Consolidation and Reserve Center
of the Beijing Land Administration Bureau, was created to be in charge of the auction execution.
The purpose of the Measures is to formalize the procedure of land reserve and development,
improve the implementation of the urban master plan and the land-use plan, and ensure the
supply of land in an orderly manner.
Another institutional improvement lies in an increased influence of the environmental
bureau, which previously played a marginal role in the decision-making of industrial land
redevelopment projects. In 2007, the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) released
two documents - the Guidance for Site Environmental Assessment and the Notice about the
Issue of Soil Environmental Impact Assessment on Former Industrial Sites. The former
standardizes methods and procedures for soil assessment. The latter stipulates that any former
industrial site is required to conduct a site assessment before being redeveloped; if pollution
exists, a cleanup proposal must be submitted to the Beijing EPB; cleanup responsibility falls on
the former industrial enterprises; new construction is allowed only after the soil reaches a certain
cleanup standard. However, because the Guidance does not have regulatory power and the
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Notice is only an administrative regulatory rule without an ability to punish, both have not been
ubiquitously enforced among land redevelopment projects.
7.3 Implications of Land-Recycling Cases
To ensure the healthy development of brownfields, I argue that, as cities in China advocate a
market-driven land market, appropriate government intervention is vital. First, China has far
from a well-established brownfield system. Many scholars (CAO and GUAN 2007) suggest that
the urgent need for China now is to enact brownfield laws and regulations. They argue that as
long as regulations are in place, private sectors will make adjustments to accommodate the extra
costs for brownfields. Although the role of the government is simply to set up rules, the three
land-recycling cases in Beijing suggest otherwise.
In practice, as shown in the three land-recycling cases in Beijing, although their land
redevelopment happened in a similar time frame under the same regulatory system, there have
been variations in how redevelopment decisions were made. These differences originated from
the distribution and redistribution of power, i.e., the ability to influence, among key stakeholders
and their interactions in response to new institutions. Based on the case studies, I find that, in the
absence of a complete regulatory system of brownfields, the introduction of the Land
Consolidation and Reserve Center is conducive to more effective and efficient management of
land contamination in terms of risk management, funding, and liability.
Compared with private land developers, the Land Center has a stronger moral obligation
to not releasing unsafe land to the market. It respects advice from the environmental bureau and
works closely with its environmental and planning counterparts. As to cleanup liability, for now,
it is not plausible to follow the "polluters pay" principle, i.e., have enterprises take the full
pollution responsibility. Neither should the government be counted for all of the emerging
environmental problems, nor should the private sector. By capturing the land value gains, the
Land Center can readily mobilize funding among needed projects.
Additionally, the solution to avoid future land contamination problems is not just holding
either the government or the private sector accountable, but also making the decision-making
process more transparent to empower civil society. It is true that environmental concerns of the
public are reflected through visible conflicts and media reports. Due to the latent characteristic
of brownfields, the involvement of the public in brownfield issues is quite minimal. From the
three cases, we find various degrees of citizen participation in land-recycling projects. The
influential level of social actors depends on their accessibility to the site planning information.
Market-based planning mechanisms such as auctions, open design competitions, and public
comments can compromise the insufficient brownfield management system.
7.4 Research Contribution
Although problems with polluted land have been widely studied in developed countries, this field
has remained virtually untouched in China until recently. There is an increasing environmental
awareness within Chinese society, and land contamination is gradually being discussed in public.
For example, in March 2006, the Chinese State Environmental Protection Administration hosted
a workshop on industrial-site environmental assessment. Land contamination is not only an
environmental issue, but also an economic and planning one, which involves different
governmental agencies, including environmental bureaus, urban planning departments, and land
bureaus. Researchers and policymakers actively discuss environmental standards, cleanup
techniques, and incentive instruments, yet few focus on probing into the underlying reasons that
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local governmental agencies fail to work cooperatively and actively on environmental issues.
Even fewer approach land contamination from a planning perspective. My research will fill this
gap by identifying potential problems that may derail the state environmental efforts and the way
institutional changes may achieve a sustainable land-recycling process in China.
Although China's public land ownership and planning power are distinct from those of
many other countries, the recommendations I present in this research offer a set of perspectives
that policymakers of other countries may consider for their planning and environmental policies.
I expect my findings to be especially relevant not only to the industrial restructuring occurring in
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least once, some two or more times. Each interview is coded based on the date of the interview with first
four digits indicating the year, the following two digits indicating the month, and the last two indicating
the order of the interview cited in the text. Please contact author for more information about interviews.
Interview
Interview 20070101. January 2007. Miao, Beijing Industrial Bureau.
Interview 20060802. August 2005. Yang, Beijing Chemical Industry Group Corporation.
Interview 20070103. January 2007. Li, Beijing Municipal Bureau of Land and Resources.
Interview 20090604. June 2009. Jiang, Beijing Municipal Research Institute of Environmental Protection.
Interview 20090605. June 2009. Li, Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau.
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Interview 20051207. December 2005. Chi, China Development Bank.
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Interview 20060109. January 2006. Liu, Centre of Real Estate, Tsinghua University.
Interview 20060610. June 2006. Zhu, Beijing Coke Plant.
Interview 20070111. January 2007. Chen, Beijing Municipal Urban Planning Commission.
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